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Abstract 
This research makes an original contribution to the literature on the relationship 
between the Conservative Party and trade union movement between 1974 and 1984. 
Through primary source material I analyse how an emergent New Right within the 
Conservative Party planned, prepared and enacted industrial conflict with the 
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) in 1984. This conflict was a result of 
ideological change in the Conservative Party, which saw internal cabinet opposition 
marginalised through a challenge to One Nation “wets” within the Cabinet. I argue 
that the government’s industrial policy counters statecraft interpretations of the 
Conservative Party at this time. This is demonstrated in the following key areas: the 
radicalism of the party’s industrial policy; the planning and preparation for industrial 
conflict; the creation of a recently unclassified “Hit List” of UK pit closures, one 
that was denied to full Cabinet scrutiny in 1984; and the use of direct government 
interference with the policing of “The Battle of Orgreave” and its aftermath. These 
actions fit the remit of The Ridley Report of 1977, a template for ideologically driven 
reform of which the desire to 'fragment’ nationalised industries was a precondition 
for denationalisation. I argue that a group within the Conservative Party pushed 
through these changes to construct a new relationship between labour, industry and 
government.  
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Literature Review  
Introduction  
This thesis will analyse the development of a New Right within the Conservative 
Party between the electoral defeat of Edward Heath in 1974 and the Miners’ Strike 
of 1984. My research will demonstrate an ideologically driven agenda, one con-
structed by a New Right within the Conservative Party, that was to bypass the prag-
matism of statecraft theory and engage with long term planning for industrial con-
frontation in 1984. Therefore, the literature to be reviewed will encompass both sec-
ondary sources, detailing a theoretical and conceptual development of New Right 
thought, primary source material that offers evidence of an implementation of ideo-
logically driven political agenda and the subsequent interpretation and analysis of 
internal Conservative Party policy towards industrial conflict of 1984. It is with this 
context in mind, that I will review literature in the following areas; 
- The relationship between the Conservative Party and trade unions in the post-
war period.  
 
- The rise of a New Right in the Conservative Party.  
 
- The debate between pragmatism and ideological approaches.  
 
- The 1984 Miners’ Strike. 
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The sequence of this literature review reflects the proposed construction of the thesis. 
Firstly an examination of the post-war relationship between organised labour and the 
Conservative Party; secondly, the theoretical development of a New Right that was 
to challenge the accepted role of corporatism, trade union and the role of the state; 
thirdly, analysis of internal Conservative Party Cabinet divisions and the rejection 
of One Nation “wets”, government development of, and preparation for industrial 
confrontation with the National Union of Mineworkers and lastly the 1984 Miners’ 
Strike and its political aftermath. 
The period in question evidences change in a political and industrial dynamic in the 
UK; one that has clear economic and social significance in contemporary Britain. 
The thesis examines this political historical period between 1974 and 1984 viewed 
through the eyes of two contrasting theoretical analyses of Thatcherism and the de-
velopment of a New Right – was the construct of this New Right and the eventual 
industrial conflict with the NUM, developed and delivered through an ideological 
agenda or an implementation of pragmatic statecraft? Therefore, with this question 
in mind, this literature review will focus on these two interpretations and offer a 
summary of the secondary literature in detail. Primary source material will be used 
in the form of CAB1 and PREM2 notes, and archive material in the form of letters 
                                                          
1 Cabinet Minutes and Papers (CAB)  
2 Prime Minister’s Office Files (PREM) 
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and documentation from The National Archives and The Margaret Thatcher Foun-
dation.  
Academic Relevance of Research 
The first contribution this thesis makes is to analyse a development of New Right 
thought regarding the British trade union movement and post-war corporatism. This 
research aims to add to the existing literature on the 1984 Miners’ Strike through 
demonstrating, through academic analysis, the development of, and implementation 
of an ideological template within a New Right of the Conservative Party to counter 
the trade union movement; ultimately leading to industrial conflict with the National 
Union of Mineworkers in 1984. Existing works which covers this period demon-
strate a socio-political examination of the subject, that is, accounts of the 1984 Min-
ers’ Strike demonstrated as an historical event.  
This thesis offers a new dynamic within this genre. Through new primary source 
material, this thesis adds to this historical narrative – it proves an existence of a New 
Right strategy that was to plan theoretically and physically for an industrial conflict 
with the National Union of Mineworkers and a wholesale closure of the UK mining 
industry. I provide new evidence that counters official government policy that there 
was not a “Hit List” or closure scheme of productive UK coke plants. Denied con-
sistently by government and National Coal Board officials, prior to and during the 
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1984 strike, this thesis conclusively reveals the existence of a UK wide “Hit List” of 
coal mine closures.  
The second contribution is the demonstration of change within the Conservative 
Party. I offer an academic analysis of the Conservative Party’s change of internal 
political dynamic, from a form a conciliatory politics to one of confrontation; from 
one of dialogue and reform to conflict. I evidence the development of a New Right 
within the Conservative Party and contextualise this construct, through its relation-
ship with organised labour, concluding with the 1984 Miners’ Strike. This will be 
achieved through an initial analysis of the theoretical change within the Conservative 
Party, and secondly on an evidence-based demonstration, by new primary source 
material, of preparation and enactment of industrial confrontation with organised 
labour.  
Thirdly, the unique contribution of this thesis to political studies will be the demon-
stration and development of primary source material, that sheds new light on the 
relationship between the Conservative Party post-1974 and the National Union of 
Mineworkers. I will offer new knowledge, gained primarily from documentation re-
leased under the thirty-year rule in 2014, that demonstrates clearly the construction 
of an ideological agenda to target the trade union movement and engage in a pre-
pared and planned confrontation. My analysis, scrutiny and presentation of new 
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CAB and PREM documentation will reveal an organised and dedicated approach to 
implementation of economic ideology, through the political guise of a construct of a 
New Right within the Conservative Party. The primary documentation, augmented 
and contextualised by secondary source material, will reveal the lengths to which 
this New Right would engage in order to formulate a planned timetable for trade 
union confrontation. It will also reveal a reinterpretation of a “New Conservatism”, 
the theoretical development of economic conservative template through the eco-
nomic inspiration, notably that of Enoch Powell, Patrick Minford, Keith Joseph, Mil-
ton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek. This reconstruction of Conservative thought and 
direction, would ultimately, I demonstrate, lead to an expulsion of the threat of the 
“wets” from cabinet, the preparation for industrial conflict and the defeat of the 
NUM in 1984, allowing for neoliberal economic policy to be implemented and to 
flourish.  
This analytical framework and timeline add to the canon of existing secondary work 
on the subject. It offers new primary evidence that demonstrates the existence of a 
“Hit List”, and whose existence was denied to Arthur Scargill in 1984. Successive 
governments post-1984 have denied the existence of a closure list of more than the 
recognised number of 21; this thesis adds to the political debate and academic polit-
ical literature, in that I have demonstrated categorically the existence of the “Hit 
List” using primary evidence, justifying Arthur Scargill’s claims, revealing the lack 
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of clarity offered to Parliament and to Neil Kinnock as Leader of the Her Majesty’s 
Opposition. The existence of a “Hit List” of pits that this thesis demonstrates has 
both academic and political importance; it offers evidence to refute the allegations 
of industrial conspiracy, it legitimatises Arthur Scargill’s demands for a national 
ballot on the condition of government clarity and scrutiny, and it presents a new 
dimension to the dispute that the claims of the NUM were justified and that the strike 
was not illegal as a legitimate ballot could not have taken place.  
Fourthly, I have revealed the direct government deployment of police resources to 
Orgreave. Through primary source material, this thesis demonstrates government 
interference with the policing and aftermath of what became known as “The Battle 
of Orgreave”. Again, I offer an academic analysis of the industrial dispute through 
the revelation of primary sources, which counter official government policy. There 
has been literature on both the “Hit List” and direct government influence on polic-
ing of the strike, but this research offers new analysis, a new interpretation through 
primary evidence, of an historical industrial event within an academic genre.  
This thesis, therefore, adds to political studies of post-war industrial relations and 
the rise of New Right politics. It legitimises claims and adds genuine evidence to 
previous conjecture and does not offer neutrality in its conclusion. It also demon-
strates conclusively direct government interference in the build-up of coke and coal 
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stocks, and that Arthur Scargill’s assertions of a “Hit List” of pit closures was indeed 
correct. It shows that there was a template for industrial deconstruction and there 
was unofficial government interference with localised policing matters in Yorkshire.  
 
Contemporary Relevance of Research  
My research offers a new perspective to contemporary UK politics. The legacy of 
the 1984 conflict can be witnessed in the politics of 2018 and the legacy of industrial 
decline of a nation that has been divided between post-industrial towns and metro-
politan urban conurbations. The miners’ strike is a symbol of a class and an industrial 
generation that does not fit easily within the globalised, service economy that has 
been generated through neoliberalism. Its legacy is one of decay of mining villages, 
of industrial towns, of marginalisation of working classes who feel isolation and a 
sense of loss, mirrored through poverty and social inequality.  
These issues are reflected through Brexit. Areas of the country that once felt a sense 
of identity and belonging, as identified in this thesis in its analysis of pit villages and 
their particular socio-economic dynamic, were, in vast numbers seen to vote leave 
in the 2016 referendum on membership of the European Union. Small town and vil-
lage populations throughout the United Kingdom, were to demonstrate reflect a form 
of politics that was to seek answers through populism and extremes, that were simply 
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not viable alternatives when full time work and social cohesion were prominent. The 
European Union, a neoliberal institution and advocate of free market capitalism, and 
seen as an assault on UK nationalised industry and sovereignty, was rejected through 
Brexit.3 I argue, the social cohesion, destroyed through de-industrialisation and re-
flected through the rise of immigration and European integration, has been replaced 
by a nostalgia for a time of certainty and consistency; mining villages and towns 
offered a sense of purpose and belonging, and its disappearance constructed a void 
that was to fuel drug addiction, poverty and isolation. Brexit can be seen as a clarion 
call, a cry from these communities that once stood up and fought the tide of neolib-
eral economic policy. 
Post-industrial mining communities were to feel the full force of global markets. 
Deindustrialisation – the policy of Margaret Thatcher and Keith Joseph – was aug-
mented and hastened through the development of the European Union free market, 
and as Arthur Scargill argued, “the free movement of labour”. Brexit, argues Arthur 
Scargill, would allow for the ability, “to re-open the cotton mills, re-open the steel 
plants and invest in new mining facilities with carbon capture – creating jobs and 
protecting the environment.”4 Within the EU, Scargill argues, “We were not allowed 
to subsidise pits under EU rules unless we were closing them – that’s the kind of 
                                                          
3 Scargill, A, Speech to the SLP Congress, 28th October 2017 
4 Scargill, A, Speech to the SLP Congress, 28th October 2017 
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policies that were being dictated to us by the European Union”. 5 The binary forces 
of Thatcherite monetary policy and European Union free market liberalism, were the 
perfect storm to construct a form of politics, as seen in 2018, that would fuel the 
regression from Europe and the rise of populism.  
The rejection of Atlee’s “humane” post-war politics was to be absolute. The priori-
tising of the pursuit of economic anti-inflationary measures, to the detriment of 
Keynesian aggregate demand and prioritising of full employment, would emphasise 
a form of politics that rejected the ideals of collective responsibility. Work patterns 
and community would change by and through the forces of neoliberalism; neoliberal 
forces; the sectors of industry, technology and commerce would be removed from 
the traditional working community, to emphasise a new construct in the UK – that 
of a service industry which was deindustrialised and globalised, flexible and at one 
with the ebb and flow of the free market. A society that would be transient and accept 
market-driven forces and an establishment that would be constructed through the 
requirements of neoliberalism. A New Right within the Conservative Party would 
acknowledge through the influence of Thatcher, Keith Joseph, Nigel Lawson and 
Geoffrey Howe, these new social and economic opportunities that would arise from 
deregulation, market liberalism and ultimately trade union reform. To establish this, 
                                                          
5 Ibid.  
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and to erode the accepted Keynesian post-war consensus, it would be acknowledged, 
that there could be no more compromise. No longer could there be a corporate con-
sensual tone to industrial partnership; there could be no more conciliation, as the 
global new order of technology, money transfer, low regulation and free trade could 
not be delayed due to the intangibles of human emotion. If an agenda had to be real-
ised, if an economic and social revolution had to take place, there was a legitimate 
need for conflict. 
And the political conflict was not isolated to the mining and industrial community. 
Conservatism and the Conservative Party, I demonstrate, were to implode in a bitter 
internal war of ideology. Again, the contemporary struggles, witnessed from John 
Major’s through to David Cameron’s leadership, and the division within the party 
on European integration, the role of the state and the prevalence of an economic 
model that was to prioritise a neoliberal and latterly austerity agenda, can arguably 
be traced to the preparation for, and enactment of the 1984 conflict. The divisions 
within the Cabinet, and the rejection of cabinet responsibility, once seen as such a 
key ingredient of governance by Harold Macmillan, was to be replaced with divi-
sion.  
Conservatism as a political concept would shift – and this shift is prevalent I argue 
in the Cabinet of 2018 –the construct of a fault-line of dogmatism and One Nation 
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politics within conservatism. An engagement with ideology, of a dogma prepared to 
accept industrial conflict in 1984, mirrors an intransigence within the Conservative 
Party of today and does not fit well within the traditions of conservatism and One 
Nation Conservatives. The Cabinet post-1979 was one of Establishment; of men who 
were not prepared to renege on the status quo and who were not adaptable to the 
challenges posed by globalised neoliberalism. Through secondary, and more signif-
icantly primary source material, I present and examine internal cabinet meetings, 
reports and agendas that challenge the nature of what conservatism is and the polit-
ical actor – the “wets” that represented the traditional ideology of conservatism. The 
nature of the Conservative Party was to change indelibly, and this research presents 
literature which evidences the initial construct of this change. And it is from this 
point, from the advent of a New Right, post-1974, that has seen a permanent change 
within the Conservative Party. Consistent electoral failure, post-Thatcher, saw the 
rebirth of the Conservative Party as a form of social and neoliberal political entity, 
one that was at ease with the mantra of personal and socio-economic freedoms. And 
one that was to ensure flexibility of the work force, the changing relationship be-
tween government, the state and the market, and align itself, not with the traditions 
of One Nation Politics, but those of neoliberalism – of the politics of Britain in 2018. 
The Conservative Party, from the point that I identify in this research, has been fully 
reconfigured to reject Keynesian macroeconomics, has prioritised the market over 
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the role of the state, has internalised market forces within vital public services; and 
as a political organisation, the contemporary Conservative Party has rejected One 
Nation politics. The theoretical, philosophical and eventually ideological thought 
processes, that lead to this point, are demonstrated through the literature of this re-
search. 
Therefore, there is a direct link to Brexit. I argue this thesis engages with, through 
the post-industrial malaise of community, the rise of populism and ultimately the 
issues of Brexit within both the Conservative Party and the post-industrial commu-
nity. As demonstrated in this work, Thatcher’s form of creative destruction heralded 
the ability for the entrepreneur as an individual to succeed through the deconstruc-
tion of the permanent; that is the permanency of the collective ideals of the trade 
union and the permanency and solidity of the mining community. Literature in this 
work highlights the distinctive nature of the working-class coal mining community, 
reflected in the industrial communities throughout the country. Though certainly in-
sular and intransient, these communities were constructs from an industrial age – 
mining and pit villages, steel villages and towns; reliant on industry, and to a large 
extent self-reliant for social provision, these unique communities were vulnerable to 
the vagaries of global change, economic reform and deindustrialisation. Documen-
tation and evidence in this research demonstrate the targeting of these communities 
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by Government – the targeting of the men and women, of the families of these com-
munities whose insularity, community and political allegiances made them an obvi-
ous nemesis to a New Right seeking momentum in this time of economic and polit-
ical change. And the consequences of this change, the deindustrialisation and polit-
ical neglect that has been observed through neoliberal economics is relevant to the 
changes occurring in 2018. It is within these ex-mining and ex-industrial communi-
ties, challenged by government, and evidenced through this research, which were 
fragmented and ultimately depoliticised, and pulled into levels of poverty, drug de-
pendency, unemployment, academic underachievement and social discontent that 
would ultimately lead to disenchantment and Brexit. There is a linear connection 
between 1984 and 2016; the development of New Right thinking, I evidence from 
1974 onwards, that have had lasting consequences on working class communities in 
Britain.  
Therefore, this research adds to the existing literature on the subject matter. Through 
the presentation of new primary source material and augmented by secondary read-
ing, my research adds to the academic analysis and understanding of the develop-
ment of a New Right within the Conservative Party – and evidences the development 
of a theoretical and ideological political force that was to target and redesign both 
the Conservative Party, trade unionism corporatism and industrial Britain, notably 
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the mining industry and the NUM. I have presented evidence that enhances, chal-
lenges and changes some existing theories regarding the New Right’s construction 
and its preparation and conduct of the 1984 miners’ strike, primarily through the 
revelation of an industrial “Hit List” that adds legitimacy to Arthur Scargill’s polit-
ical concerns at the time of the strike. There has been writing that engages with the 
proposal of a “Hit List” as argued by Scargill, but there has been no concrete evi-
dence thus far. My research therefore adds to existing theories on the 1984 Miners’ 
Strike and the redesign of the Conservative Party’s industrial strategy and ultimately 
its integrity regarding industrial policy from 1974 to 1984.  
 
Ideology and Statecraft  
The academic relevance of my research and its demonstration through primary 
source material is contextualised in two areas – statecraft and ideology. The primary 
findings and secondary reading are examined through the debate of Thatcherism, 
that the New Right and industrial strategy, was either a reflection of statecraft – 
sound political decision making and party management, that enabled government to 
reach for a higher ground of politics, or the construct of a grander ideological pro-
gramme, a hegemonic power grab that would bypass the practicalities of statecraft 
in an attempt to redesign a neoliberal economic agenda. 
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I argue and demonstrate in this research, that the period of Conservative Party inter-
nal change and challenge to the trade union movement between 1974 and 1984 was 
driven through ideology. This thesis therefore adds to the academic understanding 
of ideological change within political organisations; through secondary reading, I 
contextualise the theoretical implementation of economic and neoliberal ideology; 
through primary resources I demonstrate the practical implementation of this ideo-
logical agenda. I demonstrate that the wholescale rejection of conciliatory processes 
within the Conservative Party and between the government, National Coal Board, 
police and striking miners, ultimately does not and cannot reflect statecraft theory; 
it evidences a form of ideology that can be demonstrated visually through historical 
sources in both CAB and PREM note forms, letters, diary entries, speeches and 
memo form. I demonstrate an ideology that was to reject a political consensus, reject 
corporate power sharing and was to fulfil a long-term, strategic objective; the de-
industrialisation of Britain to allow for the implementation of neoliberal economic 
reform.  
I demonstrate through primary sources a series of theoretical and ultimately practical 
demonstrations of ideology that was to emerge as New Right thought within the 
Conservative Party. It would be an ideology, this research reveals, that was based 
around the implementation of an economic dogma, that would bypass the traditions 
of Cabinet responsibility, One Nation conservatism and a corporate power sharing 
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agenda; it was an ideology that was to place economic control, the control of infla-
tion and monetarism, over the pursuit of full employment: the advent of neoliberal-
ism.  
This I argue is evidenced through this research. The 1984 conflict with the NUM,  
I demonstrate, was not one that was to reflect the long-term decision making and 
practical implementation of the policy of statecraft theory. The evidence I have pro-
duced points to and analyses an ideological agenda within the Conservative Party as 
a political organisation and a grander hegemonic project that would ultimately lead 
to the advent of a neoliberal agenda that is prevalent today in the UK.  
 
The Conservative Party  
This research dovetails two events. Edward Heath asked the nation in 1974 “Who 
Governs?” and the answer was to be defeat at the hands of Harold Wilson and the 
trade union movement; in 1984 the imagery was one of a Conservative Party who 
was resoundingly in charge, crushing the trade union movement at Orgreave. This 
research adds to the literature of the Conservative Party during this period of transi-
tion, offering analysis and proposing answers, through primary sources, as to why 
the party would reinterpret its identity and embrace dogma. I evidence this change 
through an embrace of economic and cultural ideology; the rejection of One Nation 
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Conservatism’s innate distrust of radicalism, of change and revolution, to formulate 
an economic and moral form of politics through to an interpretation of Thatcherism, 
which embraced moral endeavour, economic counter inflationary measures, mone-
tary control, within a strong state mechanism.  
The literature, both secondary and primary, focusses on this metamorphism of polit-
ical identity and looks at a Conservative Party that was prepared to question the true 
meaning of what conservatism actually is; a challenge from political economists, of 
Minford, Joseph, Friedman and importantly Hayek, as to what conservatism actually 
entails; this research analyses the withdrawing of conservatism from the political 
engagement with the economic and indeed the moral agendas, of which the malaise 
of the 1970’s represented – a moral, economic and national decline, emphasised by 
the inability of the Conservative Party to effectively govern within a corporate 
agenda. Therefore, this research adds to existing literature in identifying a socio-
political period of Conservative Party history of relevance to modern Britain. The 
rejection of One Nation conservatism, the rejection of Macmillan’s Middle Way al-
ternative to dogma, a rejection of the moderates within the Cabinet and an embrace 
of economic ideology, one that would ultimately lead to long-term neoliberal he-
gemony.  
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Trade Unions 
This research reveals a dedicated political template to counter the influence of the 
trade union movement post-1974. I demonstrate, through both secondary and pri-
mary reading, the theoretical change of a mindset and a readjustment of govern-
ment’s position in relation to the trade union movement from a conciliatory, mutu-
ality of existence of government and trade union, to one of hostility, of conflict and 
of enmity. The relevance of this research is the nature of the premeditated conflict 
with the trade union movement; the trade union movement was to be highlighted as 
a stumbling block to neoliberal reform of the labour market, denationalisation and 
privatisation of public utilities. It was a collective not viewed as a progressive, lib-
erated and reforming entity, but one that was regressive and antiquated. The post-
war acceptance, I reveal in primary and secondary literature, of trade unionism as an 
essential arm of government was to be rejected out of hand; trade unions were 
reimagined as the hindrance regarding economic development and not the solution. 
This, as this research analyses and demonstrates, was a predetermined and manufac-
tured construct. The trade union movement was not only to be targeted physically at 
Orgreave, but theoretically and psychologically, and reconstructing the template for 
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a post-Keynesian neoliberal agenda, that is prevalent today. Therefore, it is devel-
oped and evidenced through this research, that the defeat of the trade union move-
ment, its targeting by a New Right of the Conservative Party, and its eventual defeat, 
as highlighted by the 1984 Miners’ Strike, was a long-term strategy. A policy that 
did not adhere to One Nation conservatism but mirrored the needs of those who saw 
the market place, and not the collective, as the means to end Britain’s economic and 
moral decline. Therefore, I argue through this research, and evidence through pri-
mary and secondary sources, that the defeat of the NUM and Arthur Scargill was a 
prelude to the effective implementation of neoliberalism through Thatcherism; the 
1984 conflict was a door leading from a collective world to one of denationalisation, 
deindustrialisation and market liberalisation – the advent of neoliberalism. There-
fore, this research adds to existing contemporary political literature.  
 
Literature Review.  
 
This research analyses a changing dynamic and relationship between two represen-
tational organisations – the Conservative Party and the trade union movement. The 
period in question from 1974 to 1984 demonstrates a post-war period where a con-
ciliatory relationship began to change and to morph into something more hostile and 
less open to negotiation and dialogue, with the eventual consequence of the “Winter 
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of Discontent” and ultimately the conflict with the NUM in 1984. Yet, the post-war 
period did see times when the Conservative Party viewed trade unionism in a posi-
tive light. The post-war relationship between trade unions and government reflected, 
as Kavanagh and Morris argue, in their work Consensus Politics from Atlee to 
Thatcher 6 a period of conciliation. The Labour Government of 1945- 51 having laid 
the foundations of the welfare state, constructed a set of political and social princi-
ples that were to be broadly agreed upon. As well as a commitment to a welfare state, 
active government and policy to address inequality and poverty, there was broadly a 
commitment to full employment and an acknowledged conciliatory approach be-
tween government and the trade union movement.  
Paul Addison argues in The Road to 1945 7 that a “massive new ground had arisen 
in politics” to the commitment to “principles of social and economic reconstruction” 
of which all parties were agreed on an acceptance of “pragmatic reform in a mixed 
economy”. 8 Addison’s explanation of “pragmatic” decision making reflects a post-
war political environment, that though still divided regarding the role of nationalisa-
tion, was striving to formulate policy, forged through war, that engaged in the polit-
ical and not the ideological reasoning behind post-war social and economic recon-
struction. The Conservative Party would accept this “post-war settlement”, none 
                                                          
6 D. Kavanagh & P. Morris, Consensus Politics from Atlee to Thatcher (Wiley – Blackwell, 1989).  
7 P. Addison, The Road to 1945 British Politics and the Second World War (Random House Books) 
8 P. Addison, The Road to 1945 British Politics and the Second World War (Random House Books), Intro.  
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more so that R.A. Butler who would oversee the development of a “New Conserva-
tism” – one he saw as “humanised capitalism”.  
Butler’s conservatism argues Richard Austen, in The Art of the Possible: The mem-
oirs of Lord Butler was one that “made Keynesian economics official; public inter-
vention in the economy became not a matter of ideology but practical judgement”.9 
W.H. Greenleaf describes in The British Political tradition: The Ideological Herit-
age 10 how Butler “urged the party” to adopt greater redistributive taxation to reduce 
inequality and poverty. This acknowledgement of “humanised capitalism” reflected 
a recognition of the role played by the state in capitalism, in that it “acted as a trustee 
for the interests of the community and a balancing force between different inter-
ests”.11 The accepted economic wisdom was that of Keynesianism – state monitoring 
of the market place, and a prioritising of full employment which meant that capital-
ism was not simply an area of “industrial go as you please”. Butler argues that the 
Conservative Party would place an “assurance that, in the interest of efficiency, full 
employment and social security, modern conservatism would maintain strong and 
central guidance over the operation of the economy”. 12 In other words, a Conserva-
tive Party that would be prepared to smooth the rough edges of capitalism and the 
                                                          
9 A. Richard, The Art of the Possible: The memoirs of Lord Butler (Hamish Hamilton, 1971).  
10 W.H. Greenleaf, The British Political Tradition: The Ideological Heritage (Routledge, 2003), p. 258 
11 Ibid, p.258 
12 Ibid, p.259 
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market place and would acknowledge the need for social equality and harmony, 
whilst propagating individual opportunity and responsibility. 
 In The New Conservatism, Anthony Eden argued that, “we are not a party of unbri-
dled capitalism and never have been. Although we believe in personal responsibility 
and personal initiative in business, we are not the political children of the “lasissez-
faire” school. We opposed them decade after decade”.13 Craig Phelan summarises in 
Trade Unionism Since 1945 that during this period of economic and social consen-
sus, the “Conservative Party also adopted a more tolerant attitude to the trade union 
movement. R.A. Butler chaired the party’s Industrial Committee in 1947 and pro-
duced the Industrial Charter which offered a “Workers’ Charter”.14 The relationship 
between government and trade union was more “tolerant and moderate” reflecting 
the overall Conservative policy of “One Nation Tories”. Chris Wrigley in British 
Trade Unions 1945 – 1995 15 cites the development of a new post-war direction for 
conservatism and trade unions; a series of conservative charters and “broad princi-
ples for shaping the post-war world” 16 were developed as early as 1945. These char-
ters were designed to win working class votes and align government and maintain 
                                                          
13 W.H. Greenleaf, The British Political Tradition: The Ideological Heritage (Routledge, 2003), p. 260 
14 C. Phelan, Trade Unionism Since 1945 (Peter Lang, Oxford), p. 202 
15 C. Wrigley, British trade Unions 1945 – 1995 (Manchester University Press, 1997).  
16 Ibid, p.5 
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the priority of full employment – “a very different approach different approach to 
trade unionism than that of the Conservative policies of the 1980’s”.17  
And yet, the Conservative Party and conservatism was to change. A “New Conserv-
atism” in the post-war period did not reflect the “New Conservatism” of Nigel Law-
son and Keith Joseph. These were different politicians with different priorities; from 
the conservatism of Macmillan, Eden, Butler, to a New Right emerging within the 
party, they all reflected an interpretation of conservatism that would have to be chal-
lenged. Indeed, the whole concept of a political consensus became to be a myth; in 
fact, consensus, was simply an opportunity for the Conservative Party to enhance 
electoral success, and was in reality “misleading, uncritical and glosses over both 
internal party debates and crucial points of conflict with Labour”. 18  
Harriet Jones in A Bloodless Counter Revolution argues that the post-war acceptance 
of consensus politics was merely a reflection of an existing “Disraelian condition of 
concern for “the condition of the people”.19 The orthodoxy of the Conservative Party 
during the post-war period to a form of conciliatory politics, of a politics that ac-
cepted full employment and the position of the trade union movement, was one that 
“deliberately exaggerates the extent of policy consensus after the war”. Consensus 
                                                          
17 Ibid. 
18 H. Jones and M. Kandiah, The Myth of Consensus: New Views on British History 1945 – 1964 (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1996), p.3 
19Ibid.  
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and a cordiality suited, argues Jones, a New Right, who would use the ambiguity of 
consensus to “distance Thatcherism from what it presented as a weak and flabby 
consensual conservatism”. There was a shift in an acceptance of consensus politics, 
and out of the tacit agreement between government and trade unions, grew a “rigor-
ous debate” that was to lead again to new interpretation of what conservatism was 
and what it stood for – indeed, to yet another “New Conservatism” which in reality 
was a counter to the “Butler dominated Conservative Research Group” and an “ef-
fective anti-socialist front”.20 The reality of consensus politics and a positive trade 
union relationship was in reality an illusion – a construct. 
Ben Pimlott views Conservative Party acceptance of consensus politics as nothing 
more than “a shamelessly sentimental yearning” that was wrapped in a non-existent 
nostalgia. In The Myth of Consensus,21 Pimlott argues that the role of consensus was 
an artificial construct, an historical narrative that did not exist, but acted as a con-
venient catalyst in the critique of Thatcherism. The warm glow of consensus cloaked 
the reality of industrial, economic and moral decline; Pimlott argues, “the consensus 
is a mirage, an illusion that rapidly fades the nearer one gets to it”. 22  
                                                          
20 H. Jones and M. Kandiah, The Myth of Consensus: New Views on British History 1945 – 1964 (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1996), p.3 
21 B. Pimlott B, The Myth of Consensus. In: Smith L.M. (eds) The Making of Britain. The Making of Britain. 
(Palgrave,1988).  
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Therefore, interpretation and economic analysis of the importance and role played 
by trade unions in the post-war world was to change. Chris Howell in Trade Unions 
and the State: The Construction of Industrial Relations argues that “regardless of the 
reality of trade union power” there emerged a “labour question”. 23 A debate emerged 
regarding the decline of post-war Britain and “trade union responsibility for eco-
nomic failure”. Though Howell argues that this debate could be found in the pages 
of “The Economist magazine and The Times of London in the 1890’s and the 1970’s” 
there was renewed concern in the 1960s regarding the association of organised la-
bour to this question of decline. The question of “industrial relations reform” would 
therefore become a central plan of consecutive governments as Howell argues that 
“a plausible case can be made that industrial conflict and trade union resistance to 
those reform efforts brought down two governments”. 24  
Peter Dorey in British Conservatism and Trade Unionism,25 1945-1964 examines 
this shift in dynamic and Conservative Party thinking. Dorey examines the “remark-
able contrast” between Conservative policy to trade unions in the early post-war 
decades and to that after the 1970s – this transformation “begs the question of what 
                                                          
23 C. Howell, Trade Unions and the State: The Construction of Industrial Relations (Princeton University Press, 2007), 
p.3 
24 C. Howell, Trade Unions and the State: The Construction of Industrial Relations (Princeton University Press, 2007), 
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25 P. Dorey, British Conservatism and Trade Unionism, 1945-1964 (Farnham Ashgate, 2009).  
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changed?”. 26 Dorey explains the role played by the change in political actor; the 
post-war years saw a Conservative Party which was predominantly constructed of 
One Nation Tories; the leading “intellectually dominant” politicians, Harold Mac-
millan, Anthony Eden and Rab Butler, were sympathetic to the trade unions as they 
were part and parcel of their own personal background and experiences, therefore 
formulating a positive association. 27 These were politicians whose political experi-
ences had been forged through observing the poverty of the early 20th Century, the 
economic turbulence of the 1930’s and the need for post-war reconstruction in the 
1950s – they agreed that trade unionism was necessary.  
Yet, in The Conservative Party and the Trade Unions Dorey looks to the changing 
nature of the “trade union question”. Dorey observes that the trade union movement 
in the 1960s and 1970s “became particularly problematic” due to the “principles and 
precepts of conservatism itself”. Although individual political actors may have 
smoothed over trade union difficulties, there has always been an intrinsic “faith in 
capitalism” that “clearly constitutes a major reason why trade unions have always 
been problematic for the Conservative Party”.28 The Conservative Party and trade 
                                                          
26 C. Howell, Professor Chris Howell, review of British Conservatism and Trade Unionism, 1945-1964, (review no. 
854).  
27 Ibid.  
28 P. Dorey, The Conservative Party and the Trade Unions (Routledge, 2006), p.3 
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movement “conciliation” was a post-war construct – a myth with economic, com-
mercial and industrial consequences. 
Correlli Barnett’s The Audit of War: The Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great 
Nation counters this notion of positive trade union relations between state and or-
ganised labour. The post-war years were not a New Jerusalem but were riddled with 
“illusions”. The emphasis on welfare and the pre-eminence of the Beveridge Report 
destined Britain to be second-class economic and industrial citizens; coal, steel and 
shipbuilding industries were inefficient compared to international competitors; the 
“fundamental weakness lay in Britain’s human resources” – under skilled, under ed-
ucated and controlled by elites precipitated by the class structure and the closed shop. 
British industry, government and business, were under an illusion of prosperity, 
whereas the reality was that “strikes and simmering discontents” were “rife across 
the whole industrial scene”. 29 Rigid and restrictive labour practices had placed 
“trade union shackles on productivity” and government policy of “appeasement” and 
harmful “loyalty” to full employment were fundamental deficiencies in Britain’s role 
as an industrial nation.30 As Kenneth O. Morgan argues, in The People’s Peace: 
British History 1945 – 199031 that in reality, the “unions were becoming restive” as 
early as 1949 - wartime restrictions on the right to strike and pay restrictions, saw a 
                                                          
29 C. Barnett, The Verdict of Peace: Britain Between her Yesterday and the Future (Macmillan, 2001), p.200 
30 Ibid, p.441 
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trade union movement challenge its natural bedfellow the Labour Party; Aneurin 
Bevan, argues Morgan, “the darling of the left” saw the inevitability of emergency 
action by government to “prevent a socialist government being undermined at a crit-
ical moment by indiscipline and subversion”. 32  
Therefore, post-war unity between government and trade unions was transient; this 
is reflected in the authorised biography, Edward Heath, 33 by Philip Ziegler. Ziegler 
examines the contrasting relations between No. 10 and the trade union movement. 
Although Heath’s introduction of the 1971 Industrial relations Act saw some mem-
bers of the TUC critique Heath’s administration as “the most dogmatic since the 
war”34 he was to “personally establish a good relationship with most union leaders” 
and he “loved the trade unionists more than he loved the industrialists” considering 
them “by far the more important partner”. 35 Heath was both moderniser and yet a 
conciliatory figure who sought “patience and goodwill” in dialogue with union lead-
ers; this ultimately was to be “a false dawn” of a cooperative yet modernising ad-
ministration – “it was the miners who shattered the Conservative dream of wage 
restraint” and it was a trade union, the NUM, who was “immeasurably strengthened” 
by the defeat of Heath in 1974.  
                                                          
32 Ibid, p.98 
33 P. Ziegler, Edward Heath (Harper Press 2011).  
34 P. Ziegler, Edward Heath (Harper Press 2011). p. 335 
35 Ibid.  
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John Campbell argues in Edward Heath: A Biography 36 that Heath misjudged the 
mood of the trade unions, “there was no conception” of the “damage the miners 
could inflict” and the “government was fatally slow to react” as Heath’s “appeal to 
moderation cut no ice”. 37 The authority of government could “not withstand another 
miners’ strike” and the 1972 strike was to lead “directly to the second strike of Feb-
ruary 1974”. This was to end Heath’s premiership and, Campbell argues, it was 
Heath’s “unsuccessful conciliation led just as surely to losing Downing Street”. 38 
Lessons would be learned from this political humiliation.  
 
The Rise of the New Right in the Conservative Party 
 
The defeat of Edward Heath, argues Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders in Making 
Thatcher’s Britain, was to lead to “myths about the industrial and potential political 
strength of miners that sustained the victors and aggrieved the vanquished”. 39 The 
“inflation of 1974-5 could be laid at the door of the Heath government” – his “irres-
olution” to the trade union question was to ultimately to be “succeeded by Thatch-
erite determination”. 40 Therefore, the subsequent years following the defeat of  
                                                          
36 J. Campbell, Edward Heath: A Biography (Pimlico, 1993).  
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Edward Heath, was followed by “Thatcherite determination”41 to reconstruct con-
servatism from “one strand to another”. 42 Dennis Kavanagh argues in Thatcherism 
and British Politics: The End of Consensus? 43 that this would entail the construction 
of a “more resolute conservatism”. Kavanagh argues this conservatism was born 
from an existing tension existing within the Conservative Party, “the liberal and the 
collectivist” and he argues that these “strands” have existed for much of its history; 
post Heath’s “spectacular U-turns” the neo-liberal strand of the Conservative Party 
would emerge to emphasise the “importance of individual and the limited role of 
government” that “clearly derives from classic liberalism”.44 This “more resolute 
conservatism” is analysed by Richard Toye in From Consensus to “Common 
Ground”: The Rhetoric of the Post-war Settlement and its Collapse 45. Toye docu-
ments that “by the early stages of the 1970 – 74 Heath government demonstrated 
many of the rhetorical tropes associated with the Thatcherite assault on consensus”. 
46 These “rhetorical tropes” as described by Toye were the theoretical foundations 
of a “New Right” within the Conservative Party – a New Right that had found inspi-
ration from Powellism.  
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Camilla Schofield looks at the influence of Enoch Powell and post-war Powellism. 
In Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain 47 Schofield argues that 
through the challenges facing a post-war Britain, “New forms of representation and 
contestation in the media, new technologies of domestic housework, social planning 
and anxiety surrounding the future of family life, investigations into the experience 
of working-class masculinity… and cultural movements of migration” Powell was 
steadfast to the “survival of the nation”. 48 Powellism celebrates the certainties of 
organic representation and identity; the celebration, sanctity and survival of the nat-
ural fabric of England and Englishness, a “web of understood relationships which 
sustain society” – of the Church, of identity, of Englishness and the sovereignty of 
Parliament. These webs of intricate, historical, delicate and unbinding rituals would 
be challenged by socialism, corporatism and the trade union movement, “paper con-
stitutions of Western invention” that offered only “sham independence and real 
chaos”. 49 Simon Heffer describes in, Like the Roman; The Life of Enoch Powell50 
Powell’s fascination with the “Mother of Parliaments” uniqueness: she has in fact 
“neither daughters nor peers” no other institution may challenge this “unique” phe-
nomena. Through its uncodified and evolutionary development, Parliamentary sov-
ereignty was, argues Heffer, “the focus of the nation” it’s true source of legitimacy 
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48 C. Schofield, Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain (Cambridge University press, 2013), p.12 
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50 S. Heffer, The Life of Enoch Powell (Faber & Faber, 1998).  
  
43  
  
and authenticity; Powell argued that beyond Parliamentary sovereignty there was no 
political reality only “despotisms and republics”. 51 Socialism, trade unionism, cor-
poratism could not be allowed to alter the natural institutions of liberty and freedom 
for the English working classes; “the public interest” could not be represented 
through artificial interference, “socially and economically, is one and indivisible”.52 
Powell was to influence a form of conservative liberalism, a search for historic indi-
vidual freedoms, bound within a natural sovereignty. Liberalism, and economic lib-
eralism, fit this grander theoretical narrative well.  
Mark Garnett and Kevin Hickson analyse in Conservative Thinkers: The key con-
tributors to the political thought of the modern Conservative Party 53 the influence 
of the “twin ideological traditions that John Enoch Powell attempted to integrate” 
being “economic liberalism and traditional Toryism”. 54 The former represented,  
argue Garnett and Hickson, “freedom from coercion and best protected through the 
extension of the market as a mechanism through which decisions should be taken” 
and the latter emphasised “social order, the authority of the state and the defence of 
the nation”. Powell was the first intellectual Conservative to challenge the nature of 
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the post-war agreement, and the first to challenge the “paradigm of progressive con-
servatism”. He would start the germination of a New Right – of a thought process 
that would alter the fabric of what conservatism is; a clear definition of Conservative 
as an alternative to the suffrage and bondage of socialism and those who are part and 
parcel of the socialist political agenda. Economic liberalism is freedom for the indi-
vidual by “limiting the scope of government intervention and maximising the role of 
the markets”. 55 For Powell, the intricacies and delicacies of English sovereignty and 
English individual freedom were challenged through socialism, economic liberal-
ism, through capitalism offered a means of individual freedom. Therefore, through 
economics, and primarily through monetarism; economic control would allow deci-
sions “that were left to the individual”. 56 Money supply was key; the emphasis was 
therefore to prioritise the control of inflation over the pursuit of full employment – 
a rejection of Keynes. Trade unions, though not directly responsible for inflation, 
did “cause unemployment” and challenged the natural flow of the market through 
incomes policies. Trade unions “undermined economic efficiency” through reduced 
competitiveness and secondly challenged the “rule of law” through the “coercive” 
nature of the closed shop;57 “trade unions had not achieved positive outcomes”.  
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Powellism would construct a theoretical foundation for a New Right within the Con-
servative Party. In terms of implementation of this theoretical design, E.H.H. Green, 
in Thatcherism: An Historical Perspective 58argues that between 1975 and 1979 both 
Margaret Thatcher and Keith Joseph “outlined in keynote speeches many of the 
broad objectives of what came to be known as Thatcherism”.59 Green poses the ques-
tion “What do I mean when I speak of Thatcherite political economy?”60 and he 
answers by claiming, “they”, Thatcher and Joseph, “saw their main aim as being to 
“roll back the frontiers of the state”. This was to be achieved by “replacing the mixed 
economy with a private sector dominated market economy” a “reform and reduction 
of the welfare state” and challenging “institutions which hampered the operation of 
the market, trade unions” who were to “have their powers and legal privileges 
curbed”. 61 Green interprets Thatcherism as a search for the embourgeoisement of 
the working classes – a Victorian value of self-sacrifice, dedication and pursuit of 
individual excellence. It is a direct challenge to the post-war consensus, a critique 
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of, not just Atlee and socialism, but one of a failure of the Conservative Party “hav-
ing taken a wrong turning in and after 1945 as a consequence of misreading the 
1930s”. 62  
Thatcherism was to be an extension of Powellism, and it was Margaret Thatcher, 
who was to forge a New Right within the Conservative Party, but it’s true definition 
is still contestable; Ivor Crewe and Donald Searing, state that they “Address both a 
puzzle and a theory. The puzzle is posed by the emergence of Thatcherism,” an un-
conservative ideology”.63 In Ideological Change in the British Conservative Party 
Crewe and Searing, analyse the nature of the “un- Conservative” nature of Thatch-
erite New Right politics; Thatcherism is not conservatism. They document the con-
cerns of “the Conservative party at prayer”, the traditional One Nation heartlands 
and institutions – religious, social and political – that did not “particularly care for 
Thatcherism”. The party, “they say is in the grips of a heresy. The new leadership, 
they say, “worships at the shrine of Hayek” has become the “prisoner of Chicago” 
prefers conflict to practical reform and is not really Conservative at all”.64 Crewe 
and Searing look at the relationship between “Thatcherism and conservatism” and 
argue that although Lord Alport argues that “Thatcherism is not conservatism” this 
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is misleading; they argue that a “silent majority thesis” were outside the “magic cir-
cle” of established Conservative thinking. The values of Thatcherism are the “prin-
ciple interests of Whigs” those of “capitalism, free enterprise and property” – these 
are values of enterprise and wealth through the efficiency of the economy. Therefore, 
Thatcherism, it can be argued is not “un-Conservative” yet returns Conservative 
Party theoretical roots to the its pre 20th Century identity of “a firm commitment to 
statecraft and free enterprise”. 65 The nature of “progressive Toryism” argue Crewe 
and Searing reflects “paternalistic roots” that arose post-1945 and the “devastating 
defeat” to the Labour Party; and therefore, an adoption of the welfare state. The 
“Whiggish” conservatism of Thatcherism, is therefore not a new phenomenon within 
the Conservative Party, and a consistent historic in that the “heavy hand of govern-
ment distorts the marketplace and undermines economic growth”. 66 This reflects a 
contemporary interpretation of Hayek, Friedman, Joseph and Alan Walters. For One  
Nation Conservatives such as Ian Gilmour and Francis Pym who embrace a new 
form of neoliberalism, monetarist driven conservatism was an anathema; but as 
Crewe and Searing suggested, this regression to “Whiggery” reflected a form of pol-
itics that was engaged with economic and social freedom. This research will engage 
with this debate; the embracing of economic policy within the Conservative Party 
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led by Margaret Thatcher was considered a new interpretation of conservatism; a 
rejection of Macmillan and Butler, and an overt and aggressive rejection of socialism 
and consensus politics.  
For Nigel Lawson, who argues in The View from No.11 Memoirs of a Tory Radical 
there is a new form of conservatism, indeed a “New Conservatism” designed to re-
gain “the initiative from collectivism” and challenge to the “evils of socialism”.67 A 
more robust form of Conservative thought that would be prepared to tackle the “Brit-
ish economy trapped in a cycle of low growth and high inflation”.68 The “evils” of 
socialism and central planning described by Lawson had been advanced by Friedrich 
Hayek in The Road to Serfdom.69 Hayek expresses his fears for “Individualism” that 
is being challenged from both the left and the right. Individual liberty and freedom, 
argues Hayek, was “first fully developed during the Renaissance” to construct the 
foundation of Western European civilisation. Hayek looks back to the England of 
1870, that was to be the exporter of “English ideas” of liberalism and “the rule of 
freedom”. The England of the 19th Century was to lose “its intellectual leadership” 
and import the ideas formed in Germany by Hegel and Marx; liberty, liberalism, 
freedom and individualism would be shelved for socialism and collectivism; of 
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68 Ibid, p.29 
69 F. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Routledge, London). 
  
49  
  
“planning” and “organisation” as Hayek argued “socialism has displaced liberal-
ism”. 70 Hayek’s central areas of interest were not simply economic but “political 
and legal theory, as well as political economy”. A.J. Tebble, argues in F.A. Hayek: 
Major Conservative and Libertarian Thinkers 71 that we saw his “highpoint” of in-
fluence in the 1970s. Hayek’s “ideals” were to be “adopted by Margaret Thatcher” 
and his political economic philosophy would be the “source of many of the adopted 
by her as Prime Minister”. 72 Political and individual freedoms against the “tyranny” 
of socialism require economic freedom, as Milton Friedman argues in Capitalism 
and Freedom 73 and “economic arrangements are important because of their effect 
on the concentration or dispersion of power”. 74 Friedman correlates the historical 
freedom of the individual to periods in history of economic liberalism and freedom 
of the market; historically the “typical state of mankind is tyranny, servitude and 
misery” and yet Friedman argues that in the Western World the 19th and 20th centu-
ries “stand out as striking exceptions of to the general trend of historical develop-
ment”. Therefore, argues Friedman, “capitalism is a necessary condition for the po-
litical arena” – capitalism and political freedoms are intrinsically linked, “private 
enterprise” ensuring political freedoms. Friedman argues that the financial system – 
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capitalism – only fails through crisis “produced by government”. In Why Govern-
ment is the Problem 75 Friedman explains that the Great Depression was “produced 
by government” and that the issues facing the modern United States in education, 
homelessness, crime, education, welfare, housing and medical care, are due to “the 
problem is not that government is spending too little but it is spending too much” a 
“reverse invisible hand” where the “people effectively have no choice”.76  
A New Right within the Conservative Party looked to both Hayek and Friedman for 
inspiration, and it was Keith Joseph who would take up arms in “dismantling the 
corporate state between 1979 and 1981”. Morrison Halcrow in Keith Joseph: A Sin-
gle Mind 77 states that “The year 1974 was a year when political goalposts were 
visibly shifting” and when a “single Conservative deciding that he had never really 
been a Conservative might have seemed a fairly small earthquake”.78 That Conserva-
tive was Keith Joseph. Joseph’s moment of epiphany was in April 1974 when he 
converted to a form of conservatism where “his loyalties lay firmly in a new faith; 
in the free market”. This sentence encapsulates his, and indeed the New Right of the 
Conservative Party’s thought – faith and economics. The connection between a mo-
rality and a religious zealotry to embolden Britain through an economic renaissance 
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that would sustain personal freedom and liberty of the individual; theoretical politi-
cal economy that was to be made relevant and real to the masses. Halcrow describes 
how Joseph, with the “passion which matched that of a converted Marxist” pro-
claimed that, “You don’t understand, Keynes is dead, Dead”. 79 Therefore, Keith 
Joseph’s “career” argues Halcrow, has to be judged “in terms of what is called 
Thatcherism” – a political and moral force, of which Joseph, inspired by Hayek, 
Powell and Friedman, would help “define and refine it” as he “helped to defend and 
sustain it through dark days” and as a “phenomenon” rather than a “political philos-
ophy” would shape. It would incorporate a faith in sound money, a form of simple 
patriotism, a moral code that “implies working with the grain of human nature”, a 
preference for making decisions, a distrust of all groups “claiming a stake” in re-
sources that have not been earned, and a sense of anger at British people being 
cheated out of their just rewards.80 Ultimately Thatcherism, argues Halcrow was 
more akin to “winning a psychological battle in a society where governments had 
largely lost credibility” yet “the paradoxes and puzzles remain”.81  
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And these paradoxes of Thatcherism reflect a theme of this research. The challenge 
to the trade union movement, through a construct of a New Right, was to be moti-
vated through ideology or statecraft. Was Thatcherism a pragmatic, efficient, politi-
cally motivated force or an ideological construct, reaching for a level of hegemony 
and power within UK society? Daniel Wincott argues in Thatcher: Ideological or 
Pragmatic? That “Interpretations of Thatcher’s governments are conventionally di-
vided into two groups. The literature on “Thatcherism” suggests that Thatcher has 
led a new ideological offensive”, yet for Peter Riddell, “Thatcher has been a prag-
matic leader”. 82 Wincott looks to the inconsistencies of the definition of Thatcher-
ism, in that many writers “have failed adequately to define what they mean by ide-
ology or pragmatism”. 83 Wincott argues that the debate itself is too inconsistent, that 
the debate cannot and does not reflect any concrete solutions and Thatcherism is 
“ideological and pragmatic”. Wincott’s observations reveal the complexities of the 
debate regarding the true theoretical background to a New Right. Yet there are in-
terpretations that offer greater clarity. 
Stuart Hall, in Thatcherism: A New Stage84 offers a bold analysis of a “radical Right” 
that “'Thatcherism' is the global character — the hegemonic thrust — of its interven-
tion. Nothing short of a counter-hegemonic strategy of resistance is capable of 
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matching it on the terrain of struggle which it is day-by-day beginning to map out”, 
and that it presented a “radical political force, capable of setting new terms to the 
political struggle, and effectively condensing a wide range of social and political 
issues and themes under the social market philosophy and banner of the radical Right 
is a qualitatively new political event. We must take account of the radicalism of this 
intervention”. 85 Hall equates Thatcherism as nothing less than a hegemonic power 
grab, a radical force that was to challenge the political, cultural and societal forces 
as “it has a 'philosophy' as well as a programme. This hegemonic character to its 
intervention is something profoundly new, in terms of the radical breaks which it is 
prepared to make with the whole inherited baggage of assumptions and attitudes”. 
This is not politics of the pragmatist, but of the radical and the pursuit of power; a 
popular authoritarian phenomenon. Andrew Gamble argued that “Thatcher’s pro-
nounced ideological stance was unusual for a Conservative Party leader”. In Privat-
ization, Thatcherism, and the British State Gamble argues that the change in style 
and direction that Thatcherism offers is enough to pronounce a “Thatcher revolu-
tion”86 a new “redefinition of the relationship between the state and the economy”. 
Through this, Thatcherism represents an attempt to restore the “conditions of Con-
servative hegemony” to “restore the Conservative Party to electoral dominance”, the 
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revival of “market liberalism as the dominant public philosophy” and to rejuvenate 
the state to free the economy.87  
The critique of Thatcherism, as a form of ideologically driven New Right project, 
stems not just from the left, but from the centre right, One Nation element within the 
Conservative Party. Ian Gilmour was a Conservative party MP who was arguably 
“one of the most left-wing figures in British politics: a feat he has achieved by not 
moving”88 – the act of not moving, was objectively staying within the middle ground 
of politics and staying a One Nation Tory. Gilmour explains, in Whatever Happened 
to the Tories: The Conservatives since 1945 89 that “Margaret Thatcher had recently 
affirmed her intention of having a “conviction government” composed only of peo-
ple who wanted to go in the direction she wanted” – Gilmour critiqued monetarism 
as “totally divorced from reality”90 and he was to lament that the “course of the con-
servatism of the eighties and nineties had borne no relation to One Nation Toryism”. 
Jim Prior, in A Balance of Power, 91critiqued Thatcher ideology, in that it was wholly 
a “very simplistic approach” to politics, based on “a combination of her own instincts 
founded in the corner shop at Grantham, laid over by a veneer by Hayek and Fried-
man”92 and in The Politics of Consent Francis Pym wrote that though Margaret 
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Thatcher was a “political operator of considerable skill” dogmatic decision making 
and “her success in making a virtue of unpopular measures has had the side effect of 
branding anyone who disagrees with her as a spineless creature” – in essence, the 
“wets”.93  
Eric J. Evans counters this idea. In Thatcher and Thatcherism94, Evans argues that 
Thatcherism is “markedly different” from liberalism, Marxism or even conserva-
tism, as it “offers no new insights” and is “better seen as a series of non-negotiable 
precepts than a consistent body of thought”.95 Thatcherism is a continuation of the 
Conservative Party’s “preoccupation with statecraft” argues Jim Bulpitt96, and 
Sheila Letwin views Margaret Thatcher, not as an ideology, but as a political actor, 
with “individualism as the key attribute”. 97 Evans does not discount the “importance 
of Thatcherism” but suggests that the success of her administration was due to her 
possessing “political skill of a very high order”. She offered a “battered” electorate, 
not an ideological vision but a series of coherent policies of economic growth, indi-
vidual opportunity and “a new beginning based on old truths”.98 Peter Riddell argues 
in The Thatcher Government, that ultimately it is all down to the efficiency of polit-
                                                          
93 F. Pym. The Politics of Consent (Hamish Hamilton, 1984), p.15 
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ical decision making; he returns to the Labour government of 1976 and sees “sym-
pathy with the necessity for the broad change of direction in economic policy which 
began in the mid-1970s under Labour and has been sustained and extended by the 
Thatcher administration”.99 The continuation of Labour economic policy would 
simply have a been “economic suicide” and there was necessity for change. Riddell 
argues that politically, things could have been handled somewhat more sympatheti-
cally and “differently” regarding unemployment and deindustrialisation, as mone-
tary policy and monetarism became an obsessive distraction, but both political and 
economic change was required; Thatcherism was pragmatic decision making.  
 
The 1984 Miners’ Strike. 
The research concludes with the 1984 Miners’ Strike. A central premise of this re-
search is an analysis, through primary research, of the lengths that a New Right were 
prepared to take regarding conflict with the NUM in 1984. This primary research is 
to be undertaken at Kew Records Office, including PREM and CAB notes, that will 
offer new information, perspective and detail to the proposed premise including 
planning and preparation for industrial action with the NUM, the internal debates 
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and decision-making process within the Conservative Party regarding industrial con-
flict and the evidence of a predetermined, ideologically driven economic and politi-
cal agenda, aimed at dismantling trade union legitimacy and authority. Primary re-
search, in the form of internal documentation, letters, memos, correspondence and 
minutes, will demonstrate this proposed theoretical and eventual physical implemen-
tation of dogma; secondary source material will create a template for primary source 
evidence.  
In The Miners’ Strike 1984 - 5 Loss Without Limit, Adeney and Lloyd, offer a first-
hand experience of the miners’ strike, through archive and interview, and a picture 
is assembled of the damage, the “loss” to society and community that the strike 
caused, “The government’s blank cheque to the electricity generating boards; the 
huge bills for the policing; the damage to the fabric of society from the scenes wit-
nessed by the dispute; the cost to the pits; the limitless antipathy that developed be-
tween working and striking miners; above all the bitter financial and personal suf-
fering of miners and their families”.100 Huw Benyon, in Digging Deeper:  Issues in 
the Miners’ Strike,101 argues that the aftermath of the conflict demonstrates the “Role 
of the state in British society has been clearly revealed. The state apparatus, the po-
lice, the law, the judges, the Civil Service and the media have all been used against 
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the workers”102 and amongst this Benyon “argues the case for coal. It also argues the 
case for the miners”. Benyon looks to the “absence of a national ballot” – an issue 
of relevance to this research and the lack of clarity regarding pit closures – and he 
looks to the “Breaking” of the miners as political and ideological necessity.  
Francis Beckett and David Hencke, in Marching to the Fault Line: The Miners’ 
Strike and the Battle for Industrial Britain,103 take a contemporary view, from a jour-
nalistic viewpoint to “offer an historical view” that was balanced in the appraisal 
that “Neither Thatcher nor Scargill paid the price for their war. Neither has ever 
acknowledged even the smallest error”. 104 Seamus Milne, in The Enemy Within: The 
Secret War Against the Miners, looks to the “hostile propaganda and fantasy” in the 
British media and security services that it “felt necessary to paint the strike as a dis-
mal morality and its leadership as the epitome of megalomaniacal self-delusion”.105 
Both Coal Not Dole: memories of the 1984/85 Miners’ Strike by Guthrie Hutton106 
and Miners’ Strike People Versus the State107 by David Reed and Olivia Adamson, 
take an intimate, interview related format using those associated in the conflict – 
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miners, their wives and families, all expressing their emotions and thoughts on the 
strike, the violence, the tensions and hardships, and its aftermath and defeat.  
Conclusion 
The above literature reflects the construct of this thesis. The research entails an ana-
lysis of two areas in relation to the development of a New Right within the Con-
servative Party; firstly, its relationship with the traditions of conservatism and One 
Nation thought, and secondly the relationship with the UK trade union movement. I 
intend through this research, to construct a foundation of secondary analysis to con-
textualise this historical – political debate regarding the development of a new phe-
nomenon within conservatism, and secondly, the use of primary source material to 
evidence the construct of an ideological agenda to confront the National Union of 
Mineworkers. Therefore, the literature used will reflect theoretical analysis, histori-
cal investigation and primary source materials in order to contextualise the research 
findings and then to formulate and evidence the core ontological position.  
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Preparation to “provoke a battle”: New Right Conservatism, the Trade 
Unions and the Conservative Party 1974 – 1984 
 
Chapter 1 – Ideology, Statecraft and the Conservative Party  
1.0 Introduction  
It was all to do with Thatcher getting rid of trade unions…. if you can 
hammer the NUM, nobody else will stand up to you.108  
David McArthur, Fife miner. 
Between 1974 and 1984 a group within the Conservative Party, a New Right, was to 
design, plan and engage in industrial confrontation with the National Union of 
Miners (NUM). The crushing industrial dispute in 1984 epitomised by the state’s 
victory at the ‘Battle of Orgreave’ – a violent confrontation between police and 
miners at the South Yorkshire Orgreave Coking Plant – was a construct of this New 
Right, a rejection of statecraft, a rejection of One Nation conservatism and and an 
embracing of policy designed through the pursuit of economic dogma.  
This research counters Jim Bulpitt’s assertion that between 1975 and 1983 the 
Conservative Party used the “art of statecraft” to pursue an “elite operation in 
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damage control”. 109 Bulpitt argues that Thatcherism represents a political ability to 
“to understand and work with the limitations placed on elite activity”.110 I argue, that 
Bulpitt’s analysis of Margaret Thatcher’s economic and industrial response to the 
defeat of Edward Heath in 1974, which can be found “in the realm of party 
statecraft”111 is insufficient. Though compelling in that it offers political clarity and 
answers, Bulpitt’s analysis of Thatcherism through the prism of effective statecraft, 
does not provide the answers to primary evidence I demonstrate in this thesis. The 
New Right was a construct within the Conservative Party that, I argue, was not 
prepared to work within the limitations that were a legacy of Edward Heath, as there 
was a grander ideological agenda. A New Right would push beyond these limited 
boundaries of One Nation politics, and construct a form of hegemony, a neoliberal 
agenda, that has socio-political consequences to this day in Brexit and the rise of 
populism. The miners’ strike of 1984 was the fulfilment of a political agenda; the 
social breakdown in community, unemployment and the violence of the conflict, 
does not demonstrate good politics in a difficult and demanding political arena – it 
was a greater socio-political, and ultimately neoliberal agenda – as Bulpitt critiques 
“a grand purpose”. 
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This research demonstrates a New Right that would formulate a theoretical set of 
ideals, it would construct this “grand purpose”. These ideals, inspired through 
Powellism, Hayek and Friedman, and instigated through Lawson, Minford, 
Hoskyns, Howe and Joseph, were not limited through day to day politics; there was 
a bolder vision beyond existing political parameters. This New Right agenda would 
advocate monetarism, the pursuit of economic and personal freedoms, construct a 
template for deindustrialisation and ultimately engage in trade union conflict. This 
“fragmentation” of industry and trade unions, as I evidence, does not constitute 
statecraft’s governing competence or the avocation of violence against the largest 
democratically mandated trade union in Western Europe, the National Union of 
Mineworkers. The secrecy of planning and preparation for an industrial conflict, the 
scenes of intense violence at picket line, in particular at Orgreave, the deceit 
regarding an existing “Hit List” of viable coal mines that were earmarked to be 
closed yet denied to parliamentary, media, cabinet scrutiny and public scrutiny, the 
direct influence of policing matters by government and the eventual levels of 
unemployment, levels of social discontent and lack of community cohesion, drug 
addiction, levels of crime and under achievement academically in post-industrial 
mining communities, does not demonstrate Bulpitt’s “characteristics” of 
“competence in office” – it demonstrates a strategy that was designed to counter the 
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threat of the NUM, and to formulate strategy that was to finally end the legacy of the 
defeat of Heath in 1974.  
The trade union movement, most notably demonstrated through the NUM, was an 
obstacle to neoliberal economic reform; it was an obstacle to denationalisation, 
deindustrialisation, privatisation, globalisation and economic monetary reform. 
Trade unionism, through corporatism, was the stumbling block to roll back the 
frontiers of Atlee’s socialism, of Macmillan’s consensual Middle Way and Heath’s 
regression. Trade unions were a unique apparatus in a complex dynamic of corporate 
power sharing, and in order implement a cultural and economic hegemony, a 
neoliberal new order, they would have to be defeated as a viable political force. This 
research demonstrates that the consensual overtones of Heath were not to be 
replicated – there could be no dialogue or discussion with trade unions to impose 
reform; there was only one alternative – conflict. This research demonstrates this is 
no hyperbole, but a realistic pattern of behaviour undertaken by a New Right whose 
long-term vision was a nation that would aspire to a neoliberal agenda. I evidence a 
concerted plan to undermine the trade union movement in the in the UK by a New 
Right within the Conservative Party; the “Hit List” I reveal through new primary 
source documentation, demonstrates the lengths to which government would go to 
conceal a transformative industrial agenda. A list of pit closures, not disclosed for 
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over thirty years, identifies a pivotal moment in British 20th century industrial 
relations; a predetermined and planned assault on a British trade union.  
And the consequences of New Right industrial reform were immense. The defeat of 
the trade union movement would ultimately redesign corporatism and the post-war 
Keynesian legacy of demand driven macroeconomics – Keynes, arguably until post-
2008, would be marginalised, as the pursuit of full employment would be usurped 
by the conditions sought for low inflation and market liberalisation. These conditions 
and deflationary measures could not accept wage demands by trade unions, or the 
apathy of the One Nation Conservatives who accepted these demands; the priority 
was not full employment, was not corporatism, was not the continuation of industrial 
community, but neoliberal economic reform.  
The defeat of Scargill, the NUM, and the demise of the British Steel Corporation, all 
analysed in this research, demonstrate not statecraft’s sound political boundaries of 
good party management and electoral viability, but so much more. They demonstrate 
a change in hegemony, a change in a political mindset of what is vital to a society 
and a community; gone were the ideals of a humane form of politics, eschewed by 
consecutive post-war governments, on both the left and the right, and gone was an 
industrial Britain, a Britain, where, as Orwell describes, “The liberty of the 
individual is still believed in, almost as in the nineteenth century. But this has 
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nothing to do with economic liberty”.112 The liberty of the New Right counters 
Orwell’s claim; liberty is inextricably bound within the political economy; liberty 
was not to be associated with freedom of association and expression through 
collective identity, but liberty of the market place, the liberty of global forces to re-
engineer British society to that of the neoliberal; to break the post-war consensus. 
Therefore, with new primary evidence from The National Archives, I demonstrate a 
covert strategy, whose aim was not to implement coherent energy or industrial 
policy, but to prioritise industrial confrontation with the NUM, which was seen as 
the ‘enemy within’. Evidence of an industrial “Hit List” of pit closures, government 
interference of police operations at Orgreave, and the planned destruction of the UK 
mining industry, used in this research, are not consistent with a policy of statecraft; 
 the series of measures do not equate to good party-political management as they did 
not pass through collective Cabinet responsibility or Parliamentary scrutiny.  
This covert nature of the “Hit List” of pit closures demonstrates an agenda that was 
dedicated not to long-term industrial strategy but covert targeting of an industrial 
base by a New Right. The dedicated build up and importing of coke stock in 
preparation for industrial conflict and the politicisation of policing of the strike, 
notably, as revealed, at Orgreave, all reflect a lack of government transparency and 
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Cabinet scrutiny. The documentation I present for the first time academically, is 
designed not for the full scrutiny of cabinet, it is notably “secret” and bypasses 
political party and governmental protocols. The secrecy of policy reflects a 
determination to impose a solution that was to be controversial, to dare and think the 
unthinkable, to challenge a previous scared cow – the trade union movement.  
The post-war world was designed through, and by a form of collective identity and 
spirit that was legitimised by conflict; the hegemony of this period, forged through 
war, was a mindset of corporatism, trade unionism and collective ideals. These ideals 
had infused a nation, and the idea of challenging these was controversial – as 
reflected in the secrecy of documentation, the lack of transparency regarding the 
preparation for the 1984 conflict, the existence of a “Hit List” of working coal mines, 
the importation of foreign coke stock and the government influence on policing the 
miners’ strike. The word “secret” highlighted on the top of primary documentation, 
I reveal, demonstrates the lengths to which a New Right were prepared to go; to 
challenge corporatism, to challenge One Nation conservatism, to challenge the NUM 
and trade union movement, in order to construct a neoliberal agenda; an agenda, and 
an economic and social philosophy that prevails today. The year-long dispute with 
miners was planned and conducted not to gain electoral success, maintain political 
party unity or administrative credibility, but was part of a grander hegemonic 
strategy of implementation neoliberal economic policy on a national scale. The 
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dispute was designed and instigated to implement an ideologically driven agenda – 
one constructed by a New Conservatism – a New Right – whose intention was to 
impose a new economic order through industrial and trade union confrontation. This 
research shows the change of dynamic within the Conservative Party towards a 
rejection of statecraft in favour of ideologically driven trade union reform, leading 
to industrial confrontation in 1984.  
This chapter sets out the main research questions. It also provides some context  
for the in-depth analysis later, exploring tensions between different interpretations 
of Thatcherism, including statecraft and ideologically driven views. Finally, it  
provides an overview of the main research. 
 
1.1 Key research questions 
This research addresses the following key questions in relation to Conservative Party 
trade union reform post 1974: 
How and why did the Conservative Party change?  
This research reveals a process of change within the Conservative Party. I argue that 
there was to be a repositioning of the Conservative Party from 1974 to 1984, and the 
marginalising of Conservative statecraft policy, leading to imposition of 
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ideologically driven internal party change. Using primary source evidence, I 
examine:  
• The process of ideological change. To contextualise the evidence produced, 
this research examines the theoretical foundations of a New Right. I examine 
the inspiration of Enoch Powell and Friedrich Hayek, who provided the 
intellectual stimulus and legitimacy to calls for economic freedom, the 
rejection of socialism and a challenge to the trade union movement.  
• The implementation of New Right ideology. I examine the adaptation of an 
agenda inspired by the New Right and adopted amongst notable 
Conservatives; analysing the work of Nigel Lawson and Keith Joseph.  
• The targeting and political elimination of the “wets”. I argue that One 
Nation Conservative MP’s were deemed to be surplus to ideological 
requirements and removed from Cabinet positions of influence.  
 
Why did the Conservative Party prepare and plan for industrial confrontation with 
the NUM in 1984?  
The period in question is bookended by two key events – electoral defeat for the 
Conservative Party and the defeat of the National Union of Mineworkers. The 
question of “Who governs” posed by Edward Heath in February of 1974, was 
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designed to “strengthen”113 the Conservative Party’s hand against the trade union 
movement; after having “surrendered abjectly after the first battle with the 
miners”114 in 1972. The bargaining position of the NUM “had been immeasurably 
strengthened” due to the “cartel of oil producing countries”, which had demonstrated 
the UK’s dependence on coal.115 The subsequent decision of Heath to go to the 
country in 1974 was a disaster leading to humiliating defeat for the Conservatives; 
the “Government could never withstand the monopoly powers of unions”.116 Heath’s 
defeat was to feed “myths about the industrial and potential political strength of the 
miners”117 – and it is from this point that this research offers an analysis of the 
subsequent change of ideological framework. Conservative Party statecraft in 1974 
had failed – “In a statecraft context the Heath–led Conservative Party represented a 
total failure on all dimensions”.118  
To Heath, Conservative statecraft had failed due to trade union militancy. I argue 
this “failure” to sustain credibility, the necessary attributes associated with 
Conservative Party electoral efficiency, party management and electoral credibility, 
led to the rejection of Conservative statecraft. This failure was to offer opportunity 
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and momentum to an emerging new form of conservatism – a New Right. I have 
evidenced a point in post-war UK political history, from 1974 - 1984, when both 
individual political actors and ideology within the Conservative Party would 
construct a template that was to view the trade union reform as a means of reclaiming 
political and economic authority. Therefore, this research evidences this process; the 
defeat of Conservative statecraft at the hands of the trade union movement and the 
subsequent ideologically driven process of planning and instigation, of confrontation 
with the NUM in 1984.  
This research demonstrates the construction of this industrial conflict. How did a 
Conservative party legislate for the intensity of industrial confrontation? How would 
statecraft policy view damage to community and wholesale damage to a viable 
industry? I argue and evidence a process of an ideological change that would lead to 
the 1984 conflict; one of internal rejuvenation that was to take place within the 
Conservative Party to ultimately enable the defeat of “the enemy within”.119 
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Did government industrial strategy and eventual confrontation with the NUM in 
1984 demonstrate Statecraft or Ideology?  
This introduction will examine both Thatcherism as statecraft and as an ideological 
construct. Statecraft theory will be examined in the context of Jim Bulpitt’s re-
examination of Thatcherism as a means of resolving the “electoral and governing 
problems facing a party at any particular time”.120 To Bulpitt, Thatcherism was not 
an ideological adherence to Hayek or Friedman, or an implementation of a bold, 
grand strategy; it was solving problems posed by governance and the winning of 
elections.  
This research counters this position. The period in question, I demonstrate through 
primary evidence, does present an ideological template for internal party change and 
confrontation with the NUM. I argue that the statecraft associated and identified with 
Heath’s term in office was rejected, as were the actors who represented One Nation 
conservatism.  
Ideology is demonstrated through the Conservative Party’s changing dynamic with 
the trade union movement. The visceral scenes of violence between the state and 
trade union on British soil – at picket lines and at Orgreave – demonstrates this 
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changing dynamic – a rejection of conciliation and dialogue, of the maintenance of 
administrative efficiency, towards a greater emphasis on confrontation and conflict, 
to impose ideology.  
 
1.2 Methodological approach  
Using an interpretive approach this research uses existing and new primary evidence 
in relation to Conservative Party policy towards the trade union movement, allowing 
for interpretation and understanding of political decision making. Regarding evi-
dence collated in this research, there are, as argued by Bevir and Rhodes, multiple 
narratives and interpretations to be considered as the “The heritage of 'Thatcherism' 
lies in the dilemmas it helped to make”.121 This research interprets existing evidence 
and offers new primary sources, to add to the “multiplicity of stories about 'Thatch-
erism”. Therefore, to construct a critique of the Conservative Party and the trade 
union since 1974, it is necessary, as Bevir and Rhodes argue, to trace “the appropri-
ate historical connections back through time” – to examine and research the relevant 
theories and “narratives structures” that “relate people and events to one another”.122 
These “historical connections” are therefore demonstrated in this research. They are 
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demonstrated in the analysis of conservatism through both Thatcherism and Powel-
lism, using both secondary and primary sources, to demonstrate the economic and 
political reinterpretation of conservatism and the Conservative Party through ideol-
ogy. Secondly, these historical connections are set out using archival research, 
through primary source material and literature. Evidence of the introduction of ide-
ologically motivated policy is presented through primary sources; PREM (Prime 
Minister’s Office records) and CAB (Cabinet Papers) demonstrate policy, planning 
and actors, motivated to conduct a predetermined industrial policy that was to con-
ceive, plan and ultimately implement industrial conflict with the NUM in 1984.  
Of importance to this research is the presentation of new primary evidence in two 
key areas. Firstly, the recording in Cabinet Record MISC57 of the construction of a 
secret Whitehall working group established to develop the necessary response to in-
dustrial conflict with the NUM. Secondly, the revelation, through primary evidence, 
of the existence of a “Hit List” of mining collieries to be closed; Arthur Scargill had 
claimed the existence of a “secret hit list” of more than 70 working pits that were 
earmarked for closure. Both the government and National Coal Board said in 1984 
that they intended to close 20 pits. Evidence produced in this research from The 
National Archives, through Cabinet Record MISC57, reveal the plan to close 75 
mines over a three-year period; this was denied by the government and the National 
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Coal Board (NCB), and was not presented to the NUM or its membership prior to a 
proposed ballot on strike action and did not receive full Cabinet scrutiny or approval.  
 
1.3 Trade Unions and Conservatism in the post-war period 
To demonstrate successfully the change in dynamic between the Conservative Party 
and the trade union movement, there is a need to examine the historical context. This 
section offers a brief historic account of British post-war trade unionism’s 
relationship with and to the Conservative Party. 
The post-war relationship between Conservative Party and trade unions 
demonstrated a “unique set of circumstances”.123 Peter Dorey argues that 
conciliatory tendencies within the Conservative Party were to expand into 
mainstream policies. The effect of the “people’s war” of 1939-1945 and periods of 
opposition for the Conservative Party were to determine an acceptance of policy 
born out of “persuasion and education”.124 The outcome of shadow cabinet debate 
regarding trade union policy was the publication in May 1947 of The Industrial 
Charter which was to promote an objective of bringing “government, capital, and 
labour together in common partnership”125 and as Peter Dorey argues, The Industrial 
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Charter demonstrated “that the official policy of the Conservative Party was in 
favour of trade unions”. It was to acknowledge the pursuit of human relations within 
industrial policy, a rejection of the “us and them” culture of worker and management 
and that “Government policy would ensure a development of dialogue between 
employers and employees".126 
Yet by 1971 a critique of accepted trade union practice was emerging. Speaking to 
Finchley Conservatives, Margaret Thatcher was to acknowledge, “the right to join a 
trade union was fundamental” but there was a new sense of caution as she noted that 
in regarding strike action, there were “always two sides to a question… There has to 
be increased productivity as well as increased wages."127 By October 1977 
Thatcher’s considered reappraisal was to turn to outright hostility. Keith Joseph, in 
a speech entitled, Eroding Freedoms and Impoverishing Britain proclaimed, that the 
trade union movement was “preaching and practising a one-sided civil war which is 
wrecking the economy”.128 Joseph’s attack demonstrates a reinterpretation of the 
trade union movement – a journey that would reconstruct a perception of trade 
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unions as a legitimate force for good, to a “trade union problem” and ultimately a 
“visceral loathing of organised labour”.129  
This new approach shows a fundamental change in dynamic. Keith Joseph’s 
interpretation reframes a once consensual political alliance. Historically post-war 
relations between the Conservative Party and the trade union movement do not 
reflect Joseph’s view. In 1958, for example, the Conservative Home Secretary, R. 
A. Butler, envisaged a society composed of a “fully employed community”. Butler 
argued for an acceptance of the Keynesian pursuit for full employment, noting that 
“those who talked about creating pools of unemployment should be thrown into them 
and made to swim”130 – full employment would ultimately ensure a limiting of state 
intervention, thus allowing for a greater “freedom of the individual”.131 This 
definition of freedom was to be redesigned post-1979, yet under a paternalistic form 
of conservatism freedom was to be associated with a “healthy society” where 
institutions such as “trade unions, limited companies, co-operatives, literary 
societies” 132enhanced the cause of liberty.  
Albeit with obvious historical and social differences, conservatism and trade 
unionism could co-exist. Peter Dorey looks to a “post-war settlement” when the trade 
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union movement was fully associated with a Conservative Party, committed to “an 
increase in the number of Conservative trade unionists” to “counter the influence of 
the left within the union movement”.133 It was perfectly feasible for conservatism to 
engage with trade unionism, to counter a radical left and to pursue a balanced and 
pragmatic approach to collective representation. Conservative candidates were 
actively encouraged to engage and field in the trade union electoral process to ensure 
“better behaviour by management and employees alike” as “taking workers into the 
confidence of management would, it was believed, lead to fewer strikes”.134 
Therefore, trade unionism was “vital to the post-war settlement.”135 Working class 
affluence and purchasing power acted as effective driving agents of economic 
revival. Trade unions were to become a part of the establishment; John Mcllroy 
argues that by the 1970s they were to enjoy the position of “the fifth estate” with a 
mandate for “rectifying” an inequality of establishment power. They were to have 
left “Trafalgar Square a long time ago” to transfer influence and representation 
amongst the “corridors of power”.136 Under Edward Heath, regular meetings were 
held at both No. 10 and his Albany residence, with Jack Jones, leader of the 
Transport and General Workers’ Union reflecting that, “There is no doubting Ted 
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Heath’s sympathy for people and we quickly established a feeling of 
camaraderie”.137  
Yet the dynamic between the Conservative Party and trade unions was to change as 
Peter Dorey argues, from one of “conciliation to confrontation.”138 The post-war 
cordiality of “quasi-corporatism” made way for the “bargained corporatism” of the 
1970’s, leading to wage restraint and ultimately the “Winter of Discontent”.139 The 
corporate “politicisation” of the trade union movement, once seen as beneficial in 
reining in the excess of trade union militancy, the relationships that Conservative 
figures such as Walter Monckton “once boasted”140 were to be “seen as an object of 
shame” by Thatcher. 141 The positive symbolism of power sharing was now a 
“Negative rather than a positive order” – trade union, the state and management, all 
“muddling through” with compromise and stalemate. The passivity and incapacity 
of the state, in face of the renewed “economic difficulties” of the 1970’s, would be 
challenged to break the deadlock of inertia between capital, labour and the state – 
“Mrs Thatcher sought to change all this”.142  
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There was a need for government to break the impasse of who was governing the 
nation – trade unionism needed to be made accountable. Historically the trade union 
movement had received, from successive governments, “immunities” from common 
law.143 Trade union legislation had traditionally offered a basic protection against 
the vagaries of competition and the market place, and a degree of stability and 
employment rights. Patrick Minford challenges this assumption. As one of 
“Thatcher’s most trusted academic advisors”144 Minford was “illustrative” in his 
theories relating to the deregulation of the UK labour market. Minford argued that 
trade unions used “monopoly power” to drive wages beyond the market rate, 
ensuring wage costs and ultimately inflation. The agreed perception of the trade 
union as a public good was wrong; “In short, trade unions are ‘public bad’” 145 in 
that they artificially affect the redistribution of wages through society and essentially 
enforce the opposite of their modus operandi – they cause unemployment.  
Minford challenges the orthodoxy of trade unions. He questions the accepted 
wisdom of the benefits of job security through a collective organisation, looking to 
the economy as two distinct entities; “the union sector and the competitive sector.”146 
At a micro level, the workforce has a “stark choice” – firstly those who are fortunate 
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to be a part of a trade union – a group who prosper through the security of an 
organisation pursuing a negotiated rate of pay, a wage settlement, on behalf of the 
individual trade union member. These workers are protected and are therefore 
protective of their role. Counter to this is the non-union member; those not fortunate 
to work within the trade union sector who are prepared to, and indeed should, accept 
a “going rate” for non-unionised labour. This elastic, flexible, non-unionised 
workforce does not have the benefits of negotiation, closed shop or collective action 
or indeed the same choices; the realities is adaptation to this competitive, insecure 
sector or accept unemployment.  
Therefore, trade unions argue Minford were to realign as a “key determinant of 
unemployment”. The reality of this “stark choice” was either work for a non-union, 
low wage sector of the economy or due to the trade union closed shop and Labour 
Monopolies Commission “remain unemployed”.147 It was the very success of trade 
unions in sustaining unrealistic wage demands, against the true reality of the market 
place that was counterproductive on two fronts; it falsified the correct levels of real 
wages in the labour market and thereby caused unemployment. Trade unionism, 
once an emblem of the representation of those in the work place, was now an 
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institution which created through their “protected legal position” unemployment.148 
The answer to this was to “make the labour market work better”.149 
The symbolism and perception of trade unions would begin to change. Counter to 
their origins, they would now be labelled a cause; a symptom of unemployment. The 
clarity of Minford’s argument, the union sector against the competitive sector, was 
to deliver a new agenda, a clear line of distinction – of the “insider” and the 
“outsider”. During the “1980s there was a subtle change in the way unemployment 
was discussed”150 – of a “hysteresis”. This was a self-perpetuating level of 
unemployment driven by trade unions; unemployment was a construct of those who 
sought the security of a represented collective workforce at the expense of the 
“marginal” or “discouraged worker”151 who would leave an industry disillusioned 
and seek non-represented employment or become unemployed.152 Those who are 
inside the trade union movement – those protected “insiders” enjoy more favourable 
job security, financial reward and stability than those who are “outsiders”.153 
Businesses are aware of labour costs of hiring, training and firing staff – insiders, 
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aware of this are prepared to push their wage demands above the market rate, 
knowing the security of the “insider” position.  
Trade unionism acted as a fire blanket for the insider. Due to their levels of 
protectionism and regulation, trade unions were a “key determinant in 
unemployment” as they were only interested in the role of their “insiders”, with little 
or no concern for the “outsiders” – the unemployed. If the long-term unemployed 
were no longer able to join a union, to be part of a “supply chain” they were to 
become, as Milton Friedman argues, a part of a “natural” cycle of unemployment – 
and this cycle needed to be challenged.154  
This challenge was to be taken up by a New Right.155 New Right think tanks came 
to prominence in the 1970s in recognition of a “perceived crisis” of economic 
liberalism. Successive UK administrations, both Conservative and Labour, had not 
proved “sympathetic” to challenging the failed Keynesian orthodoxy. Britain’s 
economic decline had failed to be arrested and the “pursuit of influence” within 
government circles was still not apparent; it was at this point that “advocacy tanks” 
sought recognition in their pursuit of freedom. Richard Cockett argues that the 
construct of “free market groups” such as the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS 1974) 
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did “as much intellectually to convert a generation of opinion formers”156 – “opinion 
formers” whose ideas were influential for key figures in the Conservative Party. A 
notable example was Keith Joseph, whose role “as a conduit for the IEA157 was 
essential in introducing the new right ideas into the Conservative Party”158 – a 
process of economic, ideological transformation based upon “the German social 
market philosophy”.159 There were “obvious connections” between New Right think 
tanks and “the main protagonists” within the Conservative Party: Keith Joseph, 
Nigel Lawson, Cecil Parkinson, Kenneth Baker and Norman Fowler; those who 
actively engaged with an economic agenda. 
For Keith Joseph, it would become an economic “crusade”. In a record of a 
conversation held with Sir Keith Joseph in March of 1974, Ralph Harris discussed a 
need to “seek advice about individuals and published sources that could help him 
develop a new “crusade” for private enterprise”.160 Joseph was to emphasise the need 
for economics and economic liberty to transcend its traditional boundaries of simply 
a “creed of growth” and to enhance a new “ethical and social case”161 – an enhanced 
pursuit of freedom of opportunity – to be a cause for the “outsider”. A new language 
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of willingness to confront the trade union movement emerged; in a speech to The 
Bow Group in February of 1979, Joseph again discussed this “crusade” of a New 
Right that would effectively confront the “ancient ideology of the Labour 
Movement” to challenge the “raisin d’être of the trade union, the free collective 
bargaining process... riddled with confusion and contradiction” – of a new form of 
conservatism that would dare to “say that union power should be reduced”.162 The 
trade union movement had become a “problem” in need of “solving” – a cause of 
unemployment instead of the cure.  
Joseph argued that the “accepted wisdom in high places was to give in”163 once 
confronted by nationalised industries. This would no longer be tolerated. There 
would be debate, there would be challenge and there would be analysis of the role 
the trade unions had played in the decline of Britain economically and industrially. 
Trade unionism would no longer be sacrosanct – no longer a “sacred cow” – 
academically and politically it could be challenged and seen to have failed. The 
1970s and “the events of that decade” 164as argued by John Mcllroy, had 
demonstrated that trade unions had indeed failed – corporatism had failed. Joseph 
argued in 1979 that “trade unions have albeit unwittingly – tried, too often, to do the 
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wrong things, and they have succeeded”.165 There would be no more “coming 
together over beer and sandwiches at Number 10.”166 Mcllroy identifies that post-
1979 a New Right emerged with ideas “lubricated by the strategic thinking about the 
confrontations demanded by radical change, and about precisely how to devastate 
trade unionism”167, and as Chris Wrigley argues, the point of change was to be “from 
1979 the trade unions were no longer consulted as contributors to gaining higher 
productivity”.168 
Trade unionism was now to be associated with an organisation that had to be 
overcome and to be defeated – not worked with or consulted. There was to be “no 
question” argues Chris Howell that “taming the trade unions” was a core goal of 
Thatcherite conservatism.”169 Margaret Thatcher’s successive administrations were 
to enjoy “mixed results” in both economic and social policy, yet Howell argues it 
was to be “strikingly successful in the realm of industrial relations” as a once 
powerful labour movement was to be driven “into what may well be terminal 
decline”.170 Howell looks to the priority placed upon industrial policy, and considers 
the “puzzle” of why the British labour movement was to “succumb so quickly to the 
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radical reforming efforts of Conservative governments elected after 1979?”171 
Howell argues that the answer lies in the power of the state, “the driving force of the 
erosion of trade union power and influence was a British state that acted much more 
like an architect in shaping labour’s relations.”172 The Conservative Party actively 
managed a “state response” to the labour movement and was to become the “driving 
force in the erosion of trade unionism”173 – the state, far from being “abstentionist, 
played a crucial role in the construction of new institutions to manage, or regulate, 
class relations.”174 
This was to be in marked contrast to Edward Heath’s premiership of 1970 to 1974. 
Initially forged in a pursuit of the “quiet revolution” of modernisation and labour 
market reform, Heath was to confide in President Nixon, that the British public, were 
“punch drunk with taxation”.175 There was a need to challenge the lack of “self-
confidence” in British society; it was to be his mantra to “Set my people free”.176 
Yet he was not ready to “put his foot flat down on the economic accelerator” as 
Heath “despised and detested” the toleration of unemployment.177 Though 
professing a need to stabilise both prices and incomes, Ian Gilmour argues, that 
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“Heath’s apparently abrasive radicalism was firmly rooted in One Nation 
convictions” his true political ambition was to “create unity”. 178 This was to ensure 
that the “Government was lamentably ill prepared for a strike” which was duly to 
materialise in January 1972. Flying pickets of the NUM amassed at Saltley Coke 
Depot which would lead to “spectacular U-turn” in industrial policy and Arthur 
Scargill proclaiming, “we wished to paralyse the nation’s economy”. 179  
The bitter industrial conflicts and conciliatory incomes policies would lead to 
election defeat in 1974. The defeat of Heath was to play an important role in 
“colouring the assessments” of future administrations, a moment of clarity to a party 
who had seemingly lost “their reputation as the party of competent government”180 
a perception “severely shaken, not at least among Conservatives themselves.”181 
Though Geoffrey Howe argued that, “We had lost, certainly. But disaster had been 
averted”182 Heath was depicted as a leader of a rudderless and broken government; 
scathingly The Spectator was to describe him as a “broken figure, he clung with 
grubby fingers to the crumbling precipice of his power. The spectacle was ludicrous; 
it was pathetic; it was contemptible”183 and though “unfair” in that the reality of 
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defeat was not at all a disaster184, it was to leave a “sour memory in the minds of 
many Tories”.185  
Therefore, conciliation and cooperation between government and trade union, was 
now depicted as political weakness. Yet the disaster of 1974, would also offer 
opportunity to rejuvenate and change. Heath had lost three out of his four contested 
elections and along the way, the party had arguably lost “its way on managing the 
economy”186 – they were to lose credibility as a governing party, and ultimately this 
would lead to challenge from within; a change of leader and the pathway to construct 
a new form of conservatism, denoted by the left as “Thatcherism”187. The defeat 
would offer opportunity to evaluate the necessary development of policy to win the 
1979 election, and to instigate change to reassume the mantle of effective 
government. 
 
1.4 Conservative Party change – Ideology or Statecraft? 
There are perhaps two main interpretations of Thatcherism. For some thinkers, the 
advent of Thatcherism marked an ideological battle, a form of dogmatic project 
against an establishment that had failed. Ideologically driven policy, enthused in 
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economic liberalism was to enforce hegemonic change – within industry, the trade 
union movement and beyond, through to education and commerce; a grand strategy 
that would halt decline and revive the nation.  
For others, Thatcherism was merely a pragmatic response to changing times. It was 
more a demonstration of “statecraft”, which explains the electoral success of the 
party after 1979. It was the implementation of a winning strategy within the political 
party, of confident party management and a demonstration from party actors and 
policy that grew from a reasoned response to events. 
These two interpretations will be examined in the context of a change in policy 
between government and the trade union movement post-1974.  
 
1.5 Ideology and the Conservative Party 
This research demonstrates change in a political party. It shows a change of 
relationship and interpretation between government and trade union movement – 
from a “non-interventionist line”188 to one of a perception of trade union activity as 
“bringing the country to its knees”.189 This section demonstrates how, as in the words 
of Stuart Hall, change “does not appear out of thin air”190 it evolves and develops as 
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actors and events determine change within a political organisation. The development 
of policy towards trade unionism was a response by a party to a series of events prior 
to 1974 – there was a change of policy from acceptance and dialogue to 
confrontation. This reflected an intrinsic, historic precedent of the Conservative 
Party – an ability to adapt in its ambitions of gaining, developing and sustaining 
power.  
The Conservative Party historically offers an ideological set of contradictions. The 
search for the “real Tory tradition”191 amongst a “babel of conflicting voices” argues 
Andrew Gamble, will not be found in the philosophising principles of the organic 
nation or “ideas”. The party and its history do not reflect any coherent set of beliefs 
or a unified movement, but a “ragbag drawn from every conceivable position” – 
what it does is to “reconcile the politics of support and the politics of power”.192 This 
ideal of power, of the “activity of governing and the instruments of government” 193 
has certainly been historically prevalent within the Conservative Party even before 
the advent of a New Right, albeit a power that is constructed in deference to the 
nation state – a power with limitation. Therefore, for conservatism and the 
Conservative Party the historical pursuit of the “politics of power”194 requires an 
                                                          
191 A. Gamble, The Conservative Nation (Routledge, 1974), p.2 
192 Ibid, p.5 
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid, p.15 
  
91  
  
ability to embrace change, to reaffirm the relations between government, state and 
the nation. David Seawright argues that this constant reaffirmation acts as a “secret 
weapon”195 for a party which changes more rapidly than is projected. The perpetual 
rate of change within the party is a symptom of an ingrained determination to 
succeed in governing the nation – as is proved historically. Seawright demonstrates 
the need for the One Nation label to act as a symbolic totem to underpin constant 
revisionism and change of what conservatism is and represents. The vague neutrality 
of conservatism, the debate over a lack of dogma, allows that “competing debates 
over doctrinal trajectories are facilitated within such an ethos.”196 Therefore change 
in the Conservative Party is not the enemy of perpetual success – it enables political 
dominance.  
Michael Freeden argues that conservatism is aware of its ability to engineer identity 
to formulate a foundation for power. It is not so much that the Conservative Party is 
averse to change; it is a case of how this change is controlled and delivered. Freeden 
argues that the change within conservatism is a natural defence mechanism, a 
“morphological trait.”197 This trait, argues Freeden, constructs a perception of 
consistency and continuity, whilst allowing for change within the party – the key is 
                                                          
195 D, Seawright, The British Conservative Party and One Nation Politics (Continuum International Publishing, 2010), 
p.3 
196 D, Seawright, The British Conservative Party and One Nation Politics (Continuum International Publishing, 2010), 
p.8 
197 Ibid 
  
92  
  
management and control. Therefore, an adherence to a Conservative ideology is far 
more complex than simply a pursuit of a status quo. Conservatism and the 
Conservative Party demonstrates a history of “various interconnected 
developments.”198 The post-war challenges to conservatism were not simplistic; old 
certainties of British dominance were ebbing away in the face of national decline, as 
was a Conservative Party which was “aghast” to “theoretical politics”.199 Up until 
the 1970s there existed a set of political and voting certainties as “rates of class and 
partisan alignment were relatively stable”200 – two party dominance of electoral 
power, was to create policy based on core, class based electoral trends and “sectoral 
strategies”. The “bi-partisan” nature of consensual politics offered a convenient 
structure and foundation, from which to examine an accepted “established narrative” 
of party-political realignment.201 The economic and social disruption of the 1970’s, 
was to challenge this “established narrative” and disrupt Conservative Party 
administrative predominance.  
The “Tory tradition therefore is not best understood as a tradition of ideas.”202 The 
Conservative Party is the party of “political practice in the modern era”203 – the party 
of governance of the 20th Century; demonstrating a politics of power and of 
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administration, with the ability to prioritise these agendas and a willingness to adapt 
to maintain these goals. I argue, to restore this political predominance post-1974, to 
continue the politics of power, it would reinvigorate its “morphological trait” and 
reinvent itself once again.  
 
1.6 Thatcherism as Statecraft 
In this section, I examine the interpretation of Thatcherism as a form of statecraft. 
Statecraft argues Jim Bulpitt, “crudely” is the “art of winning elections” in that the 
“how” of politics is as important as the “why”.204 It offers a series of solutions to 
political questions: how to win elections; how to form an efficient administration; 
how to maintain power. Statecraft is the maintenance of a “winning electoral strat-
egy” – a gaining of a hegemonic, dominant position through “political argument.”205 
Paradoxically, Bulpitt argues, therefore statecraft is the art of “depoliticising” poli-
tics to maintain pragmatism in high office – a clarity of political argument; the re-
jection of dogma and ideology.206 The ability to govern, to form a united and efficient 
governing body and to maintain a working majority in Parliament is paramount; it 
requires a set of political skills which may not resonate with mass movement, but 
demonstrates ability in the pragmatic art of running a nation. Statecraft theory looks 
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to the advent of policy in the context of how effectively a political party tackles the 
routine – the challenge of governing a nation.  
This necessity to do what is right for a nation resonates with statecraft theory. The 
apathy of post-war consensus was to lead to indecision and lack of national direction 
on all levels. Thatcherism is a rejection of this confusion, it reflects an ability to 
govern well, to utilise power effectively and efficiently. Jim Bulpitt identified this 
use of power, as part of a far greater historical precedent set by the Conservative 
Party – the art of winning, of gaining the mandate to govern and to govern well. 
Bulpitt challenged the notion of a “New Right” or “Thatcherism” as these were only 
a temporary political order. Within an historical context, they were to be seen as 
gatekeepers of an effective political party, and the contemporary nature of the new, 
“must be related to its past practices”.207 The historical precedent of the Conservative 
Party is to “gain office and govern satisfactorily” and Bulpitt argues, that this prac-
tical philosophy, overrides the multitude of perspectives, assertions and ideological 
posturing which have been associated with Thatcherism – at its core is a political 
party that will pursue statecraft in order to govern well.  
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Ideology cannot minimalize political and economic risk; it cannot “service the con-
tinuation of power”.208 The success of the Conservative Party, from the “era of Salis-
bury onwards”,209 has been a demonstration of continued statecraft and an ability to 
adopt economic and political strategy to conduct good government. The Heath ad-
ministration and its pursuit of corporate statecraft rendered a party out of power, 
unable to regain the initiative of competent governance – this is where Heath failed. 
The outset of his regime had demonstrated defiance to the unions “the hard face of 
the Tory Party”210 which ultimately was to lead to conciliation and defeat. Trade 
unionism and the economy had been his downfall – practical measures were required 
to ensure the exorcism of the Heath U-turn and “tough economic medicine was re-
quired”.211  
A statecraft approach would reveal itself in the practicalities of economic control; 
efficient and effective economic monetary and fiscal policy would be the govern-
ments number one priority; through monetarism. Monetarism – practical govern-
ment control of monetary supply, offering a solution to the “miseries of inflation” 
and a rejection of a “churning out of too much money.”212 This was not an ideolog-
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ically driven agenda, it was a case of gaining control – control of inflation and con-
trol of spending. Ultimately this would lead to a construction of the “enterprise so-
ciety”.213  
Conservatism, through economic competency and effective governance, would re-
verse the malaise of the 1970’s. The Keynesian “ascendancy” and construction of 
tripartism had challenged both the historical ascendancy of Conservative One Nation 
politics and the legitimacy of a governing party – the undermining of democratically 
elected administration. Practical and effective economic, energy and industrial pol-
icy was required to reverse decline and reassert government and state authority. And 
economic policy would offer a practical set of tools to reassert a status quo; a prior-
itising of fiscal policy, and control of inflation, government expenditure and mone-
tary efficiency, through the implementation of monetarism, would allow for the pen-
dulum of power to swing back to a governing party to enforce political reform. These 
were practical fiscal tools to construct a coherent and efficient platform for national 
change.  
Monetarism presented the requisite practical application of economic statecraft; as 
an economic tool, it was to neutralise the ideological debate. Bulpitt acknowledges 
the argument that the application of monetarism can be seen in terms of ideology, 
but he argues that it also transcended political boundaries, the Labour government 
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post-1975 had adopted monetarism under Denis Healey.214 Essentially it was a tech-
nique for taking “certain decisions out of politics” and for this it was a “superb (or 
lethal) piece of statecraft”.215 Bulpitt saw monetarism and the prioritising of infla-
tionary control, not as a signifier of ideology, “in many ways” he argues, monetarism 
“was, and in many ways still is, a modest little economic theory.”216 What it was to 
offer was a practical application that could be absorbed by the whole of the party 
and understood by an electorate – and in many ways, it was a practical move to 
access the “intellectual resources of the new right”.217 This pursuit of economic cred-
ibility was a return to the traditions of conservatism – sound government based on 
economic credibility allowing for the winning of elections.  
Therefore, Bulpitt looks at political success in a rational and pragmatic fashion. 
Thatcherism achieved political success and created a government of authority 
through the, “Art of winning elections and achieving some necessary degree of gov-
erning competence in office”.218 The prioritising of economic credibility, the target-
ing of low inflation, were political tools. Policy was designed to lie hand in glove 
with the movement of autonomy back into the hands of government and the state 
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mechanism. Bulpitt argues that for all perceived radicalism of Thatcherism or a New 
Right or neoliberal agenda, these terms do not reflect the pragmatism and reflection 
of historicism which it conveyed – the “statecraft of monetarism must be viewed as 
less a radical break from the past and more an attempt to reconstruct it”.219 The com-
petency of Thatcherism, the winning of elections, the control of party management 
and the evolving of economic fiscal measures fits with Conservative historicism.  
The emphasis is not entirely on the economic principles or process – it is based on 
outcome. What achieves power? What enables a Conservative victory? It is the use 
of a principle to formulate an outcome – that of a Conservative administration and 
continuation of administrative power. Economic control and competency was not 
achieved through ideology, but through an adherence to the notion of the continuity 
of pursuit of a central position in British politics – indeed, Bulpitt argues that in 
“statecraft terms there is are precious little difference between the monetarism and 
the politics of Keynes.”220 It is the practical implementation of these policies that is 
important. 
Bulpitt argues against a “perceived ideological phenomenon”221 associated with 
Thatcherism or a New Right. Through an association with the practicalities of 
government and achieving power, he argues, ideology was, “not, and never have 
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been the party’s main bias.” 222 Bulpitt was to associate Thatcherism with a return to 
a tradition of conservatism that was to understand the constraints of government and 
was perfectly capable of displacing them for others to fight, while they continued in 
office and did what they have always done best – govern. Though critique of 
Thatcherism has suggested a burning of the established Tory old guard, statecraft 
was to “reassert that tradition” of politics being a tribal art of wielding power and 
reasserting time and again the historical competence of the Conservative Party in 
office; if ideology can help determine this outcome, then so be it, but within a 
broader context of an historical continuation of conservatism.  
Statecraft theory can offer explanation and clarity of policy. In the murky world of 
politics, statecraft is a means to erase the confusion of dogma and ideology and 
construct a “competent rule, rather than ideological crusade.”223 Yet it’s potential is 
limited; actors – politicians – crave the limelight of political power and success. 
Statecraft’s practical implications act as a powerful tool in suppressing thoughtful 
debate and intellectual curiosity as “intelligence is naturally subordinate to the active 
parts of statecraft”.224 Politicians can leave natural scepticism and “part of their 
cognitive function”225 to the pursuit of practical political power – statecraft can offer 
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answers, but are they the correct ones? Statecraft theory can achieve clarity – it offers 
explanation to an electorate who cannot associate ideological interpretative polices 
within their everyday lives. The interpretations of Thatcherism, as demonstrated are 
many; the clarity of what Thatcherism represents is still not conclusively articulated 
through ideology. Statecraft offers pragmatism for the nature of governing; it will 
comprise an understanding of and indeed the imposition at times of ideology, as 
ultimately all political decision making in government is scrutinised within an 
ideological framework, but it works on a principle of delivering practical explanation 
to the art of winning elections, managing a political administration and ultimately 
governing a nation.  
Therefore, the importance of statecraft theory to this research is that it counters the 
ideological narrative; it offers a perspective that sees Thatcherism not as a grand 
strategy or hegemonic project, but just as Macmillan and Churchill demonstrated, it 
reveals a Conservative Party ability to reject ideology and to win elections and to 
govern. Margaret Thatcher demonstrated a winning mentality and the political 
vigour that enabled her to rise to the “high politics” of government.  
1.7 Thatcherism as Ideology 
Rejecting statecraft interpretation, however, this research shows that the change 
within the Conservative Party was largely driven through an ideological agenda. In 
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this respect, this research reveals through evidence the construct of industrial policy 
that would go beyond the practicalities of statecraft theory. The policy, actor and 
thought process that were to construct the confrontation in 1984, I argue were driven 
by a mindset constructed by a grandeur of vision and goal – national regeneration 
and an ending of decline. It would require more than statecraft can offer to realise 
this vision – it would require an ideological template.  
In this section, I present the case for Thatcherism as a form of ideology. There are 
no concrete definitions of Thatcherism. Various interpretations reflect it as 
embracing national leadership, an expression of personal beliefs and moral guidance, 
a challenge to the state, a promotion of a free economy and individual liberty – all 
of these enshrined in a doctrine of low inflation and anti-trade unionism. 
Thatcherism can be witnessed through either the prism of “monstrous invention” or 
a “monstrous monolith.”226 The change within the Conservative Party, the rise of 
Thatcherism from the defeat of 1974, like the complexities of conservatism as an 
historical ideology, is not of one discourse, but a “field of discourses”.227  
The first contemporary discussion of Thatcherism was found in the pages of 
Marxism Today. It was to define Thatcherism within a grander narrative – a 
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development of no less than an “ideological reconfiguration” of British politics.228 
Stuart Hall described Thatcherism as a “new political event” whose intent was not 
“tinkering with this or that mechanism, but to change the terms of the struggle”.229 
There was to be no evolution of Conservative policy, no grey areas of historic non-
ideological posturing – power could not be established through deference to tripartite 
corporatism, but by the means of confrontation and dissimilation of an established 
protocol of the Conservative Party and its relationship with organised labour; 
“Thatcherism's project was to transform the state in order to restructure society”.230 
Hall argues that Thatcherism confronts that challenge that “things cannot go on in 
the old way.”231 It was a “radical” break from a whole set of “baggage and 
assumptions” which had formulated consecutive post-war administrations, both 
Conservative and Labour, and both susceptible to the challenge and power of trade 
union demands. A “profoundly new” strategy was required, one aimed at 
reinterpreting the relationship between government and the British working classes, 
by gaining an effective “penetration into the very heartland of Labour's support: in 
the unions, the working class and other social strata”.232 
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It was no simple task demanding a “construction of a new agenda in British 
politics”.233 Hall looks to Gramsci’s “concept of hegemony”234 and the construct of 
power in political terms. Gramsci looked at the gaining and maintaining of 
“hegemony” in terms of a ruling party’s need for the “consent” of the public. This 
consent is not finite and not definable through class – this “movement of power” is 
constantly changing, evolving and more importantly challenging. The post-war 
corporate agenda, the consensus of a bloated state, trade union and public sector, 
presented the necessary obstacles. Hegemony is not a position of security – it needs 
constant “resistance” to be maintained.235  
Therefore, politics would no longer to be fought along narrow party lines – it was to 
become “a much-expanded field.”236 The pursuit of hegemony does not lie in one 
class, it is a “lived reality” evolving constantly and thereby bypassing the static 
position of political tradition. Multiple layers of society, “the economy, in society, 
in culture” would have to be targeted and “actively worked on to produce particular 
forms of power, forms of domination”.237 Historical fault-lines within the electorate 
and class would not be taken for granted, there was a need for a “production of 
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politics” that would aim to be both politically and “ideologically constructed” 
through “restoration, by reconstruction”.238  
This was an ideological construct that was to go beyond a Conservative tradition – 
a grand formative plan. The foundation of this policy would be a pursuit of reigniting 
British values, of ending decline, of finding a position which lay at a moral, racial 
and spiritual crossroads, of which the pursuit of economic liberalism was infused 
with an emotive self-determination and patriotism. The aim was to lie beyond a 
Conservative Party of the One Nation hue, as Hall was to proclaim that by 1987,  
We are living through the transformation of British conservatism – its par-
tial adaptation to the modern world, via the neo-liberal and monetarist 'rev-
olutions'. Thatcherism has reconstructed conservatism and the Conserva-
tive Party. The hard faced, utilitarian, petty-bourgeois businessmen are 
now in charge, not the grouse-shooting, hunting and fishing classes.239 
For Hall, change within the Conservative Party was not a temporary “swing in the 
political fortunes”, but something far greater. Change post-1975, was “dynamic and 
momentum appears to be sustained”240 – it was to be no more and no less than a 
prolonged construction of a “new agenda” in British politics – a shift of politics, 
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culture, mind set and policing to the right. No longer was the primary function of the 
Conservative Party to simply occupy or to command “the apparatuses of the state” 
but to mould and sustain a mindset to shift a generation away from the conventions 
of party politics and away from the tribal certainties of Labour against 
Conservatives. Its aim was to create a new template for British life, of how we live, 
work and behave; a change of the “ideas of the people who simply, in ordinary every-
day life, have to calculate how to survive, how to look after those closest to them”.241 
Thatcherism therefore does not offer bland rhetoric, it offers strategy to revolutionise 
and to change – a direct challenge to “the old solutions and positions.” 242  
Andrew Gamble argues that, “In one sense Thatcherism is very alien to Conservative 
traditions.”243 There lies a fundamental fault-line in that there is an innate “hostility 
of conservatism and individualism” which is at “variance with traditional Conserva-
tive ideology”.244As demonstrated in this introduction, historically the Conservative 
tradition can redesign itself to restore autonomy of Parliamentary representation, but 
this abides within a convention of stability and harmony. The state is designed to 
coerce and restore, not through the pursuit of equality, but harmoniously through an 
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established structure – it does not propagate the variances of liberal self-determina-
tion. Yet, argues Gamble, Thatcherism needs to prioritise individualism to assert its 
political narrative of self-reliance and economic freedom, through the strength of a 
state mechanism – to maintain the semblance of a free, unfettered market place, all…  
…versions of liberal political economy prescribe a strong state, able to 
establish the highly artificial conditions of a market order245 
Gamble identifies a form of conservatism that embraces paradoxical ideological no-
tions. An “artificial” process of installing liberal economic reform and individual 
freedom stems from the need for a contradictory set of criteria. Britain, Gamble ar-
gues, “has been moving both towards a freer, more competitive, more open economy 
and towards a more repressive, more authoritarian state”.246 The marketplace cannot 
work when there is compromise, when a humane challenge from a class and trade 
union challenges its autonomy and independence. Therefore, the delicacies of a “free 
economy” are such that any risk of challenge needs to be minimised. This allows for 
a mandate for radical reform of political and social conditioning, using the levers of 
the state to embolden this revolutionary reform. 
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Sections of society previously deemed harmonious with its relationship with the state 
must now be challenged. Thatcherism was to be this catalyst; a movement to chal-
lenge these established codes of behaviour and create a new orthodoxy. It was cer-
tainly greater than a political party, certainly one not so defined by regression and 
inhibited by the concerns of a Conservative Party steeped in one nation apathy. 
Thatcherism would define a new form of conservatism, one which was to tear up the 
rule book by striving for “what is politically possible” – what can be achieved by the 
art of confrontation with the pillars of stable society which served previous Con-
servative governments so well. This New Right, argues Gamble has,  
not hesitated to have rows with leaders of many public institutions, includ-
ing the Church, the universities and the BBC – all once considered sound 
Conservative institutions”247 
This demonstrates a renouncement of a post-war dynamic and an embracing of new 
ideology – rejection of the establishment and the state. It represents a bold renegoti-
ation of what conservatism is.  
Hall and Gamble were to interpret Conservative Party change in a context of macro 
ideological movement. A seismic change in the nature and role of the state, the cul-
tural and moral direction of British politics and the Conservative Party, interpreted 
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as a vehicle for a transforming vigour of an ideological revolution to counteract Brit-
ish lethargy in a modern, transforming world. The Thatcherism which was analysed 
within the pages of Marxism Today, was one which was to become a process, to be 
aided by neoliberal ideals, espoused by Hayek and Friedman, and its aim was to 
“recast the electoral politics” of post-war Britain.248 An ideological “campaign” to 
reassert new forms of “political and cultural domination”.249 Hall and Gamble 
demonstrate the role ideology was to play in the formulation of the challenge to the 
post-war established narrative. An ideological agenda would allow for construction 
of policy and could challenge the apathy imposed by tripartism and British decline. 
It would allow for clarity of purpose and a template for success, one which could not 
deviate, could not U-turn or be easily disempowered. The need for government to 
obtain and to sustain the desired hegemonic position would require an acceptance of 
chaos and confrontation. 
Therefore, I argue that ideology would elevate the challenge of the New Right. The 
challenge of trade union impasse and a rigid status quo within the Conservative Party 
required an energy and dynamism to be challenged and ultimately defeated; ideo-
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logically driven economic and social policy, would enable the embedding of a dog-
matic theoretical position, one that would be required to fully embrace the challenge 
of confrontation within both the Conservative Party and the trade union movement.  
 
1.8 Conclusion 
In this research I argue that the weight of secondary and primary evidence 
demonstrates that change within the Conservative Party since 1974 was driven by 
an ideological agenda, to instigate, plan and ultimately confront the trade union 
movement and affect political and societal change.  
Statecraft acted as a mechanism of change – a tool designed for the implementation 
of policy, of party control and electoral efficiency. The statecraft interpretation of 
British politics has made an “important contribution to our academic understanding 
of the twentieth century political development”250 as it offers clarity and a definition 
of British party politics in the areas of successful electoral strategy, political party 
management and governing competence. This allows for politics to be defined and 
made accessible, offering reasoning as to why policy is implemented, why decisions 
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are made, and a definition of the purpose of the Conservative Party and its pursuit of 
central autonomy in British politics.  
Therefore, statecraft offers reason and it offers answers. It allows for rationality of 
economic and industrial policy; an understanding of why certain industrial and 
economic policies have been pursued in the face of such strength of criticism and 
social division. To Jim Bulpitt, Thatcherism as statecraft meant the ability to gain 
electoral credibility through the depoliticisation of “contentious issues” and the 
increasing perception of governing competence. Issues, such as trade union wage 
negotiations had become ideologically politicised – “ideologically loaded”251 and 
government needed to be insulated from this ideological agenda. Therefore, Bulpitt 
argues that Thatcherism’s “primary driver” was never ideology but a need to 
construct and maintain an effective administration, and to win general elections.  
This research counters this assertion. I demonstrate through primary evidence gained 
from The National Archives, a division within the Conservative Party; a preparation 
for and assault on the trade union movement, culminating in the miners’ conflict of 
1984, that cannot be associated solely with policy which is designed to “insulate”252 
the party from a position of “high politics”.253 The role of statecraft is flexible, it can 
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be associated with and through separate policy models – it does not have a coherent 
defined methodology. The role is to govern well, and this is an obvious legitimate 
target, but it cannot answer the questions of the extremes of internal change and 
external conflict associated with the Conservative administration post-1974 leading 
to the 1984 miners’ strike and the Battle of Orgreave.  
This research demonstrates preparation and implementation of confrontation with 
the NUM driven by an ideological agenda. Energy, industrial and labour relations 
policy after 1974 did not comply solely with statecraft theory of good governance. I 
propose the development of government policy towards the trade union movement 
was ideologically driven, that the trade union movement was highlighted, prior to 
1979 in Carrington, Ridley and Stepping Stones documentation, as a target for 
reform and eventual conflict. I identify and reveal historical evidence that 
demonstrates industrial policy driven though an ideological agenda to redesign 
energy, industrial and labour relations policy, to prepare and plan for an assault on 
the trade union movement.  
Therefore, the trade union movement would be challenged. The NUM and the re-
naissance of a new left, epitomised by Arthur Scargill, were to challenge the Con-
servative political administrative dominance. An ideologically driven agenda would 
ensure this challenge would be prepared for and met head on; this would entail the 
prioritising of a market based economic model for society, the implementation of 
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monetarism, allowing, as Stuart Hall argues the restructuring of the, “Political, moral 
and intellectual leadership” of the Conservative Party itself through an observance 
and priority of the economic. Hall observed that it was through this economic dom-
inance where,  
ideological shifts do take place, through “novel combinations of old and 
new” of “change in the relative weight possessed by the elements of an 
old ideology254  
The historic would not supersede or substitute the new Conservative ideology. But 
as demonstrated by history, Conservative ideology would transform, to adapt to gain 
a hegemonic position. Trade unionism through the post-war corporate relationship 
between organised labour, central government departments and the civil service, had 
constructed a functioning position of strength within corridors of British power. The 
Conservative Party, post-1974 would re-emerge, challenge and defeat this agenda – 
predominantly using predisposed ideology. This research details and evidences this 
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implementation of an ideological template that would ensure the revival of Con-
servative Party economic authority and ultimately “inflict massive wounds on the 
labour movement.”255  
1.9 Outline & Structure of the Research 
The period between 1974 and 1984 was chosen to examine and reveal the changes 
in the ideological dynamic within the Conservative Party and its relationship to 
British trade unionism. The starting point is one of defeat for the Conservative Party 
and how it was to act as the catalyst for a Thatcherite response to mould an 
ideological agenda within the Conservative Party; to firstly implement internal party 
change and secondly to challenge the post-war corporate hegemony of the trade 
union movement; with particular significance placed on a challenge to the National 
Union of Mineworkers.  
The above chapter Ideology, Statecraft and the Conservative Party contextualises 
the research and the relationship between the Conservative Party and trade unions. I 
have set out an argument that this change of relationship was due to ideological 
transformation within a section of the Conservative Party. 
In Chapter 2, Thatcher’s Moral Crusade, I analyse the transformation and process 
of change within the Conservative Party. I argue it ultimately represents a reaction 
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against the failure of Heath’s statecraft in 1974, yet it was not solely reactionary in 
context; there is an ideological and historical background to the construct of change 
within elements of the Conservative Party. I address and present the core values of 
Thatcherism through a prism of Margaret Thatcher’s personal values and system of 
beliefs – a resurrection of British values, of a moral code that was assimilated with 
economic freedoms, hard work and religious convictions. This construct of a core 
belief system would be ingrained in New Right thinking; a means to integrate 
political and economic ideals, inspired by a religious fervour, to install conviction 
politics to end Britain’s decline as a nation. This chapter explores these foundations 
of this New Right thought; the priority it placed of its pursuit of the end of decline 
of Britain and the correlation between this decline, corporate tripartism and 
ultimately the construction of a required nemesis – the trade union movement.  
In Chapter 3, I reveal the economic and political inspiration that was leading this 
revival of a New Right thought process – Powellism. Enoch Powell – Thatcher’s 
Teacher explores the influence of Powell and his legacy on Thatcherite ideology. As 
Chapter 2 details a rise of a New Right, chapter 3, details its political inspiration. 
Enoch Powell was ultimately to be alienated from the Conservative Party but fought 
determinedly for the ideals of which Thatcherism aspired to; freedom of economics 
through absolutism of British and Parliamentary sovereignty. Powell sets the 
foundations of a New Right, both politically and theoretically; Powellism was to 
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demonstrate the construct, albeit ultimately a maverick one, of an ideological 
agenda, of which there could be no deviance from – an anti-inflationary economic 
policy and a pursuit of individual freedom.  
Chapter 4 examines the ideological conflict within the Conservative Party that was 
to prelude conflict. Chapter 4, The Defeat of the “Wets” documents, again through 
primary evidence, the internal conflicts that were to appear within the Conservative 
Party. Those who opposed ideology, the established One Nation politicians, notably 
Francis Pym, Ian Gilmour and Jim Prior amongst others, were to stand for and 
present an alternative to a New Right – an alternative to ideology and to dogma. This 
chapter examines how this opposition was to be diluted as the “wets” and how this 
epitaph represented a non-ideological political reasoning; a politics of One Nation 
conservatism. Attention is paid to the divisions within Cabinet and the challenge to 
the moderate One Nation representatives, who were to challenge monetarist 
economic policy, commonly known as “wets”.  
Chapter 5, From Ridley Report to “Hit List” – Implementation of Ideological 
Blueprint evidences through primary sources, acquired from The National Archives, 
a development from theoretical stance of New Right thought, to a realistic road map 
to confrontation with the trade union movement; from New Right theory to a reality, 
of a construct of Conservative Party challenge to the trade union movement. I reveal 
and examine through The Ridley Report and Stepping Stones reports, a premeditated 
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plan for industrial deconstruction and analyse evidence of the planning and 
preparation for industrial conflict with the NUM; the deconstruction of British Steel 
Corporation as a prelude to the 1984 conflict, the prioritising of coke imports from 
abroad that was to undermine UK coal supply to power stations and the existence of 
a “Hit List” of viable, productive mines that were targeted for decommission. I have 
documented in this chapter new evidence and primary source archive material, 
gained from The National Archives, which demonstrates the claims of covert 
planning, preparation and instigation of industrial conflict with the NUM in 1984. 
The final chapter evidences the culmination of the political, economic and 
ideological process – from The Ridley Report template, to writing of a “Hit List” 
through to the reality of industrial conflict not witnessed in the UK for generations. 
In Chapter 6, The 1984 Miners’ Strike there is an exploration of the conclusion of 
New Right trade union policy and industrial policy. The construct and undertaking 
of conflict; how the intensity of confrontation and violence was depicted, between 
striking miners and the police authorities at Orgreave coke works in 1984, completed 
the implementation of The Ridley Reports plans for industrial fragmentation. How 
the scenes of picket line violence and direct political interference with local police 
matters, demonstrates a rejection of statecraft policy and evidences clearly the 
implementation of an ideologically driven industrial agenda. I evidence an 
implementation of an ideological agenda through addressing the following; the 
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visceral imagery of conflict between striking miners and police authorities at 
Orgreave, the year long suffering of mining community, the violence aimed towards 
and from police, demonstrates the rejection of One Nation conservatism, an end of 
statecraft and therefore, an implementation of ideological agenda.  
In the conclusion, I summarise the findings and set out what they are. I reveal the 
processes, actors and events that are evidenced to form a conclusion of ideologically 
formed industrial policy. Firstly, that Conservative statecraft theory, demonstrated 
prior to 1974 was to be challenged and reversed. Secondly, that this reversal would 
entail the development of a New Right, an ascension to power within the 
Conservative Party of actors and policy that would implement an ideological 
industrial and economic agenda. Thirdly, that the process of implementation of this 
New Right agenda through the construction of an industrial template to enforce 
confrontation with the NUM in 1984.  
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Chapter 2 – Thatcher’s Moral Crusade  
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter will examine two key areas; 
• The development of this new form of conservatism - a New Right. What did 
this represent and what was it prepared to challenge? 
• How this was policy was to be implemented – an acceptance of the role of 
confrontation and an interpretation of a required “creative destruction”.  
Thatcherism was to elevate economics to a “moral level”.256 This would require 
transference of the efficiency of the good household to a national scale. Fiscal control 
would be elevated from its natural environment of No.11 Downing Street, to sustain 
a new, ideologically driven political force to engineer national revival; a New Right 
“appeal to righteousness”257 through economic individualism and liberty.  
Margaret Thatcher reflected in 1975 upon the “death of our national spirit.”258 The 
challenge facing the nation was greater than merely political or cultural, it was a 
“moral struggle and the morality of work, of self-sacrifice, of trying to do the right 
thing” – this was the “the morality of capitalism.”259 Thatcherism’s emotive plea was 
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to challenge the nation to reverse a post-industrial malaise, to cast aside “living in 
the nostalgic glories of a previous industrial revolution.”260 A New Right would 
challenge the “climate of permissiveness” – to adhere to family values of thrift, hard 
work and an “unfettered pursuit of wealth”. I argue that to challenge the hegemony 
of trade unionism and corporate Britain, a new form of conservatism was 
established. Emboldened by a mantra of moral fortitude, it would overcome the 
reticence of One Nation conservatism, and impose economic freedom. The fervour 
of a moral crusade to save an ailing nation liberated Thatcherism from the 
straightjacket of conservatism, of establishment and conformity, to one that was to 
consummately embrace ideology. An acceptance, and promotion of policy, akin to 
a form of salvation, enabled the rejection of “political elites”261 from an 
establishment who employed procedure of governance and followed the “standard 
rules of statecraft”.262 In comparison to 21st Century political challenge to 
mainstream political agendas, Thatcherism’s emotive fusion of emancipation, liberty 
and patriotic fervour, could form a dynamic that would challenge the duopoly of 
corporatism and the established internal mechanisms of the Conservative Party. 
These established political elites would face, as Stuart Hall argued, “The moral 
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discourses of Thatcherism” a “mobilisation of social identities”263 which had lain 
dormant through consensus and trade union hegemony.  
2.1 The “New Conservatism” 
Francis Pym argued that to view politics in simple cases of black and white “is both 
false and dangerous”.264 Complementing life, politics cannot be viewed within 
“polarising contradictions” but within a complex moral, economic and social maze 
– no “conclusions are the truth”. Yet, he was to conclude, that the “spirit of the age 
encourages us to be absolutist”. Thatcherism does not fit into easy analysis, it is 
multi-faceted, but it does demonstrate, in its myriad of interpretations, a search for 
clarity and absolutism. Pym argues that Thatcher would ask, “Are you with us?” by 
which she means, “Are you completely free of any doubts as to the utter 
righteousness of everything we are doing?”265 
The rhetorical question is revealing. Conservatism would emerge post-1974 as a tool 
to combat a form of disease that had affected Britain, “A severe inflation is the worst 
kind of revolution... only the most powerful, the most resourceful and unscrupulous, 
the hyenas of economic life, can come through unscathed” 266 – this argued Thatcher, 
was the reality of what Britain was facing post-1974. The politics of consent could 
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no longer suffice, as morality, economics and politics were now needed to 
“converge”.267 Morality argued Thatcher, “has a great deal to do with society,” 
arguing that “The real causes of inflation are not economic. They are social, and they 
are political”.268 A New Conservatism understood this need for change. In a speech 
to the Bow Group in 1980, Nigel Lawson argued,  
The Conservative party had been swept into office on a programme which 
seemed to mark a conscious change of direction, not merely from that 
charted by its political opponents, but from that followed by all British 
Governments since the war, including its own Conservative predecessors. 
Hence the seemingly self-contradictory notion of ‘The New 
Conservatism’.269 
Conservatism, argued Lawson, could not stand still. It was not to retreat and to tread 
the same old “false trails”, and lessons would have to be “painfully relearned”270 for 
conservatism to re-emerge from the shadow of social democracy. The challenge to 
the Conservative Party in 1979 was a perception of a country in decline, the “climate 
of defeatism” of an ungovernable nation. The means to excerpt authority, to distance 
itself from post-war malaise, was to commit itself to the pursuit of “sound money, a 
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balanced budget and free markets”.271 Jim Buller argues that economic “neutrality 
and automatism” would allow for a dispassionate dismantling of the post-war 
consensus. Economic management and competence presented a party in control, at 
complete odds with the debacle of the 1970s and trade union tripartite governance, 
which chipped away at the responsibility and empowerment of the individual.272 
Buller’s interpretation is appealing as it offers a diagnosis and a remedy to a post-
war malaise – a need to take hard, often dispassionate decisions in the face of social 
and political uncertainty. Monetarism would be the tool to forestall greater social 
change – to transcend statecraft’s practicality. Economic transformation of the 
economy was not merely pragmatic, it was “cultural” as “social engineering of an 
unusual sort was high on the Thatcherite agenda”. 273  
Lawson argued for a conservatism which challenged the traditions of post-war 
government. This pursuit of “sound money” of fiscal control of monetary supply, 
monetarism, would allow for, and formulate a foundation for greater control of the 
state mechanism, beyond simply an economic competence deemed necessary 
through statecraft. Fiscal prudence would transcend into areas of social and moral 
agendas of the nation; Lawson was to argue that,  
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To describe the new Conservatism purely in terms of an approach to 
economic policy would be manifestly inadequate—it goes a great deal 
wider than that 274  
Lawson idealised a degree of social order through an economic order. He was to 
describe the “economic sickness we were to cure”275 and a need to aspire to an 
historical “reversion to an older tradition”276 of a pre-Keynesian world of “restraint”. 
The 1970s he argued was the “decade of intervention – and the decade of inflation”, 
an increasing “interference by Government in all aspects of economic life.” 277 Trade 
unionism had ensured the term “profit had become a dirty word” and “capitalist” a 
term of abuse”278 – conservatism needed to reverse this symbolic decline. It was 
socialism that had transferred and mobilised its ideology through the trade union 
movement – it had formulated an overt collective ideological stance. Lawson argued 
that when “we first took office in 1979, at the heart of the problem of Britain’s 
malfunctioning labour market – and a number of other ills besides – clearly lay the 
much-discussed trade union question”. 279  
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Conservatism therefore required economic and ideological mantra to ensure clarity 
of purpose. Lawson acknowledged this ideological battleground – to resist the “rise 
of social democracy” there was to be a need to pursue and to win the “battle of the 
ideas”.280 Traditional conservatism was now redundant. An “efficacy of government 
action” and the “deep commitment to the notion of ‘equality’ with the Conservative 
Party having problematically “embraced both these delusions.”281 These are 
important political acknowledgements. Lawson’s identified the nature of this New 
Conservatism – one which was to reject the established status quo, to challenge the 
orthodoxies of government and established principles, drafted through consensus. 
The pursuit of equality, embraced as delusional and reductive, was now to be an 
enemy of economic change and modernisation, a hindrance to the pursuit of fiscal 
management, tight control of budgetary levers and above all else, the control of 
inflation.  
Monetary policy, not human policy, was to be the overriding ideological concern. A 
“New Conservative” mantra demonstrated an overt acceptance and resignation of 
this “inflation/ unemployment “trade-off” of “a painful transitional cost in reducing 
inflation.”282 Lawson argued that the “unspoken assumptions” of the post-war world 
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of economic co-operation and a prioritising of a labour market was “economic 
nonsense”. In a changing world there is an implicit need to change, of “adjusting to 
changing conditions”283 to remove the acceptance of Keynesian macroeconomics 
and pursuit of full employment. Speaking to the Institute of Fiscal Studies in 1981, 
Lawson argued, 
a lasting fall in the rate of inflation of about 1 percent per annum can be 
achieved at a cost of 650,000 man years284 
This presents a radical shift in mind set within the Conservative hierarchy. Up to 
1974 successive administrations, Conservative and Labour, prioritised efforts to 
“maintain national cohesion”285 through the pursuit of full employment. Lawson’s 
comments challenge Conservative Party adherence to an acceptance of 
“Keynesianism and the goal of full employment”286 – New Conservatism was to 
challenge these conventions of previous economic protocol. The acceptance of a 
degree of “cost” of “man years” reveals this fundamental shift; a pursuit of 
inflationary control, an ideological swing to accept that “full employment became 
utterly unimportant”.287  
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This was to represent in the words of Arthur Seldon a “revolution in political 
attitudes”.288 The term “revolution” does not fit easily with the history of 
Conservative thought; the Conservative is “sceptical” – he “may be nostalgic for the 
past, but he will not parade it as a declared ideal” 289 but rather as a fondness and 
eternal longing for a “Golden age”. It does not deal in the realities of the modern life 
of the individual but the abstract pursuit of a harmonious relationship with a 
“political vision” without a finite result; all defined within a paradoxical “refined 
lack of purpose”.290 This traditional form of conservatism does not equate to a fixed 
ideology or direction – it resonates and flows with an establishment that will support 
in an indecipherable manner this opaque vision – and historically it has succeeded.  
Its critiques though observe a theory without substance. The governing 
establishment without a direction – or indeed ideology. Friedrich Hayek argues in 
his challenge to conservatism,291 Why I am not a Conservative, that as an ideology it 
is tied to convention and is fearful, obtrusive and regressive; “personally” Hayek 
argued, “I find that the most objectionable feature of the Conservative attitude is its 
propensity to reject well-substantiated new knowledge because it dislikes some of 
the consequences which seem to follow from it – or, to put it bluntly, its 
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obscurantism”.292 Conservatism demonstrates a “fondness for authority” and a 
“failure to acquaint oneself with new ideas”. It has “no real argument” barring its 
rejection of change and “the growth of ideas” and demonstrates a fear of manmade 
consequences; and these consequences? Unemployment.  
Nigel Lawson, an economic disciple of Hayek,293 was to define New Conservatism. 
Continuing this train of thought, man’s imperfections lead to consequences of 
actions which are inevitable. There is a tacit acknowledgement of the inevitability 
of unemployment because of the imperfections of the state. New Conservatism 
would not accept the limitations of the state and its imperfections, it would not be 
constrained by its fear of consequences. Lawson argued that,  
Conservatism is the creed of original sin and the politics of imperfection—
that the bad in society is so intimately and unknowably linked with the rest 
that an intention to deal with one specific and agreed evil may well do 
more harm than good.294 
The pursuit of these “politics of imperfection” is futile – state intervention can only 
have consequences. Lawson’s correlates the inevitability of man’s imperfection with 
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his/ her will to intervene in the form of the state. As the nature of the individual is 
inherently flawed, how can the state hope to counter these imperfections? Lawson 
notes that in 1979, the new Conservative Government would need to be bold, to 
accept a bitter pill to cure the “economic sickness” and “all pervasive defeatism” that 
Britain was suffering from at the hands of stagflation and union power.295 This 
scenario had been wrought by the “confusion and disarray”296 of the social democrat; 
the pursuit of wage control, price control, of state intervention and of industrialists 
who were to “tramp the corridors of Whitehall in search of subsidies”.297 Lawson 
dared to ask “had Britain become ungovernable?” and the road to recovery could not 
be without a need for “obstinacy and bare knuckles”298 to “change a whole culture 
of a nation”. 
New Conservatism was to create a “healthy humility” regarding the scope for state 
activity. For some within the Conservative Party this represented the strains of “neo 
liberal dogma” from “more distant ideological shores”.299 Lawson was to 
acknowledge this scepticism, “is it some alien creed masquerading as 
Conservative?” he was to ask – his retort –– “I can only say that, as a Conservative, 
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it feels pretty Conservative to me”.300 Yet this is debatable; a new form of 
conservatism would accentuate the drive to challenge an unmanageable perception 
of Britain – for the pursuit of strong government to halt regression. Lawson’s 
proclamation of his definition of conservatism does coincide with historic 
reinterpretation of the role that a Conservative government would play in the 
modernisation of a nation. But for some, a Rubicon had been passed. Lawson’s 
defiant definition of conservatism now represented a “particular constellation of 
polices and values” – of free markets, financial discipline, a firm control of public 
expenditure, tax cuts and “nationalism” and “Victorian values”.301 The New 
Conservatism would entail both the ideology of the economic and the moral; the 
rejection of the “dependency culture” to a rise of the “enterprise culture” – 
conservatism with direction, vigour and purpose. Jim Prior argues that a doctrine 
was being formulated, that One Nation conservatism was now marginalised and was 
demythologised as a politics of regression and apathy, 
We didn’t appreciate the degree to which the Party was becoming more 
and more doctrinaire in its approach and less and less pragmatic… Even 
the era of Macmillan and Butler was talked about as a disaster. 302 
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2.2 Thatcherism’s Moral Crusade 
The aim of the New Conservatism was to create momentum and impetus. I argue 
that economic ideology was not simply to be viewed in the context of the fiscal 
policy but was to become a symbol of a greater good – of freedom; freedom of the 
economy from the restraint of wage demands, freedom for individuals to aspire. 
Most importantly, freedom to challenge the tyranny of the establishment, the 
corporate collective, the trade union movement and ultimately the decline of post-
war Britain; in an internal memo from Henry Kissinger to President Ford in January 
1975, Kissinger lamented,  
Yes. The Brits need the money now. Britain is a tragedy it has sunk to 
begging, borrowing, stealing until North Sea oil comes in… That Britain 
has become such a scrounger is a disgrace303 
Thatcherism was to emerge out of the “debates on national decline”304 – out of this 
disgrace. On coming to power in 1979, Margaret Thatcher was to witness a country 
which had succumbed to a three day week, inflation had topped 25%, Britain had 
required a bailout from the International Monetary Fund and experienced the 
“Winter of Discontent” – Britain had become “a miserable failure”.305 As a 
description  for Britain, for a once great nation it is harsh, yet it reflected the shifting 
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tides of globalisation and the reality that the old certainties of the post-war world 
were vanishing. There is no doubt that a series of administrations had grappled, some 
more successfully than other, to reinvent Britain internally and internationally. The 
Suez Crisis of 1956 and devaluation in 1967 had demonstrated the somewhat naïve 
posturing of British economic and diplomatic power; in an ever changing, globalised 
world, Britain’s economic and indeed moral compass was crumbling. Margaret 
Thatcher argued that,  
Our companies were impeded by militancy and restrictive practices, our 
management was complacent, our workforce unproductive. And state-
owned firms ate up, through subsidies, what should have gone to schools 
and hospitals.  
But the root of the approach we pursued in the 1980s lay deep in human 
nature, and more especially the nature of the British people. If you really 
believe, as a matter of passionate conviction, in the talents and character 
of your nation, of course you want to set it free. And we British have a 
true vocation for liberty – all our history proves it.306 
Thatcher looked at the symptoms of the “British disease” as economic, yet their roots 
were cultural and moral. Governing Britain would be so much more than the 
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administration of policy; it was an issue of reinvigorating a national spirit of 
enterprise, of energy and self-awareness. And economic tools would be where the 
New Conservatism would turn to unlock the apathy constructed by unproductive 
forces, by the mass intransigence of a work force that had been brought up in a post-
war world of “full employment” that was “artificially maintained by “state puffed 
inflation”.307 
Decline of British fortunes was, and still is to this day, a complex issue. A whole 
genre of literature had developed though academic questioning and post-war 
statistics without offering a solution. For Thatcherism there was absolute clarity – 
British decline was economically and industrially wrapped within a greater question 
of identity, of morality and of belief – it was not solely a change of political direction, 
but the need to impose and to create the set of goals and doctrines which had to “flow 
from this belief”308 – an end to decline. And in Margaret Thatcher, the New 
Conservatives had a leader of charisma and purpose who was to bring a religious 
fervour to this task.309 
This fervour sprang from an evangelical zeal to challenge decline. In a speech to the 
General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, also known as The Sermon on the 
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Mound, Thatcher stated that, “nowhere in the Bible is the word democracy 
mentioned”.310 The speech is important; it demonstrates a new-found scepticism of 
the morality of British democracy, “Political structures, state institutions, collective 
ideals – these are not enough”.311 Thatcher’s critique is a stance of absolutism; of 
certainty in the face of democratic traditions – she was to acknowledge the demise 
of Britain and was to dissect the problem through the eyes of a religious zealot. 
Nothing such as a democratic tradition would come in the way of this destiny, “there 
is little hope” she lamented,  
For democracy if the hearts of men and women in democratic societies 
cannot be touched by a call to something greater than themselves.312  
Thatcher’s words call for the intrinsic, natural development between economic and 
spiritual harmony. Said in 1988, by then both Galtieri and Scargill had been defeated, 
and the economic transformation of the nation was in its defining period, yet 
Thatcher’s rhetoric clarifies the reasoning behind the determined pursuit of 
confrontation with the “collective ideals” of the nation. What is apparent is the 
attachment of a moral agenda to the role of economic and social individualism – the 
notion of a collective good is marginalised and now seen as abhorrent and even evil; 
                                                          
310 M. Thatcher, Speech to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, Assembly Hall, The Mound, Edinburgh 
21st May 1988. Available at: Margaret Thatcher Foundation https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107246 
311 Ibid. 
312 Ibid.  
  
134  
  
“The real case against socialism” Thatcher argued is “not its economic inefficiency. 
Much more fundamental is its basic immorality”.313 
It is the politics of association. As an attempt to realign politics, Thatcherite morality, 
was to embrace personal freedom and the ethics of individualism. Therefore, the 
targeting of the trade union movement was to be contextualised, through a debate on 
organic freedom, a natural order of liberty, confronted by a constructed mass. 
Corporatism and trade unionism, organisations created by and for working men and 
women, were not done so in harmony with the marketplace or designed to enhance 
the individual’s role amongst the collective. Trade unionism was presented not 
simply as a political and social contemporary to be debated and countered, as an 
equal, but as an interloper, an agent to undermine the freedom of the market-based 
economy. Indeed, in Thatcher’s overtly religious symbolism, any collective 
organisation, or indeed,  
any set of social and economic arrangements which is not founded on the 
acceptance of individual responsibility will do nothing but harm.314 
There is a causal link – collective representation and the challenge to individual 
spiritual and economic freedoms. This interpretation, this conclusion, reflected 
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policies of a “conviction politician”.315 That is an interpretation of a politician on a 
mission whose identification of an enemy, lends them a sense of the required 
direction and impetus. And so, harm is caused by those institutions of the state which 
are designed to create apathy and personal indifference – the state which allows the 
individual to flounder under the “evil” pretence of socialism and the extension of the 
welfare state. The notion of good and evil, the absolutism in conviction is paramount 
in the challenge to the post-war orthodoxy. There was to be no blurred lines of 
consensus, but an alternative – an alternative to the acceptance of a consensual form 
of government or indeed the abhorrent evils of socialism. Speaking in 1975, 
Thatcher declared that socialists pursued,  
Their evil objectives with a determination and a passion which we fail to 
match at our peril. Let us from today, and until socialism is finally defeated 
in this country, fight with the conviction that our cause deserves316 
The template of conservatism’s radical departure from the 20th Century consensus is 
clear. A robust association of religiously determined conviction politics, with that of 
a clear declaration of an enemy – socialism. Morality comes in many forms – 
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socialism will dictate that the innate generosity of the human spirit, is predetermined 
to join within a collective, to shun the individual interpretation of freedom, eschewed 
by the liberal, and join in unison to forge a classless society. Socialism could not be 
allowed to dictate the moral high ground; its associations with the religious 
connotations of The New Jerusalem and the advent of the NHS and Welfare State, 
were necessarily to be tainted.  
R.H. Tawney counters this association. The morality of a collective could challenge 
the orthodoxy of the development of “individualism in the sanctification of the inner 
self alone.”317 The “doctrine of individualism”318 Tawney argues, was to define the 
essence of society as a “moral community”,319 one whose path is defined by the 
pursuit of morality and faith, rather than the spiritual purity of the individual, “faith 
albeit constrained and conditioned by material circumstanced, had in case after case, 
critically altered the course of history”.320 Therefore Tawney argues that socialism 
has parallels with Christianity. Due to the rejection of the secular world of the 
individual’s pursuit of capital and wealth – socialism is endowed by the “necessary 
colliery” of Christian belief and human “equality”. This is the relationship of 
organised labour and the Christian tradition – it is not the pursuit of wealth which is 
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paramount to the Christian tradition, it the challenge to the emphasis of the 
marketplace and market forces over the nature of humanity. There is demonstrably 
a “corrosive power of financial imperatives at the heart of market societies”321 – a 
correlation between economic manipulation and social discontent and poverty. 
There could not be a direct relationship between the driven nature of market 
dominated societies and the Christian tradition. The moral prerogative and high 
ground cannot be claimed, politically, in isolation.  
Thatcher though, was to counter Tawney directly. In an interview with The 
Telegraph in 1978, Thatcher argues that,  
there have been writers like R. H. Tawney who have condemned "the 
acquisitive society" by arguments which plainly sprang from a Christian 
culture. I respect the integrity of such men, while disputing their 
conclusions, which seem to me to rest on a total misunderstanding of how 
the modern capitalist order works.322  
Thatcher claims the association between “acquisitive society” and Christian morality 
– there is a parallel. Collective representation denies a moral basis of “personal 
choice” and individual freedom to observe a Christian tradition. Importantly, 
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Thatcher argues that the importance of the, “Christian contribution to political 
thinking” is that the, “Individual is an end to himself, a responsible moral being with 
the ability to choose between good and evil”.323 
Religiously, theoretically, morally, but most importantly politically, this statement 
is highly significant to Thatcherism. There is no doubting the moral stance the New 
Right was to take to undermine the lapse, inefficiency of the trade union movement. 
Christianity was not, as Tawney argued, directly associated with a greater good and 
a moral duty linked to the state, but it was designed for individual ethic and how the 
individual behaves, functions and interprets the world around themselves. 
Therefore, fundamental Christian goodness was not associated, and never could be, 
with the masses, the populace or the union. This was ungodly and, as alluded to 
above, essentially evil. This was the challenge the trade union movement was facing 
in the aftermath of 1979 – economic liberal ideology enforced through an energy 
that had parallels with religious conviction; a greater calling. There was to be a direct 
correlation between liberalism of individual spirit, economics and spiritual goodness 
– liberal economic policy equated spiritual goodness against the determined deviant 
collective of trade unionism. Therefore, Thatcherism was a harnessing of vital 
factors – liberal individualism, economic prudence, spiritual conviction and moral 
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certainty, into a force of nature – a movement which was to emerge, against type, 
against the consensual, clubbable nature of both the Conservative Party and the trade 
union movement. Thatcher’s Sermon on the Mound decreed that, 
There is little hope for democracy if the hearts of men and women in dem-
ocratic societies cannot be touched by a call to something greater than 
themselves. Political structures, state institutions, collective ideals—these 
are not enough. / We Parliamentarians can legislate for the rule of law. 
You, the Church, can teach the life of faith.324 
The political and industrial establishment was not enough. Not enough to carry a 
nation out of the abyss of decline, not enough to transform the soul of a nation. The 
role of politics is to “safeguard the value of the individual” – to enhance our 
freedoms and to challenge the forces which were to restrict and to deny. The 
Christian and moral connotations of Thatcherism are clear; the political order had 
rejected this fundamental message; the politics of corporatism, of socialism, of trade 
unions and appeasing One Nation conservatism, had denied these spiritual values of 
individualism and liberty. The fervour that accompanied Thatcherism through the 
political challenges of social and industrial unrest, foreign junta and internal dissent, 
was one born not through economics but the spiritual. The trade union movement 
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and the spectre of collective identity would challenge the very essence of a belief 
system based on faith and morality. This would propel a New Right to meet the 
challenge of 1984 and the conflict at Orgreave as the reconstruction of Britain had 
now transcended the political; there was now a moral agenda to be imposed. 
Thatcherism was infused with a belief system that would not curtail or U-turn: “I am 
in politics” argued Thatcher, “because of the conflict between good and evil, and I 
believe in the end good will triumph”.325  
 
2.3 Thatcher’s Creative Destruction 
Ideas in isolation remain simply rhetoric. For the New Right to succeed, for abstract 
theory to transform into economic doctrine, I argue, it would require the oxygen of 
confrontation. Thatcherite religious and moral zeal could not simply stand in 
isolation; it would serve as an energising platform for the pursuit of this 
revolutionary agenda; to implement this, there required a target, an enemy. From 
1974 and the fall of Edward Heath, there could only be one target – the static nature 
of Britain’s dormant political and industrial class. Thatcherism’s “concern” argues 
Shirley Letwin “has been with action. Thatcherism has not got what it takes to be a 
theory”.326 It is this “action” that is important – the formulation and essentially the 
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implementation of an ideologically driven agenda to nullify the trade union 
movement through confrontation. Ultimately this could be packaged as a moral 
crusade, a quasi-religious adventure, a pursuit of industrial and economic 
redemption – yet gutturally, it required an agenda – a tool in which to confront. It is 
this agenda that I present in this research: an ideological, premeditated pursuit of 
confrontation. 
The nature of this confrontation is complex. Letwin looks to describe Thatcherite 
conviction as a “metaphor of movement and direction”327 – it is one that offers 
purpose and hope. The impasse of post-war Britain needed to be resolved through a 
set of ideas and rationale that was aimed at creating tension from which this purpose 
could be resolved. There is positivity in this agenda, a rejection of regression, a 
vision of a future that was to recreate a template for British greatness; it presented a 
pursuit of vigorous virtues328 combining economic, moral and cultural certainties. 
Families, companies and individuals needed to be freed to pursue values to become, 
“upright, self-sufficient, energetic, adventurous, independent minded, loyal to 
friends and robust against their enemies”.329  
There was to be a transcendence of the political post-war norm as Thatcherism 
offered purpose. Letwin looks to Thatcherism not as a definition – but as a path. It 
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cannot be defined; it is a state of mind which is prepared to go beyond a consensus, 
to ensure a “paradigm shift” of changing both the reality and the perception of our 
relationship between “government and the governed”.330 What was once unthinkable 
was to become the reality.  
This point is important. I argue that amongst the emotive rhetoric to freedom and 
morality, lies an agenda, one that does not fit easily with a moral or quasi-religious 
crusade. The implementation of an ideologically driven template would naturally 
create shockwaves of “counter inflationary measures”331 – there would be 
repercussions. Thatcherism’s adherence to monetarism’s pursuit of “sound” money 
was acknowledged to lead to an unemployment rate “regarded by the Thatcherite as 
an acceptable price to pay for defeating inflation”.332 A belief system was moulded, 
through a moral and religious agenda, to implement swift economic policies, 
designed to cause havoc in both industrial and importantly “Tory ranks” also.333 The 
moral consequences of implementation of an economic ideological agenda were to 
prove correct in the mass unemployment figures of the 1980’s. 
Yet it is difficult to doubt the sincerity of Thatcher’s moral pursuit to end 
“stagflation” and a British malaise. Eliza Filby argues “Where critics go wrong with 
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Thatcherism is to assume that there was no moral thinking behind the economics”.334 
The emphasis placed upon microeconomic policy, the battle against state 
intervention and regulation, can be justified by Thatcherite puritanical zeal. There is 
substance in the argument that through a pursuit of economic and personal 
independence from the state, Methodist zeal was transferred “from the circuit to the 
constituency.”335 Yet Filby concurs that, “Where admirers go wrong is to appreciate 
the moral underpinnings of Thatcherism without admitting that these often 
conflicted with its economic aims”.336  
This reflects the paradox at the heart of Thatcher’s moral championing of freedom 
of economic opportunity – an acceptance of consequence. The nature of faith is one 
that is difficult to question, reflecting a personal set of beliefs and therefore there can 
be no definitive answer as to the legitimacy of a Thatcherite moral agenda. But there 
is evidence that demonstrates, as Filby argues, the conflict between an economic and 
industrial agenda, this sense of spiritual pursuit of individual liberty, and the social 
consequences caused through industrial policy – unemployment. For Thatcherism to 
exist in this vacuum, in the space between the construct of a moral, economic agenda 
and the consequences caused through attacking trade unionism and increased 
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unemployment, there must be some form of legitimising process – and it is here that 
Norman Lamont’s assertion that Thatcher, “deals in creative destruction to make her 
point” 337 becomes so relevant.  
For Joseph Schumpeter capitalism is like “a force of nature.”338 The entrepreneur 
performs a restless, continuous search for inspiration, for ideals and opportunity; for 
a construction of a new economic dynamic “which does not rely on external factors” 
to propel society by those with “vision and technique”339 who will construct 
“revolutionary creativeness”. To get to this point, to “batter down the walls” of the 
certainty of historic, sustained national economies, you need destruction – “the 
destruction is part and parcel of creativity”.340 The nature of crisis sweeps away the 
assumption of stability, it forces politicians and economists to think, and for 
creativity to exist. Schumpeter’s concept of “pure capitalism” was not simply geared 
to a greater economic efficiency, but towards a “scheme of values, an attitude 
towards life, and a civilisation”.341 An emphasis on private ownership, division of 
labour, limited state and government intervention, allowing freedom of market 
conditions – “the essence of capitalism was change”.342  
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Capitalism would adhere to a “transient existence”. There is need for constant 
renewal, a perpetual challenge to social, economic and industrial order; a need to 
reenergise and to reprioritise. With this opportunity would develop fresh seeds of 
change from the old, but this process, argues Schumpeter, does not come without 
consequence, 
But pure capitalism carried within itself the seeds of its own destruction. 
Change within the capitalist period would bring about 'an atmosphere of 
almost universal hostility to its own social order343 
For Schumpeter this panacea of “hostility” to the existent social order would be the 
ability of capitalism to innovate. There is an acceptance of a “stationary” level of 
unemployment which can be “absorbed at increasing real wage rates”, he argues, 
I do not think that unemployment is among those evils which, like poverty, 
capitalist evolution could ever eliminate of itself. I also do not think that 
there is any tendency for the unemployment percentage to increase in the 
long run. 344 
The process of “liquidation and reorganisation” would come to be seen as 
“normal”.345 The process, or rejuvenation, of development of new technology, of 
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new economic and industrial mindsets, would lead to an inevitability of 
unemployment, but this is seen as a price worth paying, as “Only through a painful 
and usually protracted process of reconstruction, ideological and practical, can the 
crisis be resolved.”346 For Schumpeter though capitalism ultimately “grows into 
socialism” and these “steps would not be retraced”347 – once capitalism was 
consumed there was no returning as a “final destination has no need to evolve”.348 
Thatcher would not accept this. Her form of creative destruction would have no U-
turns, it would lance the boil of socialism. Most importantly the embrace of a creative 
challenge to an established economic and industrial establishment would allow for 
the change; not a harbouring back to a dialectic leading to socialism – this would not 
be allowed – even if the consequences were profound. Thatcherite ideology would 
offer the impetus, through conviction and moral fortitude, to replace socialism, to 
eradicate the trade union impasse against the energy of reform. Thatcher’s no U-turn 
policy was greater than mere soundbites; it was a philosophy that was to embrace 
and accept the consequences of creative destruction, to face down inevitable 
unemployment and to deviate from socialism. She demanded the necessity for 
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change, a challenge to embrace change that is, “as necessary to a successful 
industrial economy as oxygen is to the blood stream”.349  
Thatcherism was to reject conservatism’s innate hostility to social discontent. 
Economic consequences could be transformative and there required a tacit 
understanding of the role played by unemployment in the long-term rejuvenation of 
British fortunes. In a speech to the Institute of Bankers in January of 1977, Thatcher 
argues,  
trade unionists will come to lose their understandable anxiety about the 
short-term unemployment consequences of change, whilst seeing the 
greater long-term benefits which change brings. They will see that it 
makes good sense to thin out and prune yesterday's plants so that tomor-
row's may flourish.350 
The symbolism is agonisingly simplistic in the face of over three and half million 
unemployed by 1983. The pruning and thinning out of industry and workforce has a 
resonance that did not cater for community or family; but it did inspire a New Right 
to be bold; to reengage with a form of conservatism that did not aspire to the 
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corporate mass or to the defeat at Saltley Gate. It is a direct challenge to the ideals 
of Keynesian “long term” analogies of painful economic consequences and 
diametrically opposed to trade union employment security. There would be pain in 
the short term; in the long-term Britain’s decline would be abated and again a nation 
would stand proud on a world stage. Thatcher’s “creative destruction” would accept 
the imposition of unemployment, of industrial “fragmentation” for an ultimate 
greater good.  
How was it to be possible to construct this most conflicting of social agendas? How 
to impose such a grand scheme? To implement this change, Milton Friedman, argued 
that “capitalism’s core tactical nostrum” was to challenge the “tyranny of the status 
quo.”351 Consensus, corporate power sharing, trade unionism, these “vested groups 
that have an enormously strong self-interest in pushing toward still larger and more 
expensive government”.352  
In response Naomi Klein argues a New Right requires disunity. Whether it is the 
1982 Falklands War or the 1984 miners’ strike, neoliberalism and the New Right, 
view crisis as an opportunity, the confusion associated with “disorder” allowing for 
economic and social change.353 The social consequences related to economic 
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neoliberalism are not the “result of incompetence or mismanagement”.354 It is, 
argues Klein, a reflection of the moral crusade to which Thatcherism was to be 
attached; it is a “fundamentalist” doctrine, one “Rooted in biblical fantasies of great 
floods and great fires, it is a logic that leads ineluctably towards violence.”355 Relying 
on an economic system which “requires constant growth”, disaster and conflict is 
manufactured and nurtured – leading to an acceptance of a normality of this 
perpetual change and reinvention.  
On a political level Thatcherite policy, I argue, would ultimately rely on this 
perpetuity of conflict. Her moral and religious conviction, “this great moral drama” 
a “moral vision” as Hugo Young describes it, was to lead to division between “One 
of us” or “One of them”.356 Hugo Young argues that Thatcherism presented a 
continual process, a constant series of internal and external challenges, of necessary 
victories and indeed defeats. What was required was an “irreversible shift of power 
away from the trade unions” to change a British mindset, a natural set of 
“assumptions” which British people, who occupied the post-war world, were content 
to accept. Trade unions were not seen as an unnecessary evil, but an important part 
of everyday life, a part of the furniture, of a fabric of social and political wellbeing. 
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These assumptions, this goodwill needed to be reversed indelibly for the New Right 
revolution to succeed, or as Young more eloquently subscribes, “an overturning was 
congenial to the Thatcher vision, according exactly with her need for the presence 
of good and evil.”357  
This is important; a need to provide a nemesis for the establishment to fight. For 
good to prevail, there needs to be evil – thereby to prosper one must strive and 
prevail. In a speech to the Carlton Club in 1984, Thatcher certainly outlined this 
vision with ferocious intent, 
At one end of the spectrum are the terrorist gangs within our borders, and 
the terrorist states which finance and arm them. At the other end of the 
hard-left operating inside our system, conspiring to use union power and 
the apparatus of local government to break, defy and subvert the law.358 
I argue that a New Right was constructed through a realisation of a need to embrace 
conflict – they required an enemy at the gate. An ultimate conclusion to the above 
quote was to be the labelling of the NUM an “enemy within” by a Conservative Party 
that was not prepared to “stoop to shabby compromise, pander to consensus”.359 The 
analogy of terrorist organisations sitting alongside trade unionism offers a clarity of 
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symbolism that was to fit a moral, Methodist agenda propagated by Thatcherism. It 
offers opportunity to impose Thatcher’s quasi-religious fervour, to justify dogmatic 
industrial and trade union policy – of good versus evil. Thatcher’s interpretation of 
Schumpeter’s creative destruction was justified through an acceptance and 
imposition of a moral stance; good versus evil, fitted well the methodology of 
Thatcherism. Just as Methodism was to thrive on the conquest of good versus evil, 
a pursuit of a moral agenda, would enhance political clarity. The notion of economic 
liberation, the unshackling of industrial Britain and the demonising of trade 
unionism, sat within a narrative that was played to sustain a perpetuity of change, 
firstly within the Conservative Party and secondly within the nation.  
Andrew Gamble argues that “war and slumps are great catalyst for change; without 
them, effecting transformative change becomes that much harder”.360 The labelling 
of the miners as an “enemy” – the stockpiling and preparation for this “war” 
demonstrated a targeting of the NUM, that I argue, reflects Gamble’s assertion of 
the need for this perpetual change – Thatcher’s creative destruction.  
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2.4 The Challenge to the “Tory Corporate State” 
This chapter identifies a change in conservatism and the Conservative Party post-
1974. I argue that a New Right, through an emotive, rhetorical crusade, was to target 
a post-war corporate establishment, which had allowed Britain to settle into the “rut 
of relative decline”.361 It identifies with a section of the Conservative Party, or a New 
Conservatism, one constructed through a rejection of an established process of 
political protocol, actor and industrial relations, that was to challenge a “vanity of a 
governing elite”.362 The development of this New Right would be achieved through 
the targeting of, as Middlemas describes, the “governing institutions”363 of the 
nation. Successive post-war governments would implement policy with recognition 
of civil service, business and trade unions. Dennis Kavanagh argues the role of 
government and political parties had declined, whilst the influence of these “interest 
groups crossed the political threshold and became part of an extended state”.364 This 
model had offered “political stability” as successive governments acknowledged the 
role and influence of both trade union and business that were to be gradually “sucked 
into Whitehall”.365 This produced a consensual political and socio-economic arena, 
as once conflicting interest groups now “crossed the political threshold”.366 
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Therefore the post-war period was to develop into a “world of consensus politics”.367 
It was generally a conservative with small “c” world, a world of consultation, growth 
and a “stable, national two-party system”.368 
The post-war era was one of Conservative Party success. Harold Macmillan, who 
“regarded himself a practical person”369, had defined the form of conservatism of the 
post-war years and identified with a dedication to a mixed economy, conciliatory 
wage negotiation with trade unions and the priority of the “quandary of maintaining 
full employment.”370 By 1957 the “class war was obsolete”, with the Labour Party 
concerned that “The simple fact is that the Tories identified themselves with the 
working class rather better than we did”.371  
By 1960 Britain could boast of a confident mixed economy.372 It was a time of 
expansion of output and exports, resulting with the return of the British economy to 
the black, the policy of full employment continued to succeed, and as the 
Conservative administration had won a third successive general election in 1959; 
“The Conservatives remained well satisfied throughout much of this period”.373 
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Corporatism and centrality had produced a perception of a productive nation, 
clambering from the embers of the Second World War, the welfare state was intact 
and relations with the trade union, though at times strained, were manageable and 
constructive – a country of whom the “general tone was one of buoyancy”.374  
Capitalism was to be re–engineered and modified. A tightening and interlocking of 
state, industry and trade unions into a “symbiosis of mutual accommodation” 
demonstrating an “articulation between the state and the functional interests in civil 
society.”375 The rigours of war had ensured a degree of solidarity that would enable 
a bypassing of traditional class and industrial economic division, demonstrating a 
“collective participatory basis for the organisation of production.”376 A socio-
political construct for an industrial age to forge a new form of democratic 
representation; a legitimate, inclusive attempt to cement industrial representation 
and institutional legitimacy – running parallel with democratic institutions of 
government and Parliamentary representation. Keith Middlemas argues that this 
“triangular pattern of co-operation” paved the way for the trade union movement to 
be an accepted arm of government and elevated,  
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trades unions and employers’ associations to a new sort of status; from 
interest groups they became “governing institutions” … they became 
“partners” of government with permanent rights of access and accorded 
devolved powers by the state.377 
Corporatism propelled the representatives of working classes to the heart of the 
Executive. It would reflect the “highest form of social democracy” one which was 
born from the post-war Keynesian economic drive for a mixed economy and welfare 
state. Yet a key theme that would emerge through corporatism was the challenge 
presented to a liberal democracy “marginalised by the progressive expansion of a 
tripartite process of decision making”.378 
This presented a certain challenge to New Right ideology – a series of collective, 
corporate decision-making organisations, elevating Britain from the economic post-
war crisis, to a position of influence in Europe, through tripartite policy making. The 
corporatist agenda aided the cause of the trade union movement, instilling an 
“emollient approach to trade unions”379 entailing the avoidance of confrontation and 
the extension of influence and indeed power. As Middlemas argues, by the 1960s 
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the trade union movement in Britain had become the “country’s most powerful 
pressure group”380 – government and the state were to be driven by a system of 
alliances, with a vested interest in secrecy undermining the clarity and accountability 
of Parliament. The role of the trade union, argues Middlemas, turned from pressure 
groups or special interest groups into “governing institutions” with an indirect 
mandate to cajole and persuade government policy. Though Middlemas argues that 
due to the “complexities of the British political system” corporatism itself could not 
be defined, a “corporate bias” was to reflect an “acceptance of the common national 
interest” enabling a “uniquely low level of class conflict”.381  
This “bias” though “had ramifications”.382 The fusion of Parliamentary democracy 
and corporatism, argues Jessop, was a “contradictory unit”.383 Corporatism was to 
be “destabilised, apparently deliberately, by parties trying to regain their lost 
dominance” 384 as ultimately it was to prove that “Thatcherism and corporatism 
proved to be incompatible”.385 The recognition of the limitations of corporatism lay 
                                                          
380 K. Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society; The Experience of the British System Since 1911 (London, Andre 
Deutsch, 1979), p.309. 
381 R. Whiting (1980). Politics in Industrialised Society. History Today. Available at: 
https://www.historytoday.com/richard-whiting/politics-industrial-society 
382 D. Judge, Representation: Theory and Practice in Britain (Routledge, 1999), p.131 
383 Ibid, p.132 
384 K. Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society; The Experience of the British System Since 1911 (London, Andre 
Deutsch, 1979), p.309. 
385 D. Judge, Representation: Theory and Practice in Britain (Routledge, 1999), p.132 
  
157  
  
with Edward Heath’s corporatist period 1972 - 1974, an “aberration” argues Arthur 
Seldon “in the history of the twentieth-century history of the Conservative Party”.386  
Heath had U-turned in his challenge to tripartite governance. In 1973 The Selsdon 
Manifesto proclaimed, “Britain is today approaching a state of crisis”.387 The 
Selsdon programme, originally upon which Edward Heath “had been elected”388 
Norman Tebbit argues, was to be rejected amidst a “retreat into corporatism”.389 
Originally planned by Heath as a conference in January of 1970 to provide a “fairly 
assertive restatement of the virtues of capitalism”390 it marked, argued Norman 
Tebbit, “the Tory Party’s first repudiation of the post-war Butskellite consensus”.391 
Douglas Hurd considered the gathering at Selsdon as “frivolous” 392 - but, I argue, 
the consequences were symbolic.  
Heath’s initial agenda, as demonstrated through Selsdon, was one of modernisation, 
a demonstration of “modern technocratic conservatism”.393 The pursuit of 
excellence, modernity, pragmatism and expertise had a “modernising zeal”. 394This 
was reflected at Selsdon as the “strident communiqué” of selectivity of social 
                                                          
386 S. Ball and A. Selsdon, The Heath Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal (Routledge, 1996), p.377 
387 The Selsdon Manifesto, 19th September 1973, Selsdon Group. Available at: 
http://www.selsdongroup.co.uk/manifesto.pdf 
388 N. Tebbit, Upwardly Mobile – An Autobiography (George Weidenfield & Nicolson Limited, 1988), p.105 
389 Ibid. 
390 P. Ziegler, Edward Heath: The Authorised Biography (Harper Press, 2011), p.215 
391 N. Tebbit, Upwardly Mobile – An Autobiography (George Weidenfield & Nicolson Limited, 1988), p.105 
392 Ibid 
393 D. Judge, Representation: Theory and Practice in Britain (Routledge, 1999), p.131 
394 Ibid 
  
158  
  
services and tax cuts, amidst a vigorous pursuit of law and order. 395 Yet Heath was 
to retreat from the optimism and energy of Selsdon’s reformist agenda of free 
enterprise and economic empowerment. Instead he was to revert to the comfort of a 
new “Tory Corporate State”396 of industrial and economic policy granting “de facto 
established powers”397 to non-accountable or representational bodies. The creation 
of “super ministries” and a concession of power and influence on the TUC398, these 
were to present a “mish-mash of ill-considered centralist and socialist hand to mouth 
devices”.399 The ambitions of a “clear mandate” 400 for industrial reform in 1970 
were to dissipate in the “pitched battles for pay in the public sector”.401 Heath’s 
defeat in 1974 was to become a symbol for One Nation conservatism – weakness at 
the hands of corporate power sharing. It represented not simply a case of failed 
implementation of industrial policy, but a failure in the key areas of both “political 
argument hegemony” and any form of “future governing competence”.402  
Heaths’ “disassociation”403 with Selsdon had proved symbolic. The “Selsdon 
Agenda”, the pursuit of “Quiet Revolution” with its associated “doctrinal 
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considerations”404 was rejected with a return to a “Keynesian demand boost” and the 
pretences of Macmillan. Conservatism had failed both on a macro and theoretical 
level to embrace or enforce coherent economic strategy and “in a statecraft context 
the Heath led Conservative Party represented a total failure on all levels”. The 
Conservative Party’s position in 1974 “looked extremely grim”.405 A point had been 
reached when Heath’s interpretation of a Tory statecraft and British corporatism had 
failed. A “new Toryism”406 was to question,  
what is of far greater moment is that the Government’s apparent 
abandonment of its previous electoral commitment to the free economy 
invites the question ‘whether the Conservative Party is at present fulfilling 
any meaningful function in British politics.407 
This is a highly significant development. Conservatism has always wanted to portray 
to an electorate the ability to “govern effectively” using various “dimensions of 
statecraft”.408 Within these, a perception of competence cannot be understated.409 Yet 
argues E.H.H. Green, “As the Conservative Century came to an end, and it seemed 
                                                          
404 M. Burch & M. Moran, British Politics: A Reader (Manchester University Press, 1987), p.174 
405 Ibid.  
406 The Spectator, (1973). Enoch Powell and the Liberal Revival.  Available at: 
http://archive.spectator.co.uk/page/11th-august-1973/3 
407 The Selsdon Manifesto, 19th September 1973, Selsdon Group. Available at: 
http://www.selsdongroup.co.uk/manifesto.pdf 
408 T. Heppell, The Tories: From Winston Churchill to David Cameron (Bloomsbury, 2012), p.173 
409 Ibid 
  
160  
  
that even if the Conservative Party had survived, conservatism had not”.410 Heath’s 
administration had reflected weakness; Selsdon’s agenda was to exploit this 
watershed moment – the weakness in the way that conservatism was perceived. 
When Selsdon’s inquisitors question the “meaningful nature” of the Conservative 
Party, it is questioning the core ability of the party to govern. This cuts to the core 
of Conservative Party statecraft. The Selsdon group responded, that “It is not our 
intention either to initiate or to engage in any struggle with the Conservative 
leadership as such”, yet it then retorts,  
We merely wish to start a serious discussion within the Party about its 
goals and the direction in which we want to see it move.411 
To those of us who believe that genuine choice between the Parties gives 
politics its meaning and dignity, this state of affairs is intolerable and must 
be changed: hence the formation of the Selsdon412 
This intolerability reflects the shift in perception in direction the Conservative Party 
was to take. Organised labour would need to be exorcised from the corridors of 
power – and, as Andrew Gamble argues, the consensual approach of the tripartite 
system would be challenged to, “Restore both the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
                                                          
410 E.H.H. Green, Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the 20th Century (Oxford University 
Press, 2002), p.320. 
411 The Selsdon Manifesto, 19th September 1973, Selsdon Group. Available at: 
http://www.selsdongroup.co.uk/manifesto.pdf 
412 Ibid 
  
161  
  
government”.413 This legitimacy lies in the principles of the pursuit of capital 
hegemony – the restoration of the economic pursuit of power as the central plank of 
society. Thatcherism and the New Right’s crusade intended to liberate the market 
from the shackles of this Heath’s Tory corporatism. To replace the post-war 
consensus with a march of privatisation and the private sector; as Gamble argues, 
the New Right would strip “from the state the extended roles”414 to “dismantle 
corporatism”415 to maintain the strength of the state to perform neoliberal economic 
reform.  
The Selsdon Group would not deviate from its manifesto for change and of the 
pursuit of “economic freedom”. It would challenge the Conservative government to 
“abandon its present ragbag of authoritarian collectivist policies”416 that the 
corporate experiment had delivered. A rallying call for a New Right, Selsdon was to 
reflect a shift in the dynamic of the Conservative Party – one from an extension of 
the post-war agenda of conciliation to one that was to question the nature of its own 
party’s direction. Gone was the fudge of corporatism and instead, a rallying call for 
clarity.  
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By 1973 the direction of a Conservative Party administration was challenged 
publically. It lamented the “the continuing failure of the Government’s counter 
inflation strategy” and “The Government’s about turns in economic policy are, alas, 
bringing this situation about”. Indeed, so dire was the scenario of corporate 
mismanagement that the Selsdon Group, once a reformist platform for Heathite 
modernisation, was to declare that “Britain is today approaching a state of crisis”417 
– “If the present trends continue, the electorate will only have a choice between two 
brands of collectivism at the next General Election: Socialism V. The Tory 
Corporate State”. It presented a “profoundly un-Conservative nostrum”.418  
The consensus could not hold. Muddling through pragmatically in the face of ever 
stronger trade union militancy, siphoning the authority of Parliamentary democracy, 
extending the role of the state – none of this could any longer be tolerated. Corporate 
Britain, the acceptance of industrial representation within the corridors of power, 
could not be sustained. There needed a “Conservative counter revolution”419 to 
restore the “intolerable” developments within the Conservative Party. There required 
a clarity of vision, a realignment of Tory values that were “instinctively repelled by 
the extent of central direction” required by the corporate experiment. A Conservative 
Party should not be required to operate incomes policy, to be always outbid by the 
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trade unions in “Britain’s adversarial political system”.420 There required change; 
this was to come in the form of Thatcherism.  
2.5 Conclusions 
A New Conservatism was to re-design itself as a New Right and began to assert its 
influence and authority post-1974. This was a form of conservatism, I argue, that 
was prepared to challenge the predetermined post-war position of One Nation 
conservatism – a rejection of One Nation politics and the Tory “minimalist 
statecraft” of Harold Macmillan.421 Lawson’s “conscious change of direction”422 as 
he himself describes, was to challenge the rationale of post-war government. I argue 
that this perception or construction of a “New Conservatism” was a paradox; of a 
new institution challenging its own meaning as bastion of status quo conservatism. 
To gain the momentum necessary for a national and moral recovery, I argue that 
there required a form of creative destruction – this in contrast to both Conservative 
values and the fudge of corporatism, was designed through a combative rhetoric. It 
was restless and relentless and no more so than in the 1982 Falkland’s war. The 
conflict was to see the use of language which “evoked a sense of Britishness as a 
libertarian refusal to surrender interest or power to any version of collectivism.”423 
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And it is this symbolism, these analogies, that were to be transposed to the domestic, 
home front. Thatcher was to proclaim that the “competent, courageous and resolute” 
military qualities, were, “A lesson we must apply to peace just as we have learned 
in war.424 It is these lessons, indeed a template for conflict, resonating as an 
international victory that would ultimately return in a war footing in the 1984 miners’ 
conflict.  
War would accompany Thatcher’s implementation of her moral crusade. The 
language of war, the rhetoric of external military conflict, transferred to an industrial 
battlefield. I argue that this confirms the implementation of her creative destruction 
agenda. The use of military language in the same breath as the working classes was 
to be unique – the perception of an “enemy within” an enemy amongst us, was an 
absolute fault-line with the traditions of One Nation rhetoric. The symbolism of 
industrial representation would alter. There was now a link between domestic, 
industrial representation and aggression and confrontation. It is this perception, and 
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the ability to manipulate it,425 which allowed Thatcherism to attack the “authoritative 
working-class leadership in the trade unions”.426 
This chapter reveals that the introduction to this narrative would culminate in 1984 
– a change in party political identity, the implementation of a moral fervour, the 
acceptance of a need to break free from consensus and ultimately the designating of 
a necessary target – by defeating the trade union movement. The rhetoric used 
against organised labour reflects the change in conservatism and within sections of 
The Conservative Party itself. Trade unionism was to have now been perceived as 
responsible for a country that was in a “grave position, of crisis proportion.”427 Trade 
unionism was not a rallying call for positive action and association but increasing 
militancy and threat to democracy. In a speech to the House of Common in 1979, 
Thatcher decreed that, “Some unions are so powerful that they are able to deprive 
the community of the essentials of life”.428 In January 1979 Jim Callaghan was to 
offer the Leader of the Opposition some words of wisdom regarding relations 
between government and the trade union movement. Callaghan warned,  
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that anger and indignation are emotions that it is right to display… But I 
would seriously and earnestly beg the right hon. Lady not to give way to 
overmuch indignation when she is negotiating on these issues. We have 
found by a long experience of history that it is not sufficient to refer to a 
large number of one's fellow citizens, as one of the Sunday newspapers 
did, as enemies within the gate.429 
History demonstrates that Callaghan’s words were not adhered to. The perception of 
“enemies” was embraced to offer clarity and purpose to the New Conservatives. The 
fudge of corporatism and consensus, the lack of clarity of government – this required 
the enemy that was the trade union movement to offer purpose to install a new form 
of politics. Politics of the moral, the driven and the pursuit of individual freedom. 
Corporatism was to be associated with the demise of the human spirit, the lack of 
drive from industry, the lack of creativity in commerce and a fundamental malaise 
of the British spirit. Here we can associate Thatcherism’s link between the emotive, 
socio-religious pursuit of individual autonomous harmony with, what would be 
associated as the evils of the post-war world – co-operation, demarcation and 
representation of the mass, through a legitimate diffusion of power to representative 
bodies associated with both the traditions of classical conservatism and trades 
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unionism. The demise, the decline of Britain, a was debate so vast, that in the 
Thatcherite, New Conservative perception there was one answer and one cure – the 
defeat of the regressive tactics of industrial Britain, the challenge to the hegemony 
of corporatism and the cure of purity of freedom and individualism. 
The evidence presented in this chapter reveals the development of a path to this 
confrontation through a rejection of One Nation politics. I have demonstrated a 
change in the perception of conservatism; from an associate of corporatism, to an 
advocate of conflict. This was a design to construct a new form of conservatism. One 
that was to be based on doctrine and based upon faith – faith in the market driven, 
neo-liberal policies of individualism, faith in the pursuit of the halt in decline of 
Britain and faith in adhering to a challenge to the traditions of One Nation 
conservatism and the post-war political consensus. Ultimately this chapter has 
identified a formulation of a theoretical framework, one that was to construct an 
agenda that was to rearrange the dynamic between government and corporatism; a 
shift in a perception of trade unionism and its role within a tripartite, consensual, 
governing structure. I have analysed in this chapter a challenge to corporatism, a 
rejection of conciliatory principles and the development of a new socio-political 
agenda; one driven by a desire for both internal and external conflict, bound by the 
new ethos of moral economic doctrine; one that ultimately, was bound to a need for 
confrontation with the trade union movement.  
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Chapter 3 – Enoch Powell – Thatcher’s Teacher  
3.0 Introduction 
“There is no “doubt that Powellism helped to produce Thatcherism”430 
In this chapter I argue that Powellism acted as the template for ideological reform 
within the Conservative Party; a prioritising of economic freedom and British 
Parliamentary sovereignty. To understand the construct and rise of a New Right, it 
is necessary to understand the nature and influence of Powellism. As a loose set of 
political theories, thoughts, speeches and political actions, Powellism offers context 
to the construct of a new form of conservatism post-1974. To understand the 
significance of Thatcher and ultimately Thatcherism, of Keith Joseph and the ideals 
of freedom, economics, sovereignty and individual liberty, Enoch Powell offers 
clarity of thought, a clarity of purpose and a theoretical road map of New Right 
politics. Powellism offers inspiration to a new form of politics; he would dare to 
discuss issues that were “outside the mainstream of British politics”431 clearing a 
controversial pathway for Thatcherism to tread. In discussing “Britain’s existential 
crisis” 432 born from the haemorrhaging of sovereign power, the challenge to the 
“fragile entity” of British identity and the desire for freedom, Powell could accept 
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the slings and arrows that the establishment would throw; he was a maverick who 
could countenance of controversy. His contentious and highly flammable 
protestations, the issues and debates he was to discuss, however broad and 
articulately presented, were to see him sacked; yet he was to lay the foundations for 
Thatcherism.  
Powellism offers an absolutism that allowed the development of policy that was 
rhetorically, economically and politically combative; he would inspire through 
saying the unsayable, breaking post-war consensual political taboos. Though Powell 
was to fail in the context of statecraft political legitimacy and efficiency - he was to 
be removed from government by Heath - his determined challenge to these political 
orthodoxies predetermined the eventual ideologically driven challenge to consensus. 
Therefore, Powellism, I argue, offers legitimacy to sustain Thatcherism’s 
reinterpretation of conservatism and the challenge to the trade union movement.  
 
3.1 Powellism & Ideology  
It is “impossible” to understand the development of a New Right within the 
Conservative Party without acknowledging the “ideology of Powellism.”433 Prior to 
the development of Powellism, within the Conservative Party, there was no 
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alternative to “the system of hegemony” 434 of consensus. It would become apparent 
that a “new course” was available to conservatism and through the vocal and 
intellectual challenge, “a conscious change of ideological direction in the 
Conservative Party” 435 would emerge.  
Powellism would demonstrate clearly this ideological vision. Andrew Gamble 
argues that it would be his “ideological offensive” that would offer a “new national 
strategy to the Tories”. It would be one that ultimately he, individually, would not 
follow, as he would have to accept his “political isolationism” that his “clear cut” 
alternative would offer.436 Yet economically, morally and politically for the New 
Right, Powell’s “constant ideological pressure”437 would inject a dynamism and an 
intellectualism, one that the Conservative Party would find “hard to resist”.438 
Powell’s self-destruction – his “monstrous reputation”439 that has emerged post-1968 
– would in many ways be his national epitaph, his name a metaphor for paranoid 
fear of immigration; yet his abstract conceptualism, his political boldness and 
oratorical bravery, were to eventually see his interpretation of the roles and functions 
of government “became commonplace”440 in the march of New Right “Conservative 
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populism”. In understanding Powellism, I argue, one can identify the route that 
Thatcherism took towards industrial conflict in 1984. 
His theories were to “float into the mainstream Thatcher age”:441 fierce nationalism, 
economic policy designed upon the purity of the market place, the attack on 
socialism and suspiciousness of the state. Though personally distanced from her 
“intellectual mentor”442 Thatcher was to adopt the mantra of a challenge to the 
unnatural enforcement of consensus and the “abolishing of man-made obstacles”.443 
These obstacles were for Powell the “collectivist illusion.”444 The conceit of 
government who formulated and imposed ideas of whose origins were wholly 
unnatural – what is paramount for government is a pursuit of the “natural necessity 
of things”.445 This necessity extends to a notion of the “unlimited supremacy of 
Crown in Parliament” – allegiances, created and sustained through history, that were, 
for English subjects “effortless and unconstrained”.446 The British constitution is an 
“abstraction” that reflects “living reality of Parliament” – the embodiment of the 
political will of the nation and of “the people themselves”. The legislature to Powell 
was sacrosanct – it was and is, a symbol of the freedom and birth right of the British 
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people, a demonstration of the “consent of the people”.447 To meddle, to alter or 
distort, to add new born organisations within these corridors of power, was to 
challenge the “integrity of the nation”.448 
The British, argued Powell, “are creatures of precedent”. 449 There is no “document 
or treaty” to formulate British law, but the “omnipotence of Parliamentary 
procedure” is born through “precedent authority” of the will of the British people.450 
Willingness to accord with an historical “evolutionary” mandate that evolves and 
changes over time, yet is still “not incompatible with the strongest emotional 
attachment to precedent”.451 This unwritten agreement, has organically offered 
stability and harmony; alter this precedent, tamper with the delicate eco-structure of 
Englishness and its dedicated pursuit of freedom, would be the “quickest way to 
ensure a rebellion”.452 
And for Powell this moment of rebellion was to come in the form of consensus and 
corporatism. The “effortless” sources of Englishness, the natural, libertarian ethos 
found within the English soul, would be diluted through consensus, the media, the 
European Community and the trade union movement. The working man and woman 
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would no “longer dare trust their own wits” due to a supposed domination “by their 
betters”. Individual virtues of independence of mind and spirit were now “trapped 
or imprisoned” and for Powell, this entrapment of the people to the “benign” 
dictatorship of the bureaucrat was never “racial or religious discrimination: it is 
communalism”. 453 
Therefore, corporatism’s agenda challenges the very fabric of Parliamentary 
sovereignty and British identity. Consensus politics lacked a purity of conviction, it 
represented a challenge against an established order and ultimately the rule of law. 
The role is of government is to govern, not to cooperate and to conciliate; Powell 
argued that, “Government by request has an engaging appearance, but it conceals 
the germs of tyranny and is inconsistent in principle with the rule of law”.454 An 
extension to the parameters of non-legislative power, an acceptance of a differing 
form of social contract or construct, whether it be the trade union movement or an 
acceptance of a multicultural, multinational society, diffuses and weakens the 
existing and historic moral, political and social boundaries of society.  
There is no negotiating the role of Parliament as “No treaty binds, or can bind, what 
Parliament does”.455 The nation prospers through a delicate, historical precedent – a 
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balance which needs to hold in deference the past and its values. The rise of 
collectivism and the trade union movement was to present a challenge and a 
constraint to this delicate relationship. The retreat from empire and Britain’s 
contribution to the victory over fascism, had offered opportunity to readdress and 
tamper with the “omnipotent” values of Parliamentary democracy. The development 
of consensus and corporatism were to offer “inconsistent compromise”456 which was 
to “constrain the nation’s resources and talents”.457 Powell argued in a speech in 
Wolverhampton in 1963,  
The ultimate degradation in politics is to try to cling to power by 
borrowing your opponents’ policies: nothing destroys a party so surely. 
What we stand for is neither socialism nor an inconsistent compromise 
with socialism, but the direct opposite… We offer neither servitude, nor 
the safety, ease and irresponsibility of servitude – we offer freedom.458 
Powell was to look to the principle of freedom as the “highest political good.”459 It 
was for men to make their choice to be “right or wrong, wise or foolish” and most 
importantly to “obey their own consciences, to follow their own initiatives”.460 There 
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is no “superior wisdom” of government that “serves but does not aspire to 
dominate”.461 Yet he was to speak of a post-war world, in which he saw a challenge 
to this very primary vestige of British political values. And it was a challenge 
orchestrated by an establishment determined to challenge the very fabric of British 
political discourse. Collective forces were to conspire against the elemental nature 
of Englishness – “We live in an age of conspiracies” he argues and “The politics of 
the last few years have been little more than a series of conspiracies conducted by 
the politicians and the press”.462 These presented an elite, a “dictatorship, benign, 
bureaucratic, even parliamentary, but still a dictatorship.”463 
And it was this establishment that required challenging. Thatcherism, as Stuart Hall 
argues, thrives on the art of the construction of a protagonist. Hall argues, that 
Thatcherism was to succeed “by directly engaging the ‘creeping socialism’ and 
apologetic state collectivism’ of the Conservative ‘wets’. It strikes at the “very nerve 
centre of consensus politics”.464 The “strength” of Thatcherism is in its “commitment 
to break the mould” to forge an identity and to challenge a prevailing consensus. 
This Thatcher was to achieve through her “peasants’ revolt”465 and it stems directly 
                                                          
461 Ibid. 
462 E. Powell, Speech, We live in an age of conspiracies, 11th May 1968, Chippenham Girls School. Available at: 
http://enochpowell.info/Resources/ 
463 Ibid. 
464 Hall, S. (1984). The Great Moving Right Show, Marxism Today. Available at:  
http://www.hegemonics.co.uk/docs/Great-Moving-Right-Show.pdf 
465 Ibid 
  
176  
  
from Powellism. Powell understood and advocated the need to confront this 
established “dictatorship” those who thrive on an “increase in the power and 
expenditure of governments”.466  
Powellism challenged the “functions of government”. It was to challenge how the 
state had foregone its “elementary duty” of deference to the protection of freedom 
of its citizens,467 and how government had become “engrossed with the functions of 
government" while interfering with individuals and “rearranging society” without 
performing the most basic duty of protecting individual liberty.468 Therefore Powell 
was to challenge and ultimately “exclude himself from the political elite.”469 He was 
to be sacked for proclaiming the darker side of English nationalism in his “rivers of 
blood speech”470 and was to take refuge in Ulster unionism. Yet his legacy to 
Thatcherism is that of defiance, a regression to an England that had returned from 
the wilderness of post-imperialism and sought a form of salvation. Powell would tap 
into a discontent with the established political classes and above all seek to shake up 
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a political elite who he accused of foregoing the “people themselves” who had “been 
cowed into a condition of passive acquiescence.”471 
This is in many respects, I argue, is Powell’s greatest legacy to Thatcherism – the 
annulment of class in search of the dismantling of established, consensual, post-war 
elites. The purity of Powell’s vision, his oratorical brilliance, clearly defines an 
establishment oppressing the working classes; an elite that had established a 
dominance over the working man, whose subordination to class, political party and 
trade union, had deemed the struggle for their individual rights and responsibilities, 
within an ancient, sovereign nation sacrificed to “deliver themselves passively to the 
guidance and domination of their betters”.472 
Powellism is a cry against creeping globalisation and a changing modern world. His 
interpretation of post-war Britain was to be controversial and divisive, but never 
simplistic. Powell argued that the British people had “been abandoned to those who 
hated her”.473 And, who were these people? A political elite, manifesting itself within 
the media and civil rights movements, the intelligentsia, the universities, rioting 
students – the symbolism of a “moral ascendency”.474 
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Powell saw a natural legitimacy in Parliament and government. His concern was that 
the historical precedent of sovereign and parliamentary authority was being 
undermined – by unelected, unaccountable and undemocratic bodies. And in this 
there was a challenge to the very heart and soul of national sovereignty – a challenge 
to the “authority of civil government.” Powell spoke at Northfield, Birmingham in 
1970 proclaiming that “Britain at this moment is under attack.” The enemy was 
“invisible or disguised”, one that did not manifest in an “external enemy” or the 
“shape of armoured divisions.”475 Powell saw race not as a cause, but a symbol – 
“the real enemy were not immigrants” he argued, the enemy were those in the 
establishment who had forgotten their duty to England’s “moral sphere” and the 
“integrity” of the nation.476 Those in power, those establishment figures were to be 
his “enemy within” and he would “attack them head on”. 477 
 
3.2 Powellism, Trade Unions and the “Fascist, corporate state”  
Powellism is a means of uniting two “twin ideological traditions”478 – economic 
liberalism and traditional Toryism. One places an emphasis on the allowance for, 
and liberation of, the freedom of the market – of government understanding the role 
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of the marketplace in its decision making and of governments ability to self-impose 
“strict limits” of control. The other acknowledges the sanctity of a sovereign 
Parliament, social order and cohesion and the state’s obligation to protect its citizens 
and its authority to do so.479 These seemingly diametrically opposed mantra sought 
the freedom of economic and labour movement, promoted through the use of state 
strength and legitimacy. In many ways, this reflects Powell’s broad and changing 
intellectual and ideological mindsets, but it also identifies an individual, and an 
ideological “strand of English conservatism”480 that was to challenge the post-war 
corporate orthodoxy.  
Powell was to deny that trade unionism “had produced any real benefits for their 
members”.481 Trade unions presented the “type of absurdity which people only 
entertain when they are desperately determined to do so”482 – the logic and the 
evidence, argued Powell, did not suggest that the “remuneration” of the working 
man and woman had been greatly affected by the imposition of the “restraint of 
trade” or “restriction of competition”.483 The post-war improvement in standards of 
living had been maintained through the rise in technological innovation – indeed the 
role of the trade union movement had polarised the working classes. Trade 
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unionism’s reliance on collective bargaining had in effect not resulted in a collective 
result for working people – there had been a “hoodwinking” of the “vast majority of 
their fellow citizens”. Trade unions, affected “divide and rule” – those in unionised 
industries, through union coercion, would challenge the true nature of supply and 
demand, driving up wage costs, thereby distorting the natural equilibrium.484 
In contrast, for Powell capitalism presented a form of “supernatural providence”.485 
It was a system that, if allowed, was capable of defeating “human evils”. Indeed, 
Powell in The Times in 1964, was to present the free market as an “enemy of 
discrimination between individuals, classes and races”.486 Preceding Powell’s 
rhetoric of 1968 this important – a liberated and unfettered free market was an 
“immortal wonder”487 providing maximum benefit for all concerned, regardless of 
background – for government or political ideology, socialism or state planning to 
interfere was no less than a “tilt at providence”.488 For Powell, there was only one 
way to enforce the freedom of individual access to the benefits of the unfettered 
marketplace – restrict and defeat socialism; “There is an essential and an 
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ineradicable conflict between socialism itself and the freedom of the individual 
under the law”.489 
The “vocal organs”490 for socialism were the trade union movement. Trade unions 
were designed to enslave the individual economically and morally – to make 
ordinary working people the “scapegoat for evils” as their liberty was deprived. The 
closed shop, endured due to the freedom of association, did so due to the 
impingement of right of “non-association” of an individual. Indeed, the whole 
emphasis of the trade union movement was one built upon the degradation of the 
British working man being responsible for the failure of collective government 
responsibility; “the sermons and threats, the controls and boards, the prices and 
incomes acts, the dreary apparatus of punitive Budgets”.491 These have 
disempowered the individual to such an extent that, as to; 
carry us far down the road to the fascist, corporate state, where the 
economic life and decisions of the individual are regulated by corporations 
of employers and trade unions.492 
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The language of Powell is stark – the association of fascism to the post-war world is 
obvious and emotive. Yet for Powell there is relevance to the analogy, however 
stark, as the trade union movement challenged what was at the very essence of 
Powellism – national identity. The nation is the “key form of community” – it is 
multifaceted, multi-dimensional, delicate and most importantly, organic. It is created 
through an evolutionary process of the definition of core values and principles – it is 
not constructed or built – it evolves. And of importance, the notion of identity, of 
Englishness, is an emotion; Powell argued that “a nation is not a rational thing and 
there is no construction or a rational base for nationhood. What a nation is, is what 
it feels to be, instinctively and emotionally”.493 A nation would be constructed and 
live “by its myths” – of which there is good or indeed bad, of which needed to be 
replaced. The myth of Empire, of lingering post-war supremacy, accentuated racism, 
superiority and division – “Empire was built on political mythology” was designed 
to mask our weaknesses as a nation. The legacy of British imperialism, argues 
Powell, was to allow for the “durability of policies”494 post-empire and the 
sustainability of the establishment and rigidity of the class system.  
This is reflected in the trade union movement. The myth of British industrial 
dominance, of being the “workshop of the world” and engine of industrialisation 
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inflicted a form of “social imperialism” that was not detached from the fading of 
empire. The British working man, toiling in the factory, mine or field, represented 
by the collective spirit of the union and yet unrewarded. This “myth” of a 
paternalistic “coercive state” blinded people to the necessity of allowing the 
instinctive nature of the markets to flourish. Money for Powell was “colour blind” 
as the market place created a “moral community” and morality could not exist 
outside this community.495 An “organic” and “evolutionary entity” the market cannot 
be tampered with, distorted, “planned, controlled or universalised”.496 
Government and trade union attempt to do just that – with consequences. Inflation, 
“with all its attendant evils”, Powell argued at a speech in Chippenham in 1968, 
comes about, “for one reason and one reason only; the Government causes it”.497 
Weak government holding, “a sort of emotional feeling about high 
unemployment”498 was to pander to trade union power and artificially design and 
control wage increase. The “battle for freedom is on,” Powell rallied, “nor is the 
enemy only outside the gates; he is inside as well, a fifth column wearing sometimes 
the most disarming and unsuspected of disguises”499. The trade union, not for the 
last time, was deemed as an enemy inside the establishment: a mythologised 
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organisation that was guilty for abandoning the natural order of government; “The 
trade unions have clapped the handcuffs on to their own wrists, gone into the dock, 
and pleaded guilty to causing inflation”.500  
The unnatural pursuit of full employment must not hinder the development of a free 
market. Peter Dorey argues that Powell saw the whole “concept of incomes policy 
as a fraud”501 – inflation caused through political decision making. Wage negotiation 
and the artificiality of government incomes policy was a, “Nonsense, a silly 
nonsense, a transparent nonsense. What is more it is dangerous nonsense”.502 A 
memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Peter Thorneycroft, presented to 
the cabinet in July 1957, noted that this disease of inflation must be made clear to 
the public, “the source of our inflationary disease is wages increasing out of 
proportion to increases in production”.503 Inflationary measures were not determined 
by the Treasury but by the TUC with ultimately “corporatist implications”. The TUC 
and the movement it represented would be seen by the public to be holding sway on 
government economic progress – ultimately, again facing the symbolic implications 
of a fascist state and rejection of Parliamentary sanctity. Powell warned that Britain, 
through inflationary measures controlled through trade union influence, was in 
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“Imminent danger of slipping unawares into that form of State socialism which is 
known as fascism”. 504 
Again, the symbolic reflection of trade unionism with fascist ideology – and as per 
1939, this would have to be defeated. Peter Thorneycroft would go on to outline the 
importance of defeating the “disease” of inflation, insofar as he argues that as a 
nation we would have to,  
consider measures which may be economically undesirable or politically 
difficult, if they show any reasonable chance of securing stability in costs 
or prices.505  
The quote is important. This research demonstrates the linear change in Conservative 
Party policy towards industrial relations – the deconstruction of internal Cabinet 
consent amid the introduction of ideologically driven industrial policy. The 
analogies of fascism and disease predetermine a newly sought mindset, one that was 
to transcend the notions of accountable statecraft, and to employ policy based upon 
ideological assumptions, that was once deemed unacceptable.  
And this, I argue, demonstrates a formulation of a vision; for Powell, an historic 
moment had come. Characters who were driven by their passions, not always 
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“happy” or indeed good, but those who were prepared challenge the cynicism of the 
existing established order through the driven pursuit of a single goal.506 Powell 
constituted an “historical individual” as he was to deny the traits of popularity for 
one of purpose and principle; at a rally in Shipley in 1974, after criticising the Heath 
government, a member of the audience yelled, “Judas” – Powell retorted, “Judas was 
paid! Judas was paid! I am making a sacrifice!”507 And there is no “doubt that 
Powellism helped to produce Thatcherism.”508 It did so through a dedication to an 
ideological stance of the absolutism of certainty; indeed, it was a “state of 
certainty”509 that both Powellism and Thatcherism possessed, that was to prove the 
fuel to propel ideologically based change upon the Conservative Party and its 
relationship with the trade union movement. It showed the fallacy of wage 
negotiation and industrial planning, of poor leadership, party management and 
clouded vision, formulated through consensus and corporatism and that there was a 
need to “abolish and remove these “man-made obstacles.”510 Powellism challenges 
the planned, collective economy, the “dreams and fallacies” that have thwarted 
productivity, post-imperial revival and national unity; and above all the ability for 
government to “tell us the truth”.511 This purity of spirit, of sovereignty, of 
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economics and of Parliamentary protocol, drove Powellism to be able to challenge 
and to confront. Ultimately, he was to lose out to the establishment; but he was to 
pass the baton to another to forge an ideological legacy of freedom.  
Powell “for better or worse” was a teacher rather than a legislator”512. He argued that 
the role of an MP “is to provide people with words and ideas which will fit their 
predicament better than the words and ideas they are using at the present”. This was 
to be his legacy; it was not one of legislative gravitas, but theoretical influence. 
Powell’s independence and defiance, his desire to challenge established post-war 
protocols and steadfastness in thought, would inspire Thatcherism, indeed, “he was 
a precursor of Margaret Thatcher’s views”.513 
 
3.3 Keith Joseph and “Man-made chaos” 
Keith Joseph was converted in 1974 from classical conservatism of a “government 
of all the talents” to a “real Conservative.”514 The notion of this “real Conservative” 
argued Ian Gilmour, in reality, entailed a belief in monetarism to control inflation 
and the rejection of “traditional Tory principles”.515 Joseph had been “born again” 
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politically and economically, yet argues Gilmour, it was to a dogma formulated in 
“distant ideological shores”.516 His new “Conservatism” had been located and 
sharpened at the IEA517 and refined at the CPS518 – economic think tanks, designed 
predominantly to change the British culture. This is a pivotal step in the redesigning 
of both conservatism and its relationship to organised labour. Joseph’s willingness 
to convert from an established form of conservatism was due to the unwillingness, 
and ability, of the Conservative Party to change a culture. To enforce dramatic 
change, to reassert British interests and the revert decline, as it was, 
useless to rely on the Tory Party machine to inspire that change – the party 
machine was designed to win elections, not change a culture, and tended 
to be in the business of pragmatism and consensus.519 
This was a direct challenge to the Conservative Party of pragmatism and consensus. 
Keith Joseph wanted, like Enoch Powell prior to him, a politics of conviction; 
politics, as seen by Margaret Thatcher that were to be “closely associated with the 
rethinking of Conservative principles.”520 Joseph was prepared to question an 
established interpretation of conservatism, to reclaim post-1975, a “true meaning of 
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conservatism.”521 Joseph and the “Conservative Party had found a doctrine”,522 a 
doctrine founded on principles of sound money, the burning of bureaucratic control 
and, above all, the control of inflation. These ambitions were formulated, I argue, 
not through the collective Cabinet approved agenda of a control of public 
expenditure and the rejection of statutory control, but through adherence to dogma. 
As Jim Prior was to critique, the priority for a New Right,  
was control of the money supply and that Professors Milton Friedman and 
Hayek, as the high priests of monetarism, stood above all others as our 
prophets and our gurus523 
The “word that mattered most for economic debate” post-1974 was monetarism.524 
Joseph was to aspire to Powellism’s remit of the winning the “battle of ideas” 525 and 
it would be monetarism which would now prevail as the philosophy of choice. This 
presented the shift in ideological mindset within the Conservative Party as “inflation 
had become a bigger enemy than unemployment”.526 Monetarism’s virtue is 
governmental control of monetary supply. By “turning off the tap” of the supply of 
money there is a degree of control for government of the rate of inflation – as argued 
                                                          
521 Ibid. 
522 J. Prior, A Balance of Power (Hamish Hamilton, 1986), p.104 
523 J. Prior, A Balance of Power (Hamish Hamilton, 1986), p.104 
524 R. Vinen, Thatcher’s Britain: The Politics and Social Upheaval of the 1980’s (Pocket Books, 2009), p.108 
525 M. Halcrow, Keith Joseph – A Single Mind (Macmillan, 1989), p.57 
526 J. Prior, A Balance of Power (Hamish Hamilton, 1986), p.104 
  
190  
  
Nigel Lawson, “changes in the quantity of money determine, at the end of the day, 
changes in the general price level”.527 There is an indelible link between inflation 
and the supply of money. Too much money ensured the “miseries of inflation” as 
demonstrated by the Heath government who, Friedman argued, simply “churned out 
too much money”.528  
As an economic doctrine, it had no history within modern conservatism. Heralding 
predominantly from the American economist Milton Friedman, yet as Nigel Lawson 
acknowledged, David Hume was its “true founder”, it advocates that it is the role of 
government to determine the quantity and supply of money in society. It had a 
variety of definitions; for Enoch Powell, it alleviated government “tinkering”, for 
Denis Healey, it was a term of abuse in the form of “sado monetarists”.529 For Joseph 
and his vision of conservatism, it would be utilised as a mechanism of control – a 
tool, enabling the construction of a greater agenda of societal control. Indeed 
monetarism, for Joseph, though essential in formulating a Conservative identity, 
alone was “not enough”. In April 1976, three years prior to the party’s Right 
Approach manifesto, Joseph offered a glimpse of this new economic and moral 
agenda – indeed a warning that,  
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Monetarism is not enough. This is not intended as a counsel of despair, 
but a warning note… We are over-governed, over-spent, over-taxed, over-
borrowed and over-manned530 
I argue that the use of the term “over-manned” is important in demonstrating an 
ideological agenda. Joseph’s rallying call would see him become the “obvious 
standard bearer of the free market Right”.531 It was difficult argues Geoffrey Howe, 
to “exaggerate the importance of the continuing intellectual stimulus” 532 that Joseph 
provided. He was the first Conservative frontbench figure to look beyond the need 
to simply “get the flow of money spending right”533 as this was a mandatory 
requirement of any mandated government; what Joseph provided was the ideological 
framework upon which Thatcherism looked to extend law and services which 
“permit people to make maximum number of decisions for themselves”.534 
Government should withdraw from making decisions based on a distortion of the 
working of the natural market economy – wage and price control. The state’s 
commitment to a “compulsory collectivism” maintenance of full employment 535 
ultimately would lead to dire consequences. Joseph was to release a torrent of 
accusatory rhetoric, referring to the savage repercussions of trade union 
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representation and the evils of inflationary mismanagement. Strong trade unionism 
ultimately creating inflation through the driving up of unrealistic wages as inflation, 
Joseph argues,  
Is threatening to destroy our society… The distress and unemployment 
that will follow unless the trend is stopped will be catastrophic 536  
Therefore, for Joseph, monetarism presented a mechanism for a greater societal and 
political goal. Monetary control would be a piece in the jigsaw of “everything else 
we need and want to do; an opportunity to tackle the real problems.”537 These “real 
problems” were fears that had gripped the post-war world. A society that was,  
haunted by the fear of long-term mass unemployment, the grim, hopeless 
dole queues and towns which died. So, we talked ourselves into believing 
that these gaunt, tight-lipped men in caps and mufflers were round the 
corner, and tailored our policy to match these imaginary conditions538 
Through fear the trade union movement had caused this “state puffed inflation”.539 
The post-war pursuit of full employment became a “sacred cow” – one that would 
dissuade successive government from tackling the ever “upward movement of 
money wages”. 540 Joseph argued that there had never been “serious unemployment 
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since the war” – indeed, the concept of “fuller than full employment” had been 
born541 to maintain the sanctity of job security and full employment. The resultant 
“wage price spiral” simply exacerbated a seemingly never-ending cycle of union 
restrictive practices to ensure consistent wage increase, to the detriment to the reality 
of price.  
Monetarism, as an economic tool, would assist government to challenge this man-
made ideal. A bold change of national mindset was required, one that would need to 
adjust to a new set of moral and economic criteria – “with more rewards for success 
and with more bankruptcies for failure.”542 Harsh lessons would have to be learned; 
a degree of unemployment would need to be accepted in the short term. In a Shadow 
Cabinet memo, dated 1st May 1974, Joseph argues,  
But if the country is to return to sound money by gradual steps then 
consistent policies - involving some unemployment, some bankruptcies 
and very tight control on public spending will be needed for at least five 
years.543 
This reflects Joseph’s acceptance that there was no “magic cure” to inflation.544 The 
“prescription” would not be palatable, as Britain was “over-manned”. The human 
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element was perceived as uncontrollable, the creation of “unreal” jobs was only 
adding to a “money illusion”.545 Any pursuit of, or investment in, the creation of jobs 
was damaging – the marketplace would eventually regulate a natural level of 
employment only when the “real wage is right”.546 The importance here, is the word 
“real” – a “real” wage without interference or manipulation. The only way to provide 
full employment was to remove all “man-made” obstacles from the proper 
“functioning of market processes”. The failure of the British economy was “not the 
failings of the market, but government interference”.547As a society, there was an 
overestimation in the ability of the state, of government, to the detriment of the 
“overburdened economy”.548 Joseph now referred to the fault-line between a 
functioning, free market and the restrictive practices of the post-war settlement, an 
“apocalyptic vision”549 of a “Battle that has been created due to man-made chaos”.550  
The passivity of the economy was due to the negativity of human emotion and human 
needs. Corporatism and the democratisation of industrial representation, the 
challenge of working practice and its entrance into the political arena, all presented 
a stark, frightening challenge to individual liberty and freedom. Joseph envisioned 
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the issues that Britain was facing was akin to that of “Weimar” Germany, the shifting 
allegiances of the middle classes from conservatism to fascism, implying that high 
inflation was “threatening to destroy our society.”551 He decreed at a Conservative 
Party meeting in Preston in 1974, that inflation,  
is threatening to destroy not just the relative prosperity to which most of 
us have become accustomed… but… it will lead to catastrophe… and to 
the end of freedom.552 
Enoch Powell in 1969 decreed that no less than “the structure of society itself” 
depended “Upon the sound working of the money system”.553 Five years later, 
Joseph, rather than state the consequences of mass immigration, would offer a 
“brutal challenge” in his onslaught against incomes policy.554 Inflation became the 
rhetorical theme for the Conservatives; the control of inflation was to become the 
mantra to sustain Britain’s economic and subsequent moral recovery. The challenge 
faced by Britain of stemming national decline could not be sustained by appeasement 
to institutions that denied the correct levels of inflation. Therefore, there was a moral 
and economic imperative to acknowledge and to challenge trade union activity that 
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enhanced inflationary levels. Joseph’s rhetoric demanded hostility towards trade 
unionism;  
 unions do not cause inflation, inflation causes trade unions555  
The trade union movement benefitted from the curse of inflation. It was their raison 
d’être to succeed in winning industrial wage claim disputes and placing the interests 
of their members firmly in the political arena. Therefore, government had to go 
further, to dare to challenge the historical precedent of union representation as they 
demonstrably prevented economic advancement. For Joseph, “economic policy was 
not enough” there had to be greater reforms; more social transformation, more 
determined and aggressive rhetoric to enable a distinct enemy of economic reform 
to be confronted; his mantra was not to be, “intended as a counsel of despair, but a 
warning note”.556 So, the question must be – what is enough?  
For Joseph, there was “no time to be mealy-mouthed”557 – difficult decisions and 
challenges needed to be faced. The “austere Powellism of Keith Joseph”558 would 
look beyond merely the economic to confront national decline; but to the heart of a 
new moral order. It was not enough, just to change economic policy, simply adhering 
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to a “false antithesis between monetarists and some so-called Keynesians”559 could 
not suffice; there were issues at play in Britain that were to have long lasting 
consequences; “the cost of freedoms”.560 An acceptance that the real issues of a 
stagnant economy and union obstruction can be overcome simply by an adherence 
to strict monetarism was a false dichotomy; a fundamental change of mindset was 
required. The corporate relationship in 1974 between the trade union movement and 
the Conservative Party was one of shared values of an established status quo. 
Therefore, the task facing economic reform, argues Joseph, was “not made easier by 
the unions and their members who were deeply conservative – with a small ‘c’.561 
Conservatism needed to understand the deep seated, ingrained challenges that the 
trade union movement posed; it was “The reasons go back deep into social history. 
As Tories we must understand that we are dealing with real people with their own 
views, habits and prejudices”.562 A “vendetta against profits” had been constructed 
through “anti-profit, anti-private industry” trade union practice, that Joseph argues, 
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was a political animal that wanted “to fight capitalism, bash the bourgeoisie” – 
strikingly, there was a “haemorrhage” at the heart of British industry.563Joseph 
looked to attack these ingrained prejudices, to revert the politicised nature of the 
economy and to find the “road to realism, stability and steady spontaneous 
progress”.564 
The irony is potent. Enoch Powell was to describe Joseph, as a “butterfly, not a 
hawk”565 – his intellectual questioning always diverting him from the true course of 
power, but this was his strength. His economic, intellectual and ideological instinct 
though not overtly designed for the rough and tumble of the front benches,566 allowed 
conservatism to self-analyse, to search beyond the accepted post-war consensus. 
Margaret Thatcher argued that Joseph, reworked and reedited Powellism “creating a 
new Conservative Party” one that “gave us back our intellectual self-confidence”.567 
Joseph’s reinterpretation of Powellism offered a new dynamic to the Conservative 
Party; a reworking of the ideological challenge between unemployment and 
inflation, and the sense that academic curiosity towards, and questioning of, both 
what conservatism stood for and the post-war consensus was legitimate. He accepted 
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the mantle from Powell and intellectually devised the solution to both inflation and 
to individual freedoms; the answer? The need to challenge the UK trade union 
movement.  
 
3.4 “The Case for Union Reform” – Stepping Stones  
Keith Joseph’s intellectual interpretation of Powellism was to help create a platform 
for radical economic change; he “saw himself picking up the baton that Powell had 
dropped”.568 It was a need to sustain the anti-establishment post-war agenda and 
enforcement of economic purity; of monetarism, anti-inflationary measures, free 
trade and, I argue, most importantly, the notion of trade union culpability in British 
economic and moral decline.  
There required an association between trade unionism and socio-economic decay. 
The challenge to government was not simply to restructure a set of representational 
bodies; that would entail the statecraft of dialogue, negotiation and efficient policy 
making. There was a need to “engage in a deeper level of understanding” to win 
Powell’s “battle of ideas”569 – to implement ideological transformation would entail 
a generational switch of mindset, an enforced change in a pattern of behaviour, of a 
way of life. The post-war “socialist experiment” was to install a set of “beliefs” 
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argued Joseph, which would be the “poison on our economic life”.570 With belief, 
not just policy, this could be altered.571 To do so, the Conservative Party, argued 
John Casey in 1978, must take, 
The largest imaginative leap in order to grasp the decay in custom and 
patterns of behaviour, in order to signal, a profound change in the 
consciousness of the age 572 
Casey, a part of the Conservative Philosophy Group with Roger Scruton, advanced 
the case of New Right economic liberalism. Anti-socialist and anti-corporatist he 
argued that the issues facing Britain in the 1970s were not necessarily a loss of 
individual freedoms but the loss of authority. To advance economically, there was a 
need to revert to older Tory values of social cohesion and hierarchy. And in many 
respects this authority of the state could be moulded in a productive mindset.573 The 
state would need to prioritise the “importance of regaining the commanding heights 
of the moral and intellectual economy”.574  
Casey advocates the establishment of core beliefs as the state was overstretched and 
too weak. There is a need to recognise and prioritise a moral duty of the state and 
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the party system to challenge permissiveness and subsequent weakness of thought.575 
Personal, sexual and class liberation in the 1960s had eroded the boundaries of how 
the state controls society, leading to the chaos of the 1970s – strikes, inflation, 
economic failure.576 Behaviourisms and thought processes of core groups, 
essentially the trade union movement, could be altered. Government could enhance 
a thought process, change or deliver a new moral order and to reinvent the post-war 
agenda subconsciously. Trade union hegemony could be defeated – yet it could only 
be done through a process of manipulation, control and ultimately confrontation. 
Trade unionism, as well as a physical construct to be deterred, was also ingrained in 
the mindset and identity of a nation. It was a symbol, not just of unity of the present, 
but of an historical precedent; through time it had expanded not simply physically, 
but psychologically and symbolically.  
The intellectual and political perception of a trade union’s position within a tripartite 
system of governance would be questioned. Peter Dorey argues that the language of 
the debate would change to frame a “trade union problem”577 – one that needed to 
be solved. In January of 1978 Nigel Lawson wrote to Margaret Thatcher where he 
argued that he strongly agreed with Chris Pattern’s comment that “We should stop 
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saying we can get on with the unions… this is too defensive”.578 Lawson’s comment, 
I argue, demonstrates quite dramatically, a change of mindset within the 
Conservative Party. The initiation, I argue, of a long-term process, one originating 
in Powellism, intellectually embraced by Joseph and documented in the autumn of 
1977. 
Ex-army officer and business man John Hoskyns and associate Norman Strauss 
prepared a Centre for Policy Studies document entitled Stepping Stones. This “now 
legendary”579 document was to form a strategy for “producing a new moral 
hegemony” and was to introduce the notion of “discontinuity” to fracture and sever 
the ties of the working man and woman from both community and trade union.580 It 
is the psychological template of how to deter the working classes from political and 
social representation and a “stunningly prescient blueprint for the Thatcher 
government”.581 Keith Joseph had asked Hoskyns and Strauss to write a single 
document in search for an end to decline, and would lead to a “delighted” Thatcher 
declaring “the best thing we’ve had in years”.582It was a document to plan a “high 
risk” approach to the “negative role of the trades unions”.583 It was a document to 
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set the agenda for Joseph’s “true Conservatism”584 and a commitment to a market 
economy, individual responsibility and social morality; Peter Dorey argues, that to 
ensure “this reorientation, major curbs on the power on the unions were essential”.585    
Hoskyns, in a letter from Alfred Sherman to Keith Joseph, was to “devote himself 
to para-political activity”.586 The mantra from this report was that government must 
go further than was conceivable in the past; conservatism must mask its concerns for 
social discontent and disunity and face the realities of the oppression of union 
activity and the dictatorship of the closed shop. Hoskyns’s remit was to look at a 
strategy to defeat trade unionism but also to challenge the available mechanisms of 
government, to see if the traditional institutions of British government were capable 
of this challenge; “We are not talking about a planning gadget”, he argues in a policy 
making document circulated to the Cabinet in 1975, “but about the fundamental 
approach of a government which is trying to save a socio-economic system which 
can no longer save itself”.587  
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Hoskyns and Strauss were to target how people think “at the level of ideology”588 on 
a “fundamental” level. Hoskyns did not propose a series of neoliberal economic 
policies, but, instead set several challenges or questions which highlighted Britain’s 
adoption and acceptance of the “sick society”. What were the obstacles to success? 
How could the British malaise be reversed? The public needed to associate these 
questions with the apparent rise of the trade union movement – to equate the failure 
of Britain with the trade unionism. On a statecraft level, the report acknowledges 
that trade unions were not initially targeted due to them being “the sole cause of our 
problem” – “that” the report declares in brackets that “(Would be an absurd 
simplification)”.589 
This brief sentence evidences the rejection of statecraft in the initial planning stages 
for industrial conflict in 1984. Trade unionism, as evidenced clearly, was not the sole 
arbiter of Britain’s moral and economic decline; and yet it was still to be targeted. 
Trade unionism therefore was to become a byword, a convenient symbol to engage 
in policy that enabled internal Conservative Party revolution – it would become the 
“starting point for everything”.590 With this, I argue, that an ideological agenda 
underpinned the promotion of Stepping Stones. The nature of the report was to 
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challenge the traditional perceptions of British political representation; a “Tory 
landslide is not enough”591 in that the mandate of the British population, would only 
reflect the  
electorate's material dissatisfaction since 1974. A landslide is needed, but 
it must represent an explicit rejection of socialism and the Labour-Unions 
axis; and the demand for something morally and economically better592 
Electoral victory, a prequisite for statecraft efficiency, though “needed” was not the 
priority. Hoskyns and Strauss planned and documented “educating public 
opinion”593 in the need for radical reform – for a systematic change in the identity of 
the union movement. It was not good enough for the Conservative election machine 
“simply to persuade them to remember our arguments and slogans” – the narrative 
needed to be grander, more formidable as “family, individual freedom and the social 
market economy. All these are threatened by socialism and trades union power”.594 
From a consensual relationship to one that required a need to “Drag every skeleton 
out of the union cupboard linking it to Labour”595 to “dare to do what has to be 
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done”.596 This demonstrates policy based upon a need to deconstruct an existing 
political and industrial legitimacy – in the words of its author, “the ideologue John 
Hoskyns”, an intention to “give the country a real shock”597 to install a “mandate for 
change”. 598 What Stepping Stones demonstrates, is the legitimising of policy that 
ultimately was unaccountable to Cabinet.  
Strongly “opposed by Jim Prior” 599 and a direct contrast to the politics of One Nation 
Conservative trade union policy, it demonstrates an ideological line that a form of 
conservatism was now prepared to cross. In becoming head of Thatcher’s policy 
Unit between 1979 to 1982, Hoskyns and his Stepping Stones gained credence and 
acceptability; “breaking constraints which we had assumed were unbreakable”600 
was now a legitimate Conservative Party aim.601 Prior to its existence there remained 
a tacit acknowledgement of a “softly softly approach”602 to maintain an industrial 
status quo. It was deemed possible to maintain statecraft’s aim of the Conservative 
administration maintaining a semblance of a “sensible”603 industrial policy. This 
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changed post Stepping Stones. Conflict with trade unions would now replace the 
views of the “moderate”. Hoskyns argues,  
If the electorate is offered conflict about the status quo, or alternatively 
the status quo without conflict, it will settle for the latter. What we have 
to show is that the real conflict, which is already happening, is the direct 
result of the union status quo.604 
Therefore, the question was how to create an agenda for conflict – through fear. 
There was a need to instil fear in the working-class community, to challenge the 
“unalterable facts of life”605 and most alarmingly, instil insecurity and indeed 
formulate a fear within working class communities. The working man must be 
stripped down to “the terrors of being on his own away from “his tribe”’606 to feel a: 
sense of shame and disgust with the corrupting effects of socialism and 
union power – class war, dishonesty, tax fiddling, intimidation, and 
shoddy work, the sick society607  
A sense of disappointment would be engineered within the working classes. The 
need was for the mindset of Britain to change, to challenge and ultimately destroy a 
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feeling of dependency and need for the trade union movement. Union members must 
have their existing values and attitudes modified rather than challenged – and thus 
strengthened. It is therefore particularly important to understand those values – the 
union members’ "mental set” which does not aspire to the “healthy society” and the 
pursuit to an end of decline.608 What is more apparent is its abandonment of any form 
of political, Parliamentary protocol to extend these recommendations to a section of 
the British Isles. Working men and women of a trade union were to be beyond the 
social norms, reflecting a counter culture. The next passage reflects a language 
which denotes arguably a form of social conditioning; 
The individual worker and his union are closely linked. It would never 
occur to most workers that it could be otherwise, even though he may be 
inactive and attend no meetings. Exile from the union would be like 
banishment to Siberia. Between him and the terrors of being on his own 
in a society which, as yet, offers fairly unequal opportunity, stands his 
union – that is, his tribe, his clan, his own small society. Inside it he is 
warm, and to a large extent, safe. Outside, he is nothing.609 
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This is an extreme vision610 of the life of the union member. He or she is nothing 
else when banished from an organisation that represents the legitimacy of their 
working life. Take away their life blood – the union – and they will find it hard to 
fathom a future, to raise a family or act beyond a community. Hoskyns’s reiteration 
that “outside he is nothing” was a clarion call of the utmost gravity, the humbling of 
working men and women and those who represent them – break the union, break the 
man and ultimately, as indicated by Norman Tebbit, “break the spell”.611 
The report was “apocalyptic in its diagnosis”.612 It was a vindication of neo-
liberalism; manipulation of a class, of a collective of men and women – destruction 
of “a clan”. This plan of action may or may not include direct action against the trade 
union movement – but it would essentially be the change of a collective mindset – a 
re-shifting of a mental association of how we perceive and connect with society. The 
trade union question is not just one that affects union business and industrial 
representation – it reflects so much more. It is an obstacle, a reference for determined 
defiance, a lazy means to defy modernisation and ultimately, an associate of 
Britain’s moral decline.  
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In government committee meetings, there was disagreement and “argument over 
Stepping Stones”.613 Sir Ian Gilmour argued that the report was “over-ambitious” 
citing it was “more like a war game than war”. Francis Pym, arguing that though the 
“union problem had to be grasped” and he was “fascinated by the paper… feared 
such proposals would require a substantial back-up team”.614 Willie Whitelaw saw 
it as a demonstration of people “thinking about problems from outside of politics” 
and Lord Thorneycroft, “agreed with Mr Whitelaw: the Stepping Stones paper 
provided a valuable analysis”. John Davies, argued, that “if we told the truth about 
the unions, we should certainly lose the election”.615 But its proposals were to be 
implemented; Chris Pattern drafted a strategy document in February of 1978, stating 
in regard to Stepping Stones implementation,  
A successful strategy is like an artillery bombardment with half a dozen 
properly targeted heavy guns. The conclusion I have therefore reached is 
that the best way of using “Stepping Stones” retaining the intellectual 
rigour, coherence and sophistication of the exercise, is by seeing it as an 
up-market campaign directed towards heavy weight speeches.616 
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And this would follow, 
Already a fairly elaborate plan for carrying it through, it would not make 
much sense to try to re-design it.617 
The evidence presented in the Stepping Stones report demonstrates a government 
predisposed to confrontation with the trade union movement. Hoskyns and Strauss 
acknowledge the myth of trade unionism being the sole arbiter of British national 
decline yet present a series of proposals designed solely to antagonise and ultimately 
deconstruct it. I argue that the process of “carrying it through”, of embedding 
Hoskyns’s psychological remit of undermining an industrial mindset and class, does 
not equate to a political policy necessary to govern effectively. It is one piece within 
a jigsaw in pursuit of a grander agenda – of a new “moral hegemony” pursued within 
Thatcherism. The success of Stepping Stones lay within its challenge to the 
orthodoxy of political statecraft – the art of governing and the pragmatism of party 
management. It was prepared to accommodate the ideals of Powell and Joseph of 
“winning the battle of ideas” of daring to deconstruct the idealism of a Tory status 
quo and trade union intransigence. The unions argued Hoskyns in 1980, “can’t 
reform themselves, imprisoned as they are by their own spurious philosophy, rust 
rule roots and innate conservatism”.618 The paradox is that it was conservatism that 
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would be revolutionised to finally implement an ideological blueprint. Stepping 
Stones would formulate a means to articulate this change – the deconstruction of the 
“trade’s union status quo”.619 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
The challenge presented to the New Right post-1974 was to develop a coherent and 
successful strategy to counter the loss of Conservative Party hegemony. Edward 
Heath’s statecraft of U-turn and appeasement had failed; the politics of conciliation 
led a Conservative Party to defeat and enabled socialism to prevail. Powellism’s 
emergence as a credible critique of corporatism, does not convey a sense of 
conciliation. Prior to Thatcher’s rhetorical position of an “enemy within” was 
Powellism – a clinical dissection of the apathy and growing disenfranchisement of 
the British working classes, a cry against the inevitability of globalisation and the 
free movement of labour. But mostly a clarion call for freedom and of liberty; Powell 
would inspire Keith Joseph, Hoskyns and Strauss, and ultimately Thatcherism would 
follow; a reinterpretation of the nature of conservatism and the re-emergence of the 
trade union movement as a threat to economic and social freedoms. 
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Enoch Powell did not lack for conviction, his was an “all or nothing approach” to 
politics and to national sovereignty. From the efficiency of the market and exchange, 
from “Little Neddies to nationalised industries”620, to the sovereignty of 
Parliamentary democracy; there would have to be clarity and purity. Powell and his 
disciple Joseph, David Marquand argues, take the roles of “pathfinder and 
peacemaker of the capitalist renaissance of our time”621 the delivery of a form of 
politics, though inspired through a 19th Century agenda, did not flinch at the 
challenge that the 20th Century trade union problem posed. They were to present an 
economic and moral agenda, and it would prove a prelude to Thatcherism; a 
blueprint for the change of direction required within a Conservative Party that was 
content with the status quo of corporate Britain.  
Both individuals were not designed to lead political parties of the establishment – 
both men were to fail in any capacity of leadership, of delegation, of calculated 
policy and statecraft. They were not elevated to positions of high cabinet 
responsibility and did not bend to established political wills. But I argue their 
influence is immense; they reinterpreted what conservatism is and its purpose, and 
in doing so, inspired a future political generation to break free from the shackles of 
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appeasement to the trade union demands and their hold on society. They 
reinterpreted society’s and the Conservative Party’s priorities – one from solely the 
implementation of a winning electoral strategy, to one where the response to events, 
was not to U-turn and repel, but to revert to the foundations of political and 
ideological thought. Policy and procedure, though inevitable within democracy, 
would not and could not, supersede the greater goals of freedom and liberty, of 
economic purity and a sustained advancement of the individual within society. These 
were the historic credentials of English liberty and liberal thought, and the 
establishment of a corporate, post-war power sharing agenda, at the behest of a cross-
party, manmade mandate were an anathema to these quintessential qualities. There 
was a need to disassociate the party with the bland utopianism of consensus politics. 
The ideological transformation of this new form of conservatism, I argue, had been 
conceived through Powellism, to be ordained intellectually through Joseph and 
implemented through Hoskyns and ultimately The Ridley Report.622  
Powellism above all, I argue, dares to challenge the conventions of manmade 
interference; of the trade union, of socialism and corporatism. Prior to Friedman or 
Hayek, Thatcherism or Reaganomics, Powell understood, above all, society’s need 
for sovereign freedom; for the undisputed sovereignty of Parliament, for the 
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rejection of interference with the organic political institutions of the nation. Powell, 
though undoubtedly maverick and controversial, recognised a post-war world that 
had rejected the attributes which had sustained it for so long. Though ultimately 
Powell’s pursuit of liberty and a sense of natural justice for Englishness, were to be 
his undoing, his legacy, I argue is the tacit understanding of the threat with which 
the nation was blindly negotiating. Edward Heath’s tenure as Prime Minister and the 
subsequent malaise of the Labour Party through its “Winter of Discontent” evidences 
the manmade consequences of organised labour.  
Both Powell and Joseph recognised the historic, moral and economic threat posed 
by the trade union movement; Stepping Stones would enable the ideological 
formation of a process of reform. It was an ideological tool, it does not examine the 
need, in the mould of In Place of Strife623 to re-engineer a relationship from a place 
of political and industrial policy. It identifies not the reasoning behind the need for 
collective industrial action and the consequences of post-war poverty and class 
discontent, but the need to circumvent the democratic process to implement 
ideologically enhanced dogma. It revels in the physiology of the dependency of the 
working man and how this can be broken; it heralds a new dawn in rejecting a desire 
for communication, dialogue and ultimately common ground, but the need to crush, 
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destabilise and to defeat. This would be mirrored, on the practical level, by The 
Ridley Report, 624 which I examine in this research, the ground level taking up of 
arms against the trade union movement that was demanded within Stepping Stones’ 
psychological war cry against the trade union movement. 
Therefore by 1982 a New Right had emerged to transform the Conservative Party’s 
industrial and economic mindset. Primary evidence demonstrates that the internal 
thought and ideological mindset within the Conservative Party towards trade unions 
had altered indelibly; what was once unthinkable was now acceptable. Powell and 
Joseph were to win the “battle of ideas” within the Conservative Party, the pursuit 
of economic purity transposing the ideals of corporatism. The movement’s 
symbolism was to be transformed as trade unionism was no longer to be viewed by 
those in power as a force for good. Stepping Stones’ theoretical and psychological 
propositions would allow for a re-evaluation of government and trade union 
relations. Ferdinand Mount argued in Cabinet records that the position of trade 
unions was “confused, self-contradictory and obscure”.625 From consensual dialogue 
between trade union and industry there was now an “undisputed widespread 
concern” regarding immunities and electoral clarity; a new rhetoric of having to 
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“stand firm and not to give in to the trade union bully boys”.626 Mount argues his 
concern was that deference to an established part of British social fabric, was a form 
of “perpetuating the legend of its invincibility.” This “raw, ugly power” of the trade 
unions needed to be brought within the, “ambit of ordinary civilised behaviour”.627 
I argue this chapter demonstrates conflict directed towards the trade union movement 
was inevitable once the ideological propositions of Powell, Joseph, Hoskyns and 
Strauss had borne fruit within the New Right. As political theorists, their work, 
argued Mount, was to “soften up the ground” 628 – the next phase, as I reveal, was to 
be the battle ground “ploughed and cultivated” 629 to prepare for conflict. 
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Chapter 4 – The Defeat of the “Wets” 
4.0 Introduction 
Analysis in this chapter is contextualised around the overriding government priority 
for a New Right to prosper within the Conservative Party and the need to defeat 
internal political opposition; a defeat of moderate conservatism through a direct 
challenge to “the enduring balance of the centre”.630 Primary evidence from 
previously unexplored Cabinet papers I provide, demonstrates implementation of 
policy and actor designed to eliminate internal opposition within Cabinet to 
government policy related to the “economic and industrial fields and their social 
consequences”.631 This would ensure a collective Cabinet unity and direction of 
industrial policy, and a challenge to trade union movement and the NUM.  
Famously Margaret Thatcher quoted St. Francis of Assisi upon arrival at Downing 
Street, “Where there is discord, may we bring harmony”; Jim Prior was to describe 
this as “awful humbug” as it was “totally at odds with Margaret’s belief in 
conviction”.632 For a certain section of the Cabinet who were to be associated with 
wetness and a weak ideological resolution, there would be little harmony. The 
“wets” were moderates, those who disagreed and “disliked her economic policy”.633 
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By 1983 they would be side-lined allowing for the implementation of economic and 
industrial reform.  
The epitaph of “wet” would symbolise a degree of moderate defiance; a politics 
“variously described as consensus or One Nation conservatism”.634 Francis Pym 
defines a form of “traditional conservatism”, whereby a government attempts to 
“win the consent of the nation as a whole” through tolerance, humour and a pursuit 
of harmony.635 Conservatism “precludes dogma, ideology and absolutism” – there 
are no absolute truths, merely fashions that have rejected the lessons of the past.636 
The dogma of a New Right would come to challenge this one nation approach; an 
application of policy designed to challenge statecraft’s priority of Cabinet and 
political party unity. Margaret Thatcher’s plea for harmony to replace discord, would 
be put to the test within her own Cabinet, with a defeat of internal Cabinet dissent 
and opposition to ideological reform. The 1981 purge of internal opposition 
demonstrates the lengths to which an ideological agenda would bypass Cabinet 
Responsibility and collective decision making. Primary sources reveal the extent to 
which sections of Cabinet were to be marginalised to pursue an economic agenda at 
the expense of the “acute social and political problems” confronting the government. 
This chapter analyses these internal changes within Conservative Party Cabinet. To 
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defeat Arthur Scargill and the national Union of Mineworkers, Margaret Thatcher 
required the defeat of elements of the Conservative Party. She was to make it clear, 
that she “would not moderate her polices” and would insist on a no-compromise 
position “come hell or high water”.637 Those in Cabinet who challenged economic 
and employment policy, the “wets”, would be defeated.  
 
4.1 Seeds of Division - “The theorists and the pragmatists”  
The nature of Thatcherism, argued Ian Gilmour, lay within the “fog of economic 
theory”.638 A “New Right” agenda did not fit well with a centralist section of the 
Conservative Party which remained loyal to One Nation politics. An established core 
of MPs was distrustful of the rejection of policy that was historically “steeped in 
pragmatism”639 designed to “win elections and to be in power”.640 For the One 
Nation Conservative, an ability to gain power is balanced through a contract to 
maintain social improvement, cohesion and opportunity; a balanced approach, that 
lies within the structure of the “maintenance of order and the cause of good 
government”.641 What is paramount in government is the pursuit and implementation 
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of a manifesto – of a political policy, that is “compatible with the continued existence 
of a free society with institutions which command respect and allegiance”.642 
A new form of conservatism would gain prominence within government. For 
Gilmour, and other prominent front bench Conservative ministers, their 
interpretation of conservatism, would be jettisoned for the adoption of an “extremist 
monetarist economic policy” and “rampant ideology” within the party.643 The 
advocates of moderation would be challenged. Gilmour argued that since the defeat 
of Heath, the Conservative Party had pursued a “false non-conservative trail” a sense 
of “Toryism betrayed”.644 This is a strong term, but the nature of his critique, 
captures the tone of concern within a section of the Conservative Party; a 
paternalistic form of conservatism committed to, and enshrined in a pragmatism to 
succeed electorally and govern prudently. These were politicians who demanded 
“sensible behaviour” regarding economic governance, who rejected “monetarist 
dogma” as an ideology that “would be socially divisive and it would not work”.645 
These MPs’ were “moderates”.  
A very public debate would rage in Cabinet as to the very nature of conservatism. 
One Nation conservatism and neoliberal conservatism – a “division” argued Francis 
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Pym “between what I would term the theorists and the pragmatists”646 – each side 
reaching for the moral, economic and therefore political high ground. There was to 
emerge an informal group of Cabinet ministers, who were to question the moral and 
economic crusade of Thatcherism; this evangelical politics argued John Biffen 
“could not last forever”647 as it ran against the grain of their established traditions. 
These moderates, men of experience and political understanding, would adhere to 
the continued pursuit of One Nation politics acting as an internal foil to the advance 
of “ideology and delusion”.648  
And the internal “battle” lines were drawn within Cabinet as early as 1981. 
Implementation of monetarist economic policy would see unemployment rise to over 
three million, British cities suffer a succession of riots, and as Francis Pym 
explained, “Many Ministers were astonished by the rapid rise in unemployment and 
looked at the figures in disbelief”.649 Pym’s assertion that “common sense” dictated 
that monetarist policies would “result in soaring unemployment” was to prove 
correct. It was a display, Pym argues incredulously, of an economic policy of “tunnel 
vision” with “no sign of light at the end of it”.650 Yet for Margaret Thatcher, the 
concern at the alarming closure of industry and rising dissent within her own party, 
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was to be a “challenge to her resolve”, and subsequently she was not prepared to 
give an “inch on economic strategy”. 651 Thatcher argues,  
However, I was utterly convinced of one thing: there was no chance of 
achieving that fundamental change of attitudes which was required to 
wrench Britain out of decline if people believed that we were prepared to 
alter course under pressure652 
There was clear blue water between the ideologues and the moderates within Cabinet 
– none more so than over government policy on unemployment. Nigel Lawson 
argued that the “conquest of inflation, not the pursuit of growth and employment, 
which is or should be the objective”.653 The entire “lifetime of the Thatcher 
governments” was to be dominated by mass unemployment654 as unemployment 
would become a symbol of defiance; of defiance against the conventional wisdom 
of consensus and post-war priorities representing a “touch of the tribal war dance” 
in demonstrating ideological intransigence in its economic policy.655 
Unemployment could “not be solved by government”.656 There would be a 
“realignment” of government policy regarding unemployment – a disassociation 
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with the responsibility of government over the increase in the unemployment figures. 
Inflation, yes, this would fall at the feet of the Chancellor of the Exchequer – 
unemployment – “from governments to trade unions”.657 This dramatic reinvention 
of social responsibility did not sit well with everyone in the Cabinet. The Times 
reported in an article in February 1980, that Sir Ian Gilmour, the “unimpeachable” 
One Nation Tory, was to come “out of his shell” to provide the “evidence of Cabinet 
disagreements”. What Gilmour demanded was a retreat from a policy that was to see 
Britain “divided at the roots” and once again intervene to ensure “economic and 
social equilibrium”. He was to declare that “All duty is on the government; none is 
on the people”. 658The article’s subheading was to be “Dispute between wets and 
dries”.  
The subheading reflects the growing division within Cabinet on economic and social 
issues. On unemployment, though regrettable, there could be no alternative but for 
it to be “tackled at its roots”. In a letter to ISTC 659 General Secretary, Bill Sirs, in 
June 1979, Thatcher prioritises the creation of a “thriving, efficient economy, which 
will enable employment to expand”.660 This would be a consistent mantra and in the 
face of overwhelming increases in unemployment. There could be no indulgence to 
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wet theories of social cohesion; “if there was a way of beating inflation and 
unemployment by displeasing no one in the meantime I should take it like a shot”661 
she was to argue – but fundamentally, unemployment was caused by trade unions – 
“unemployment is due to enormous past wage increases unmatched by higher output, 
to union restrictive practices, to over manning, to strikes, to indifferent 
management”.662 Gilmour’s fears had materialised; unemployment levels were at 
three million, yet annual wage claims were not being reduced – “Dogma prevented 
any arrangements for wage bargaining… shouting at the unions, instead of talking 
to them did not work”. 663 Yet despite this, there were to be no government economic 
U-turns. As Gilmour intimated, those who were to prioritise moderation and unity, 
the “moderates” were to be re-named as the “wets”.  
The term “wet” was to imply “ineffectuality”.664 It was a label of association, 
derogatory and generalised, though embraced by Jim Prior as a “badge of honour”665 
representing a fault-line within the Cabinet and amongst Conservative ranks. The 
“wets” were a sub-section of the 1981 Cabinet and cohorts who were to present an 
obstacle to the implementation of change; a regressive group of men who stood for 
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a certain form of conservatism which would curtail radicalism, and as Chris Patten 
argued, had not “yet entirely lost its common-sense or its admirable instinct for self- 
preservation”.666 
They were to position themselves as a loose coalition – a gentleman’s club of 
agitation. Thatcher’s “wets” was a term of “uncertain origin”667 – it seems that Jim 
Prior was accused of “wetness” in the summer of 1976 as “he did not want to reduce 
trade unions to impotence”.668 It was a caricature of a group of men, and the term 
was described by Michael Foot as “deeply offensive”, and by Ian Gilmour as an 
oddity to associate the “main Tory tradition “wet”; Baldwin, Churchill, Eden, 
Macmillan, Butler and Macleod were, in one sense or another “wets to a man”.669In 
essence the term represents a certain Conservative Party tradition – an historical 
symbol of Establishment and status quo, an antiquated certainty of establishment 
thought. 
Therefore, they would present “an obstacle to be surmounted”670 in Margaret 
Thatcher’s “struggle to regain the soul of the Party”.671 They were men who were 
accustomed to the stymied traditions of political antiquity, cohesion and collective 
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Cabinet unity and discussion, but more importantly they represented a form of 
authority and establishment power within the Conservative Party. These men were 
not simply antiquated marionettes of an elitist, historical establishment, but were 
politicians with real power and influence. Therefore Thatcher’s “hostility” to these 
influential politicians was based upon their established “convictions”. Though 
derogatory, wetness was associated with the traditional “dominant class” with “their 
paternalistic model of community”. 672 Thatcher’s radicalism would deviate from the 
“Tory norms of her times”.673 She would argue that “I am the rebel head of an 
established government”674 and the “tensions” that were to develop between herself 
and the Tory “wets” were clear. In her words, she would be an “outsider” – her 
gender, her social class, her drive to succeed grated her “Conservative colleagues” 
who were to revile her economic agenda; “Of course” Thatcher argues in her 
memoirs, 
In the eyes of the “wet” Tory establishment I was not only a woman, but 
“that woman”, someone not just of a different sex, but of a different class. 
A person of an alarming conviction that the values and virtues of Middle 
England should be brought to bear.675 
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Thatcher would challenge the “conventional”. 676 Since the 1970s the “crucial levers 
of power”677 within the Conservative Party had been controlled by those who aspired 
to One Nation philosophical leanings. They represented a “sizeable section of the 
traditional Conservative vote” which was “instinctively centralist”678 – those of the 
shires, the suburbs, of the middle classes. Though sceptical of the nature of socialism 
and the trade union movement, they understood the dangers of radicalism and 
dogma. An emergence of militancy within the trade union movement in 1972 and 
1975 had helped to bring down the Heath government, but a New Right with its 
youthful opportunism of a “nouveau riche” would present altogether another threat 
to “civilised governance”.679 
The “wets” looked to Thatcher as a “gate crasher at a party”680 – and in return they 
were to represent the “insiders” she so distrusted. They were to be reinterpreted as 
an internal Conservative Party enemy to economic and industrial change. They were 
an “enemy within” of an established dynamic and an enemy to be defeated; Margaret 
Thatcher recounted in her memoirs that, “the wets had been defeated, but they did 
not fully realise it.”681 The faces of an established order, notably Jim Prior, Peter 
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Walker, Ian Gilmour, Mark Carlisle, Lord Soames and Francis Pym, as politicians 
they were to present an obstacle to the “disestablishment” of the Conservative Party 
– “perhaps the most remarkable political development of the 1980s”.682 
They were “John Bull’s” with a defeatist attitude to socialism’s “inevitable 
advance”. They were weak and yet colluding, bluff and obstinate to the necessary 
confrontation with the socialist “storm troopers” of the trade union movement.683 
Thatcher argued that “retreat as a tactic is sometimes necessary; retreat as a settled 
policy eats at the soul”.684 Viewed by the New Right of the Conservative Party, as 
Thatcher recounts, the “wets” were blessed solely with a “vanity and an inability to 
make tough decisions”.685 The “wets” were prepared to retreat both in the face of 
trade union reform and internal Cabinet ideological transformation. Thatcher saw 
the “wets” as blinkered, set in their ways; she argued that their “Whole political life 
would, after all, be a gigantic mistake if a policy of positive Tory reform turned out 
to be both practical and popular”.686 There was a refusal to embrace change, to accept 
the difficult decisions that were required to forge a new national spirit.  
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Therefore, the New Right would reconstruct the nature of conservatism through 
ideology and the rejection of statecraft. It had failed – “Conservative statecraft 
collapsed” 687 amidst the ruins of stagflation. And yet the established cohort of One 
Nation Toryism of Gilmour, Prior and Pym amongst others, adhered to a policy of 
“pragmatism, flexibility, compromise and common sense”.688 Yet this form of 
politics had failed; the “path of consensus” as described by Keith Joseph had 
“reached the end of the road”. 689 
A new dynamic was required. This was demonstrated though the reorganisation of 
the Conservative Cabinet in 1981 – a purging of the “wets”. Internal documents, 
written by Derek Howe to the Prime Minister, revealed that the “principle topic 
among the backbenchers at present is a reshuffle and the urgent need for one”.690 
Codenamed the “Fox and Goose” a critique was drawn up of moderate MP’s who 
would be side-lined; Howe described Lord Soames as,  
Hardly the right image… Doubts about wholehearted support for 
Government policies. 
 
                                                          
687K. Hickson, The Political Thought of the Conservative Party Since 1945 (Palgrave, 2005), p.140 
688 E.J. Evans, Thatcher & Thatcherism (Routledge, 1994), p.3  
689 K. Hickson, The Political Thought of the Conservative Party Since 1945 (Palgrave, 2005), p.140 
690 Howe, D. (1981) Minute to M. Thatcher, Fox and Goose, Backbenchers urgently want reshuffle. Churchill 
Archive Centre 
  
231  
  
For David Howell there had been,  
Widespread criticism… His department had failed to communicate our 
policy and explain it to the public. 
 and Ian Gilmour, 
Would not be missed. Not known for his enthusiasm for Government 
policies.691 
To confront the trade union movement ultimately required the “sinking of the 
wets”.692 The paradox is that the first real casualty of Thatcher’s quest to challenge 
the hegemony of the trade union movement was to be the Tory “paternalists”. Jim 
Prior was “out of sympathy with Margaret’s views”.693 He was playing on a “very 
difficult wicket” as they had “under estimated enormously her absolute 
determination” in pursuing “new right-wing polices”. Prior laments the rejection of 
the Tory paternalism of Macmillan and Butler, whom were now “talked about as a 
disaster” and he was never to truly “appreciate the degree to which the party was 
becoming more doctrinaire in its approach and less pragmatic”. 694 
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The symbolism of the “wets” was one that reflects a greater ideological agenda. The 
symbolism predisposes weakness through the acceptance of social cohesion and 
scepticism of dogma. This, I argue, encompasses a greater picture than simply a 
rejection of Tory grandees, it presents the adoption of an ideological mindset; the 
advance of economic dogma, of “sound money” and of policy that was to be “so 
extreme”.695 Thatcherism has no time for platitudes to the establishment – “the 
established corporate institutions” the “practical dislike” of the Trades Union 
Congress as well as the circumvention of the “traditional rules of British Cabinet 
procedure.”696 The existing system of Cabinet protocol was to be thrown 
“overboard” – not because of incompetency or inefficiency, but because Thatcher 
had no time to “placate differing personal and political factions”.697 For togetherness, 
Thatcher argued there “must be a Cabinet that works on something much more than 
pragmatism or consensus. It must be conviction government”.698  
The “defeat of the wets” is merely a passing of a political baton, a generational 
change of emphasis and direction. These were men belonging to an established order 
that was changing within a globalised world, where the economic challenges that the 
government faced could not be overcome by an established code of adherence to 
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status quo. Yet there is evidence of a purge; not simply of conservative men, but of 
aspiration; of a change of ideals. There was to be a shifting of priority away from the 
traditions of conservatism that the “wets” were associated with – consensus, 
pragmatism and the overarching status quo – as Thatcher argues to “something much 
more”. The post-war consensus had failed, corporatism had shifted the political and 
economic agenda and resulted in the failure of 1970s Britain and stagflation. A new 
form of conservatism would challenge the conciliation of the establishment and 
change the ideological narrative from this point; a bold new conservatism driven by 
economics to provide freedom.  
 
4.2 An Economic Call to Arms 
As demonstrated, a new radicalism and thought had emerged within the 
Conservative Party. A new morality was not fashioned through One Nation politics, 
the desire to defeat unemployment or the “political hypocrisy” of socialism – it was 
to be “through the essence of a free economy”.699 Both the political and the moral 
challenge facing the nation would be overcome, not through the facile ideology of 
equality or a regression of the establishment, economics would smash this quagmire 
of apathy. Economics was the tool to enhance the moral Thatcherite agenda; for 
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Thatcher, recovery lay not in the collective notion of trade unionism or the antipathy 
of the elitist “wets” – “the way to recovery is through profits.”700 Ian Gilmour saw a 
“rewriting of history” that was to be “was occasioned by the monetarist revolution 
which took place in the Conservative Party from 1974-5 onwards”.701 Gilmour saw 
monetarism as the “ultimate triumph of ideology over common sense” making his 
“skin creep”702 and Francis Pym observes that the split in Cabinet lay directly 
“between the wets and the ‘monetarists’ – and yet, the “monetarists won the day”.703 
Although inflation would be curbed through monetary control, unemployment 
would eventually soar, companies crashed and the government, argues Pym, 
economically “developed tunnel vision”.704  
Yet, for Jim Prior, the “Party was becoming more and more doctrinaire”.705 The task 
facing the New Right was not designed around the pursuit of low levels of 
unemployment, but low levels of inflation and “sound money”;706 the tool of choice 
for a “successful and stable nation” – it was a scalpel to cut away at the excess of a 
bloated society. The “vague and arbitrary” notions of social justice and collective 
representation had led to “vast bureaucracies” of nationalised industry. Political 
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planning and the economics of demand had ensured the stifling of the marketplace 
and consumer confidence. Politics needed to liberate, not to stifle – to be removed 
when necessary to “make a break with what has gone immediately before”.707 
Entrenched political ideals would no longer suffice – corporatism and collective 
bargaining – the politics of a failed political generation, would give way to the 
economic. Mrs. Thatcher made a speech to the Centre for Policy Studies, on 9th 
February 1981, where she recollected, 
I remember hearing Milton Friedman in a lecture which was not concerned 
with economics at all. His theme was that any good economist should be 
a moral philosopher as well. He said that if you make political decisions 
absolutely every single thing and everything in the realm of politics that 
decisions made on a 51-49% basis and all the time you may very well have 
half the people dissatisfied. What you have to do is to limit the area of 
political decision making.708 
Thatcher was searching for the tools of conflict. Ian Gilmour was to argue that 
“where others might see social conflict… she merely saw the benevolent working of 
an invisible economic providence”.709 These “instincts” led her therefore to be 
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“keenly interested in the work of Milton Friedman.”710 Friedman proposed the limi-
tation of government and the control of the supply side of money. Monetarism was 
to adhere not simply to an ability to control levels of inflation, but inflation but re-
flected Thatcherite morality – a sense of a firm control of finance, of an elimination 
of waste and temperance. The success of economic liberation, the control of sound 
finance through monetarism, required political courage. In limiting the “political de-
cision making” Friedman advocated a change in political and governmental values, 
to enhance economic values. Thatcher was to understand this; these values were “in 
harmony” with her “early experience”711 of economic prudence, a nod to the balance 
sheet, and ultimately a rolling back of the state. Politics and political decision making 
had interfered with an economic process; Friedman argued that, “Inflation is created 
by government and no one else”.712  
For Friedman “government is the problem”.713 The notion of government was flawed 
in that “if a government enterprise fails, it is expanded”714 and he would not refrain 
from a critique of UK government policy. The Times reported in 1981 that Friedman, 
having understood that government spending had increased and needed to be cor-
rected, “blamed resistance from bureaucracy, the Civil Service and a Conservative 
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Party “not truly united”, for the fact that many fine objectives were not being carried 
out”.715 His observations would extend to a Cabinet reshuffle. In a letter to Ralph 
Harris, post the 1981 reshuffle, Milton Friedman notes that he was, 
glad to see the changes which Mrs Thatcher made in her Cabinet; maybe 
that will do some good.716 
Monetarism prioritised a “nostrum of sound money.”717 Crucially, the curse of infla-
tion, and essentially not unemployment, was reinterpreted as a signifier of the “dis-
ease of money.”718 The aim was to combat economic instability, not social inequal-
ity, by achieving and maintaining a firm control on the supply of money, thereby 
allowing an unfettered market to operate freely – this process was defined as mone-
tarism. This control of monetary supply paradoxically offers an opportunity to exert 
governmental control – gain monetary control to enhance government’s ability to 
install economic, and ultimately social, economic liberalism and individual freedom. 
Therefore, it required a change of political mentality, the prioritising of inflationary 
control over the pursuit of full employment. Indeed, unemployment could be sus-
tained as Friedman saw a “natural rate of unemployment” as “only if unemployment 
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is at a certain level (the natural rate of unemployment) will inflation remain  
stable”.719 
This “natural rate” is important. It counters a post-war agenda of a pursuit of full 
employment, of a humane political and economic agenda. Yet Friedman argues that 
full employment is not possible without inflationary increase; there was a happy me-
dium, this “natural rate”. Therefore, government would do well to concentrate on 
what it does well; to “set an appropriate structure of rules”720 ostensibly the rule of 
law, national defence and the enforcement of contracts between individuals. All 
other pursuits of governmental “good intentions” of economic and industrial plan-
ning would lead to, “inefficiency, lack of motivation, and loss of freedom”.721 Gov-
ernment should be the “referee, not an active player” 722 with a limited agenda to 
sustain civil order and protect individual liberty. Issues such as the pursuit of full 
employment, industrial and energy strategy were “excuses for widening the extent 
of government intervention in economic affairs”.723  
Eschewing a “neutral” political stance will enable the correct level of governmental 
influence. This avocation of neutrality is, I argue, an important point. Friedman de-
nies the capacity for monetarism in isolation reflects an ideological mandate. It is 
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primarily an economic tool to liberate a marketplace to function within its natural 
parameters. Yet, I argue, the Conservative Party’s adoption of this economic tool, 
was situated within a far greater ideological remit – a challenge to the British indus-
trial establishment.  
For Friedman, Keynes in his challenge to classical economics, had dared reinterpret 
the establishment. He had foreseen the post-war economic demand revolution, legit-
imising economic and social transformative policy. Though opposite in terms of eco-
nomic ideology, Friedman believed Keynes had paved the way for economics, in 
this case monetarism, to transform political protocol. A revolution Friedman argued,  
was made by Keynes in the 1930s… major reliance for economic stabili-
sation could not be on monetary policy… but must be on fiscal policy, that 
is, on varying the rate of government spending and taxing.724 
Keynes had legitimised the use of economics as a governmental tool for societal 
change. Through macroeconomic policy, he had established the transformative plat-
form for government to determine the nature of demand and prioritise full employ-
ment. Friedman in response called for a “counter revolution” a need to “curb the 
leviathan”725 of the state and government, challenging the role played by the estab-
lished political paradigm arguing,  
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Fundamental differences in basic values can seldom if ever be resolved at 
the ballot box… The wider the range of activities covered by the market, 
the fewer are the issues on which explicitly political decisions are required 
and hence on which it is necessary to achieve agreement726 
Friedman did believe in a political process in that “there is an intimate connection 
between economic arrangements and political arrangements” yet, 
economic freedom is also an indispensable means toward the achievement 
of political freedom.727 
Political values, moral judgements and decisions were not achievable without eco-
nomic freedoms – the importance “of liberty through economics not the ‘ballot 
box’”.728 Thatcher eulogised Friedman. He was to her “an intellectual freedom 
fighter”,729 an “example of what one is trying to do. You must have limitation of 
government.”730 In a letter written to Friedman in 1979, Thatcher acknowledged the 
challenge ahead and the combative nature of the economist, “Thank you very much 
indeed for your kind telegram”, she wrote, “the battle has now begun. We must 
win”.731 In a handwritten aside, Thatcher writes, “by implanting the things in which 
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we believe”.732 This New Right belief system ultimately “would transcend the polit-
ical”733 through the economic tool of monetarism; it would allow for the rolling back 
of state, the reduction of public borrowing and spending, wage negotiation and ulti-
mately a control of inflation.  
Yet paradoxically Friedman would be side-lined by the New Right. Friedman did 
not agree with the scapegoating of the British trade union movement. He did not 
consider wage negotiation, pay bargaining and incomes policies as arbiters to either 
inflation or fiscal over-stimulation. For Friedman, trade union power was a “question 
of secondary importance”,734 a form of simplistic smokescreen politics – the trade 
union movement was not solely responsible for inflation. In a visit to Britain in 1970, 
Friedman was to argue that, “Everybody from left to right is making the trade unions 
the scapegoat.”735 In contrast to Edward Heath who argued that “there can be no 
doubt” that “wage increases are the cause of price increases”,736 Friedman countered,  
I do not believe in Britain or in any other country wage inflation is an 
independent factor producing inflation of prices737 
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Again, in the The Economist in 1974, Friedman reiterated this. He argued that he had 
“been dismayed, even in my few days in London, at the widespread support of ‘union 
bashing’ to attack inflation.”738 In May of the same year, in an article in The Bir-
mingham Post, entitled ‘High Priest of Inflation’, once again he reiterated, “Right 
now in Britain the trade unions are being blamed for inflation. I have been defending 
them from that charge”739 and on television he argued that,  
In Britain, the explanation that everybody gives for inflation is that infla-
tion is caused by trade unions, the greedy grasping labourers who force up 
the wages that cause inflation740 
The trade union movement was not to blame for high inflation and unemployment 
but “political will”. British government, demonstrated initially by Edward Heath’s 
Industrial Act of 1972, had “moved away from free market policies” and was misin-
terpreting monetarism as a tool to attack industrial representation. But Friedman ar-
gues that the connection is tenuous as greater macroeconomic challenges were re-
sponsible for inflationary instability, “The great confusion in this area is to confuse 
particular prices with prices in general”.741 
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The only way to attack the “disease” of inflation was to “spend less and to create 
less money” by government.742 This does not automatically relate to trade union re-
sponsibility, or a policy to curb wage negotiation. There could be no indiscriminate 
targeting of the trade union movement – wage negotiation may have an impact on 
inflation, but it was unproven, and part of a greater inflationary dynamic of “exces-
sive tax and government intervention”. A “proper climate” for growth would require 
“investment, enterprise, the ability to borrow capital”. It is “simply not possible” 
argues Friedman, 
For the trade unions to be so powerful as to cause prices to rise generally 
unless there is a concomitant increase in the money supply. No one has 
ever produced evidence to the contrary.743 
Keith Joseph was to reject Friedman as “the evolution of my views owes little to 
him”.744 He would famously “advance from monetarism”745 in his Stockton lecture 
of 1976 arguing that there existed a “false antithesis between monetarists and some 
so-called Keynesians”.746 The framework offered by monetary stability was benefi-
                                                          
742 Ibid. 
743 P. Jay, Inflation; Causes, Consequences, Cures, (Institute of Economic Affairs, 1974), p.27 
744 Joseph, K. (1994).  Power behind the phone, The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk 
745 K. Joseph, Speech, Stockton Lecture, Monetarism is Not enough, Stockton, 5th April 1976. Churchill Archive Centre 
746 Ibid 
  
244  
  
cial, but more was required to enhance liberty and to galvanise a nation; “Monetar-
ism” argued Joseph “is not enough”.747 It was an easy option for government, offer-
ing a temptation to “buy peace” instead of slimming “down the costly giants so 
greedy of resources” – “of the “lame duck breeding measures”748 of nationalised 
industries and trade unions.  
Economic policy had been misused. Monetarism had been used not to create oppor-
tunity but to challenge “union obstruction, lack of skills, over manning” as a “wonder 
drug” to cure unemployment. Joseph argued that when this drug is removed it 
“causes withdrawal symptoms”.749 This “façade” needed to stop, and the limitations 
of economic policy exposed – monetarism would not be enough in isolation; there 
needed to be an attack on regulation, state interference, high taxation, bureaucracy 
and as Friedman lamented, an attack on the trade union movement;  
Unions have their share in responsibility by their short-sighted resistance 
to change, by the strike threat and by over manning. No one can measure 
the loss of wealth.750 
The solution Joseph argued did not “finish at economics either”.751 I argue that  
Joseph’s ultimate rejection of monetarism displays a greater ideological agenda, to 
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end “the moral dilemmas” associated with decline, to challenge the “corrosive ef-
fects of inflation” 752 and a need to “remoralise whole groups and classes of peo-
ple”.753 Joseph’s reinterpretation of the benefits of monetarism demonstrates the re-
positioning of economic policy and goals; monetarism, though a necessary tool of 
economic control, was not enough in isolation to revitalise the state. Economics was 
part of a grander narrative, a remodelling of British society. As Margaret Thatcher 
argued in 1975, “Economic problems never start with economics. They have deeper 
roots—in human nature and in politics. They don't finish at economics either”.754  
The doctrine of monetarism argues Ian Gilmour, was in the opening years of the 
Thatcher government “its guiding doctrine and principle”.755 Though not reinforced 
through empirical evidence, it did offer “a simple solution” – a rapier to counter the 
bludgeon of wage negotiation and inflation, a means to “assault” the issues of the 
British economy; even though inflation peaked at 21% by the second quarter of 1981 
and a fifth of manufacturing had been wiped out.756 But a Rubicon had been passed; 
conservatism would no longer be the preserve of the One Nation “wets”; it now lay 
in the hands of those who sought inspiration through the purity of the market.  
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4.3 Hayek’s Challenge to conservatism 
Friedrich Hayek would assert political influence over the direction of Conservative 
Party industrial and economic policy post-1974. His concern lay with the erosion of 
“both individual liberty and economic efficiency”, and he was to become an “intel-
lectual mentor” to British neoliberals and the New Right within the Conservative 
Party.757 Primary evidence demonstrates the challenge he would help to construct 
against the economic traditionalists within the party – notably the “wets”. Hayek was 
predominantly concerned with the defence of liberalism against “collectivism”758 
and was prepared to indulge in the politics of administrating economic affairs. In his 
work The Intellectuals and Socialism, Hayek argues,  
The character of the process by which the views of the intellectuals influ-
ence the politics of tomorrow is therefore of much more than academic 
interest. Whether we merely wish to foresee or attempt to influence the 
course of events, it is a factor of much greater importance than is generally 
understood.759 
Hayek believed that intellectuals were “second-hand dealers in ideas”.760 Intellectu-
als had to target elite policy makers to ensure that new philosophical and economic 
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ideals – neoliberalism – would become reality. These elites would consist of a wide 
spectrum: the intelligentsia, experts, journalists, “ideological entrepreneurs” and 
politicians.761 Hayek would have access to and influence on an internal core of Con-
servative, New Right politicians, using the media and a network of contacts to pursue 
the realisation of economic ideals. This is evidenced in a letter to William Rees 
Mogg, dated the 8th October 1977, in which Hayek directly challenged a Conserva-
tive Party Cabinet minister, the “wet” Jim Prior, to deal with the “fundamental issue” 
of the British trade union movement. This primary evidence shows Hayek being 
“disappointed” at the response he received regarding proposals he had set out on 
“trade unions” and conceded that there was “bound to be a division within the Con-
servative Party”762 over electoral strategy. He argues, 
I would readily concede to Mr Prior that the chances of the party of gaining 
a large majority would probably be considerably better if it avoided a di-
rect clash with the trade union leaders. But to deal with the fundamental 
issue she would have no chance of successfully dealing with that issue and 
making the British economy viable again the Conservative Party would in 
office merely prove that it can do better than the Labour Party.763 
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This I argue is a highly important piece of primary evidence. Hayek questions the 
priorities of the Conservative Party in 1977, their will regarding a “fundamental is-
sue” of trade unions and the economy. Here is a direct correlation between the via-
bility of the British economy and trade union legitimacy. Hayek challenges Jim 
Prior’s commitment to change, prioritising the viability of the UK economy over 
electoral strategy. This encapsulates the battle developing within the Cabinet. The 
challenge to Conservative values, of winning and holding office, of sustaining a re-
lationship with the trade union movement and avoiding a “direct clash” with organ-
ised labour, was challenged by new economic dogma. Friedrich Hayek directly in-
fluenced Thatcherism,764 but Prior was less convinced. Jim Prior, who in 1977 was 
Shadow Secretary of State, was a “wet”, a throwback to Heath’s advocacy of the 
pursuit to “Government of national unity”.765 He was in opposition to the “doctrine” 
of the New Right; what was to “stick in the gullet” for Prior were the economic 
“prophets and gurus” with their “dogmatic or simplistic answers” to national recov-
ery and “deep seated problems”.766 His appraisal of Hayek was blunt, in him “The 
Conservative Party had found a doctrine”.767 
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Hayek refused the term “Conservative”.768 A “key figure” in the debate between 
conservatism and economic liberalism he was the “single most important intellectual 
figure” in the rise of the New Right.769 What lies at the heart of the challenge to the 
notion of conservatism argues Hayek, was its “complacency” and simplicity, in that 
the Conservative “believes that if government is in the hands of decent men, it ought 
not to be too much restricted by rigid rules”.770  
Hayek argues that the nature of conservatism and the traditions of One Nation con-
servatism in particular, do not offer an alternative, a necessity of change, or of pro-
gression within “contemporary developments”.771 To apply this in an historical con-
text, the Conservative Party’s response to trade union hegemony of 1970s Britain 
was nothing more than being able “to apply the brake”.772 This “brake” is Conserva-
tive One Nation politics – “the politics of consent”.773 Like the “socialist” the Con-
servative is not concerned with limiting the “powers of government” 774 in that “he” 
tolerates “much that we dislike” in order to maintain an administration or a majority 
in the House of Commons. Hayek argues, that “I do not regard majority rule as an 
end but as merely a means” as “the least evil” form of government.775 The notion of 
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“party” lay in the “broken fragments of tradition” – to Hayek there are no “guiding 
principles” to conservatism but merely a “practical maxim” to reinstate a political 
structure. It was bereft of ideology or philosophy or indeed any “guiding principles” 
and therefore it presented a “political constraint” to progress.776 
Hayek argued that New Right priorities were a pursuit of a “higher law above mu-
nicipal codes”.777 Andrew Gamble argues, that at the heart of a New Conservatism 
lies a desire to govern a “society rather than managing an economy.”778A control of 
monetary circulation would not simply be a means to an end – it was a beginning for 
a greater agenda. Revolutionary transformation, as acknowledged by Joseph, lay be-
yond this foundation of Friedman’s monetary control – the priority of liberty and 
freedom. Gamble argues that Friedrich Hayek despaired at the “Tory hostility to lib-
eral political economy”779 – conservatism having accepted the “age of liberalism was 
over” in their unwillingness to defer from the structure and rigours of Parliamentary 
democracy. In his polemic against the notion of “Why I am not a Conservative”780 
Hayek reflects that liberalism “wants to go elsewhere, not to stand still”781 – this is 
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an important point. The Conservative offers compromise, a search between the ex-
tremes with “no goal of their own”. Ultimately this stagnation, this lack of identity 
would lead to impasse and malaise – “obstacles to free growth”.782 
Therefore, the Conservative Party in its One Nation guise, presented an obstacle to 
radical change for Hayek. The pursuit of a sustained “political community”783 of 
conservatism enabled the “political and institutional constraints” that hindered the 
free market. There was a need for the “calling for their removal” which was now 
“absolutely imperative”.784 Conservatism was now being opened up to debate and to 
challenge. The rhetoric of the “wets” was now seen as an antiquated cry of a dying 
political breed amidst obvious “incompatibilities” between a New Right, inspired by 
Hayek, and British Conservatives.785 Conservatism underpinned a pursuit of full un-
employment and sound relations with the trade union movement; within a new po-
litical and ideological era, this could not be sustained.  
To a New Right this was paradoxical. Policy that may seem to be “wrong or unac-
ceptable”786 to an electorate, may be necessary to achieve “sound money” and infla-
tionary control. The priority was not electoral reform but to achieve what was “fun-
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damentally” right; this is important, as it legitimises a challenge to One Nation con-
servatism; the pursuit of a political settlement and its “accurate reflection of the pop-
ular will”787 could now be questioned.  
Hayek questions the effectiveness of Parliamentary democracy in relation to a 
longer-term ideological agenda. In June 1978, Hayek forwarded correspondence to 
The Times where he set out an agenda for a challenge to the Labour Party and to the 
trade union movement prior to the next General Election of 1979. The letter reveals 
an interesting dynamic in the relationship between the economic and political agenda 
at the heart of the prospective administration. Hayek argues,  
The majority of the prospective Tory candidates are naturally and under-
standably primarily concerned with winning a seat at the coming election 
and feel that their chances may be reduced by what I have seen described 
as Mrs. Thatcher’s “extremism”. There may be some foundation in this… 
But I still hope that the British people will honour Mrs. Thatcher for put-
ting the long run interests of the nation above the short run prospects of 
her party… The country will not be saved by the Tories being elected788 
Hayek demonstrates a rejection of statecraft policy and the priority placed upon elec-
toral credibility and electoral success through party management. His acceptance of 
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a degree of “extremism” reveals an ideological mindset, one set to be so influential 
amongst the new Tory right,789 as it reflects an ambivalence to losing a general elec-
tion, to prioritise an agenda of which ideology is paramount in its application; it 
superseded any notion of statecraft priorities. What Hayek denotes is the timidity of 
the British political system of government. It reflects a Conservative Party at odds 
with the intellectual imperative of economic “extremism” – it is an attack on con-
servatism, on the principle of moderation, consensus and balance.  
Hayek “undoubtedly influenced” Thatcher “on policy level”.790 Arthur Seldon 791 
corresponded with Hayek, “I am glad you were critical of the Conservatives. They 
need fortifying intellectually”792 and Nigel Lawson, who upon receiving correspond-
ence acknowledged that, “There is no one from whom such a letter could have been 
more welcome”.793 As for Margret Thatcher, Hayek was careful to write letters to 
The Times “because he sought to influence debate as a private citizen”794 – he did 
not hold office in the Thatcher administration and felt the need to critique at a dis-
tance, yet she “quickly and comfortably fell into the habit of meeting him one-to-
                                                          
789 Joseph, K. (1974). Letter to Ralph Harris in August 1974, stating, “I am steeping myself in Hayek and am ashamed 
not to”. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. Available at: https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document 
790 A. J. Tebble, F.A. Hayek; Major Conservatives and Libertarian Thinkers (Bloomsbury, 2013), p.273 
791 Joint founder president with Ralph Harris of the Institute of Economic Affairs.  
792 Selsdon, A. (1978). Letter, Arthur Selsdon to Friedrich Hayek, Hobhouse Lecture. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. 
Available at: https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document 
793 Lawson, N (1978). Letter to Friedrich Hayek, There is no-one from whom such a letter could have been more 
welcome. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. Available at: https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document 
794 Margaret Thatcher Foundation, Thatcher, Hayek & Friedman www.margaretthatcher.org/archive 
  
254  
  
one, trusting his discretion”.795 Friedman was to influence from afar; Hayek had di-
rect access to the corridors of British power and was only too keen to exert direct 
influence upon a new, economically driven regime. In May 1979, Thatcher wrote to 
Hayek, 
I was very touched by your kind telegram. It has given me great pleasure 
and I am very proud to have learnt so much from you over the past few 
years. I hope that some of those ideas will be put into practice by my Gov-
ernment in the next few months. As one of your keenest supporters, I am 
determined that we should succeed. If we do so, your contribution to our 
ultimate victory will have been immense. With best wishes and renewed 
thanks.796 
“Victory” I argue would consist of defeating both internal Tory opposition and trade 
union agitation. The “wets “lacked courage due to a distaste for change as Hayek 
alluded to their “moderation, caution and the middle-minded approach… to be pa-
ternalistic and speak the language of One Nation”.797 The term “wets” purportedly 
evolved from Jim Prior’s unwillingness to do battle with the trade unions in 1981, 
and was ultimately to evolve and to split the Cabinet along radical and establishment 
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lines. As Hayek had predicted in 1977, there was “bound to be division”798 and his 
statement was utterly justified; there was to be division. The division of the Cabinet 
was to be measured in extremes – those who were prepared to accept the fundamen-
tals of the liberal economic mantra and those who were not. 
And in contrast to Friedman, Hayek had no qualms in denouncing trade union cor-
poratism. Hayek proposed confrontation to and the “revocation” of “special unique 
privileges the trade unions have enjoyed”.799 Trade unionism was to be associated 
with a malaise, one taking hold within the Conservative Party and subsequently the 
nation. Corporatism was a relationship with a body of working men and women who 
had become the “cancer of the British economy” an “incurable deadly disease” the 
“causes of the decline of the British economy”.800 
This is incredibly incendiary language. Hayek’s bold language was a clarion call for 
the radical, for revolutionary change; the “world belongs to the courageous and not 
the timid”801 – for a rejection of the statesman and diplomat and a call to “throw 
around the rudder of policy”.802 A pursuit of the administrative obligation of govern-
ment without ideologically driven economic intent was a facile attempt at consensus 
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politics, a nod to an antiquated conservatism of Macmillan and Heath – of the Con-
servative. In July 1977, Hayek questioned the wisdom of planning to win an election 
if radicalism of union reform was not a key element of Parliamentary administrative 
success,  
Mrs Thatcher might get the mandate without which she can do little. If I 
were in her position, I would rather lose the election than get into power 
without being able to take the essential step803 
This “essential step” is an interesting quote. The fault-line had been constructed, 
between the dogmatists and the pragmatists, and the Conservative Party was to be 
used as a “flag of convenience”,804 a vehicle to propagate ideological reform. Once 
in power, Thatcher was to dismantle any abiding legacy of the paternalistic and con-
sensual nature of conservatism. The battle was to instigate a counter revolution, to 
implement a socio-economic mandate in Britain and advanced through economic 
and fiscal purity. An ideological gauntlet had been laid. As unemployment became 
the “inescapable” casualty of economic war, economic policy was to be the key to 
transform British politics and the British political landscape. And with this, the inner 
sanctum of the Cabinet was kicking and screaming in discord; Alan Walters recalls 
in his diary of March 1981, “Budget speech – all hell breaks loose, the wets are up 
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in arms – we’ll have a hot summer!”.805 And yet in a prelude to this, Margaret 
Thatcher had written to Hayek in the spring of 1980 stating that, 
We are passing legislation this summer to reduce the privileges of the un-
ions; but we may well need to do more806 
The “more” I argue was the eventual conflict with the NUM in 1984. And this event 
supports the fears of Ian Gilmour. His concern was that this pursuit of ideology 
would lead to such an event as Orgreave; ideology argued Gilmour, defies the “laws 
of political gravity”.807 Hayek was not to physically enter the citadel of political 
power at No.10 – yet his influence, I argue, runs deeply through the veins of the New 
Right. Trade union legislation had been passed with his stamp of approval. 
 
4.4 “The Purge of the Wets” 
Margaret Thatcher, for all her hawkish devotion to economic dogma, was a shrewd 
politician.808 She was to appoint as Secretary of State for Employment in May 1979 
a man who was the antithesis of her belief system – Jim Prior. Prior was a 
conciliatory politician; in 1975 he had acted as Opposition speaker on employment 
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and industrial relations. His first task, he recalls in his memoirs, was “to try and 
maintain an effective dialogue with the trade unions” as he had felt haunted by the 
inadequate response by the previous Heath government in 1974.809 He was mystified 
upon returning to government by how little “most Tories knew about trade unions 
and their affairs”810 and he wanted to pursue legislation of union and industrial 
reform which was practical, could work, and could be seen to work. The importance 
was to avoid all-out war, to gain a permanent acceptance to end the continual dogma-
driven feuding that had plagued both trade union and government since the 
beginning of the 1970s. 811 
There was no doubt that Prior was a genial, old fashioned Conservative. A Suffolk 
farmer and a member of the establishment, his ideals were forged by Macmillan and 
he held an abhorrence of high unemployment,812 an insistence on working with the 
grain of the people and an understanding of the “moods and strains of society”813 
Hoskyn’s SteppingStones report had run into “predictably furious opposition”814 
from Prior and led to a protracted battle between the “wets” and those in Cabinet 
who supported the extension of union confrontation. The outcome was the bitterly 
fought argument over trade union policy in the 1979 Conservative Manifesto.  
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The message to the trade union movement of the 1979 manifesto was clear. The 
country could no longer be, “tearing ourselves apart in increasingly bitter and 
calamitous industrial disputes” amidst the “militant’s charter of trade union 
legislation”.815 There would be an “immediate review” upon coming to power of 
trade union powers, and a reassessment of their “obligations”. The onus from 1979 
onwards would be the promotion of laws which engaged directly at installing 
responsible wage negotiation and reducing, indeed ultimately outlawing, wage 
related disputes. Most importantly a sense of reality was to precede dogma from  
both left and the right, reflecting with honesty the situation the country had been 
brought to.  
Prior did not shy from taking aim at who he thought was ultimately responsible for 
Britain’s malaise. Citing Labour’s inescapable, “ties of history, political dogma and 
financial dependence to a single powerful interest group” (the trade union 
movement), Britain was, “less efficient, less productive, less reliable and less 
competitive” meaning an “immediate review of the existing law on immunities in 
the light of recent decisions, followed by such amendment as may be appropriate of 
the 1976 legislation in this field.”816 
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Therefore, the challenge for Prior as Secretary of State for Employment was to 
balance the interests of the two sides. To a large degree Prior had a decent, respectful 
relationship with the TUC and union representatives.817 He advocated the 
development of cordial negotiation, a “reasonable approach” with the policy of 
placating and the winning over of the union moderates – “we should wait and then 
act with caution in Government”. This ambition was to prove “an almost impossible 
task”. Prior was to be undermined; without consultation, in May of 1979 Geoffrey 
Howe disregarded Prior’s plea for caution at the TUC and made a speech of 
“unrelenting attack” upon the “dreamworld” of the unions818 as “Margaret was still 
itching to take immediate steps to crack down on the unions”.819 
Prior was attacked from the right wing of the Conservative Party. John Hoskyns in 
private campaigned to get him “sacked from the Employment portfolio”,820 and John 
Gorst saw his “mild and minimal” policies to union reform as a “liability” – “we 
were elected to get trade union reform through on Conservative votes”, Gorst 
complained, “not to resist it on Labour votes.”821 Gorst would eventually go so far 
as to accuse Prior of "cowardice”822 as he had “tricked” the party over trade union 
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reform. Prior angrily retorted that he was doing what he thought right, saying. “I 
sometimes believe there is courage in standing against the stream”.823 When Gorst 
moved an amendment to abolish the closed shop, Prior said this would simply drive 
such agreements underground, and conceded the challenge he and other One Nation 
Conservatives were facing from the dissenters on the New Right, “we also under-
estimated enormously the change in the whole philosophy of the right and the 
changes in the Conservative Party taking place” – it was “more doctrinaire in its 
approach and less and less pragmatic”.824 
Prior found the extremes of the first budget under Geoffrey Howe in 1979 difficult 
to digest. Howe’s budget had, in Prior’s words, indicated the “bit between the teeth” 
of the trio of power brokers of Thatcher, Joseph and Howe, as they developed a 
practical strategy to counter trade union power in contrast to previous economic 
rhetoric. The “extreme” nature of the policies based around the pursuit of “sound 
money” highlighted Hayek’s protestations that market forces would reduce 
unemployment, which to Prior was an “anathema”. What Prior pursued was a degree 
of balance. His chief interest was attracting rank and file trade union members of a 
moderate persuasion to cross the bridge from socialism. In this, Prior wanted to 
challenge the union movement to adapt and reform, yet to stay within the traditions 
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of what trade unions offered – “the strength that comes from unity, the warmth and 
understanding that is the basis of a caring society”.825 The trade union excesses 
needed to be curbed, but in an atmosphere of persuasion and dialogue – he inclined 
significantly towards voluntarism.826 Indeed it is with some irony that Prior’s 
approach was a “cautious step by step approach”,827 yet with an emphasis placed on 
the internal mechanisms of the trade union movement to reform; “My main purpose 
was to put the onus on the trade unions”828 – and it was this onus on cooperation and 
conciliation which led to collision with Margaret Thatcher and Hoskyns over the 
development and implementation of the Employment Bill of 1980. The Employment 
Bill was introduced in December 1979 – Prior’s purpose was,  
to bring a lasting change in attitude by changing the law gradually, with 
little resistance, and therefore as much by stealth, as possible… It was 
therefore all the more important not to push our reforms too far.829 
Yet this “steady as she sinks”830 approach was certainly not to the liking of Hoskyns 
or indeed Geoffrey Howe. The steel strike of 1980 demonstrated that the “limitless” 
funds of the Exchequer could not sustain the demands of militant unionists 
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indefinitely. The strike was to “reopen questions about the adequacy or pace of Jim 
Prior’s Employment Bill”.831 Prior’s bill was to deny the trade unions liability for 
the excesses of individual members who may or may not be militant – a reversal of 
the 1971 Industrial Relations Act which had ensured union liability, thus 
consolidating union resistance. Howe claims that, “Jim’s opinion was in fact wholly 
perverse”832 in that individual action should not allow immunity for trade unions 
against the consequences of damaging industrial action.  
For Howe, the lack of wholesale reform was frustrating. He argued that “Jim had 
rallied enough of the traditionalist old guard to uphold his more cautious 
approach”833 and it was time to challenge the status quo. The steel strike, described 
by Alfred Sherman at the CPS as “nothing short of insurrection”834 was an 
opportunity for hardliners to force the issue of consistent reform, contrary to Prior’s 
mandate for evolution. Cabinet records from the National Archives indicate 
consistent debate on the subject raged internally from 1979. John Hoskyns detailed 
 that the, 
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Unions cannot reform themselves imprisoned as they are by their spurious 
philosophy, rusty rule books and innate conservatism.835 
Hoskyns goes on, 
The idea that we can stabilise the economy and then build a prosperous 
future without first disturbing the TU status quo is an illusion – adding 
that if the status quo as of present was accepted it would be a sion for 
surrender.836 
In the same tone, Norman Tebbit challenged Prior’s green paper, its speed of reform 
and its lack of ambition in changing the role of trade unions. In a challenge to Prior 
he criticises the robustness of intent towards trade union reform,  
It makes heavy weather of the deep attachment that the TU’s have to the 
status quo. 
If Jim Prior invites comments by end June 1981 how quickly could he put 
proposals to colleagues? There are several places where the draft is too 
studiously neutral… it appears indifferent.837 
Tebbit seems to critique the timidity of the proposed Employment Bill, its lack of 
ambition and its regard for the historical legacy of the trade union movement. He 
noted that the draft paper makes “heavy weather of the deep attachment the trade 
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unions have to the status quo” and, “references to a system having been in operation 
for 70 years seems to imply it should continue. The whole point is that the system 
worked badly for 70 years”.838 This line of attack continues with Hoskyns lamenting 
the failure in progressing with trade union reform as, “Jim has obstructed everything 
from trade union reform to abolition of wage councils”.839 Both Hoskyn’s and 
Tebbit’s critique of “innate conservatism” was played out against the backdrop of a 
deepening recession and higher unemployment.  
The division between “wets” and “dries “extended through to 1981 and there were 
“deep divisions over the 1981 budget”.840 The Cabinet was split, with the impression 
of collective unity abandoned as internal briefings reveal that the “Government is 
divided and seen to be divided”.841 Secret Cabinet minutes showed division and 
“profound disagreement”842 amongst colleagues; Robert Armstrong calls for the 
“Home Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer privately to make sure that as 
much business as possible is done in the Home Secretary’s small group” as there is 
a need to, 
Minimise the amount of the business which has come to the full Cabinet843 
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In September 1981, Jim Prior, along with the “hostile Sir Ian Gilmour”844 were 
removed and side-lined from the Cabinet to remodel it in line with Thatcher’s 
economic thinking. From this point, opposition to wholesale, aggressive union 
reform was diminished as the “wets” in Cabinet lost their voice. In January of that 
year Francis Pym, upon becoming leader of the House of Common, asked Keith 
Joseph for a brief on his industrial strategy, “only to be told that there was none”.845  
There was to be no public, long term industrial policy. Indeed, politics, dialogue, 
industrial planning would take a back seat; dogma would transcend Cabinet unity. 
Ironically, Jim Prior’s gradualist and prudent industrial policies worked in mitigating 
the more aggressive trade union practices of the closed shop and secondary 
picketing. The 1980 Employment Act demonstrated that a piecemeal approach and 
negotiation could reduce stoppages due to industrial action. Between 1979 and 1983 
the number of working days lost due to industrial action dropped from 4.6 million to 
574,000 – “Jim Prior’s union reforms benefited the country but did not reconcile the 
Prime Minister”.846 This reflects Prior’s position, which was inherited from Heath 
and Macmillan – the pragmatism of traditional Conservative Party relations with the 
trade union movement. Prior was interested in policies which worked – not dogmatic 
statements of intent.  
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Post- “wets”, I argue that ideology would ultimately transcend statecraft. The post-
war political consensus, though creaking and needing of reform, was removed by 
dogma driven by non-inflationary policies. Government abandoned partnership and 
instead receded to threats of fines or imprisonment.847 The road ahead was one of 
confrontation; an ideological construct of power to liberalise an economy which was 
not accountable to wage restriction and negotiation with the “disease” of the trade 
union movement. The optimism of the post-war period was replaced by pessimism, 
the pursuit, argues Ian Gilmour, “of the lowest common denominator of human 
conduct” – an acceptable level of unemployment, a reversal of corporate trade 
unionism, leading ultimately to industrial confrontation.848 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has demonstrated the insertion of the theoretical into the practical, and 
the active challenge to the political establishment. I have proven a procedure that 
was to distance the Conservative Party from One Nation politics. This process, as 
demonstrated through primary sources, was constructed through an understanding 
that the nuances of conservatism, with a small ‘c’, were now defunct. Therefore, this 
research demonstrates the shifting priorities within the Conservative Party. I have 
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demonstrated in this chapter the realignment of these priorities, not within the 
confines of New Right thinktanks, or the multifaceted influence of Powellism upon 
Thatcher’s mortal crusade; it demonstrates the shift of dynamic within Cabinet. The 
active and historical advent of a process of the deconstruction of a political order 
designed to impose ideological dogma. Government was now a mechanism for 
economic reform, adherence to the rationale of inflationary control and the utter 
rejection of conciliation, consensus, corporate unity, and ultimately it was Margaret 
Thatcher's long-held ambitions to crush the power of Britain’s trade unions.  
Internal opposition to this grandest of economic objectives was now clear. The 
ideological path, formulated through both The Ridley Report and Stepping Stones, 
honed and fashioned through the economic rhetoric of Friedman and most 
significantly Hayek, had been laid and now it was time to prepare for industrial battle 
with the NUM. The ideologically driven agenda to dismantle a trade union 
movement was part and parcel of an economic agenda that was inspired by the 
Hayekian pursuit of market purity. The trade unions were to be an obstacle to 
economic reform – the “wets” in Cabinet were the obstacle to reforming the trade 
union movement. Formulating a challenge to the NUM and the advent of policy to 
ensure market liberation, ultimately lay in the defeat of internal opposition; the 
“wets” and the NUM were part and parcel of a corporate quagmire of self-indulgent 
apathy that was an obstacle to reform and rejuvenation. Thatcherism represents anti-
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establishment values – she was the antithesis of the “wets” in her desire for 
radicalism. And the process of change did not discriminate; those who were targeted, 
those who were labelled a disease or apathetic, were from differing social and 
cultural backgrounds, but their similarity was one of defiance to ideological 
deconstruction of both a political and industrial way of life. Ian Gilmour did not 
suffer through the was to understand the ramifications of unadulterated dogma; 
“social engineering of an unusual sort was high on the Thatcherite agenda. Few, if 
any, were to be permitted to escape the ideological footprints of Thatcherism”.849 
Social, political and economic policy of Thatcherism is indelibly linked. I argue that 
there were consequences to for the Conservative Party and the trade union 
movement. Each was to implode post-1979; the “wets” were to present the last 
clarion call of a form of conservatism that, though sporadically redefined and 
repackaged, has been swept away through the agenda of economic revival and 
deindustrialisation; this is mirrored by the trade union movement and most 
significantly the NUM. Both One Nation conservatism and trade unionism would 
suffer under Thatcherism and dogma. Though diametrically and socially opposite, 
they were both unique political forces that were to challenge Thatcherite dogma and 
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lose. The consequences of this loss, for both Conservative One Nation politics and 
the NUM was terminal decline.   
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Chapter 5 – From The Ridley Report to “Hit List” – Implementation of 
Ideological Blueprint 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter looks at the implementation of an industrial and energy policy, which 
was designed to prepare, plan and enact industrial conflict with British nationalised 
industries culminating with the miners’ conflict of 1984. In this chapter I identify 
and reveal a premeditated and “secret” New Right template to implement industrial 
reconstruction in the UK.  
Analysis of Cabinet Papers at the national Archives in Kew led to two main findings. 
Through existing and newly released archive documentation I argue the following: 
Firstly, the Final Report of the Nationalised Industries Policy Group – commonly 
known as The Ridley Report, details a planned, systematic “fragmentation”850 of 
selected industries; this was to include the UK coal industry. The report confirms 
policy of deindustrialisation through, when necessary, conflict with targeted UK 
trade unions; it would therefore act as a template to conflict with the National Union 
of Mineworkers.  
                                                          
850 Economic Reconstruction Group (1977). Report Final of the Nationalised Industries Policy Group. Margaret 
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Secondly, this chapter provides detailed archival evidence of a planned, yet denied, 
“secret coal pits closure plan”.851 The chapter builds upon and provides detailed 
evidence to the revelation of this “hit list” of government driven pit closures. I reveal 
documentation from The National Archives that evidences conversation and 
planning that counters official, public government policy regarding the pit closure 
scheme. Therefore, I reinforce the argument through this research, initially proposed 
by NUM leader Arthur Scargill, of a “secret hit-list" of more than 70 pits marked for 
closure prior to the 1984 industrial conflict. The research counters government and 
National Coal Board claims of a proposed limit of 20 pit closures; documentation 
presented in this research reveals a plan to shut 75 working mines, denied in 1984 to 
the NUM and Arthur Scargill. The importance of this primary source material, is 
that, it clarifies and legitimises Scargill’s rebuffed accusation of “the seeds of the 
dispute had been sown long before” the 1984 conflict; indeed, evidence presented in 
this chapter advances Scargill’s claims that, “The Tories had been preparing for a 
showdown with the NUM since before the 1979 general election”.852 This chapter 
evidences this assertion.  
 
                                                          
851 Higham, M. (2014). Cabinet papers Reveal “Secret coal pits closure plan”. BBC News Available at: 
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5.1 The Ridley Report – “The chosen battle ground”  
The conflict with the NUM was predetermined and constructed on both an 
ideological and practical level. This section examines the development of the 
practical administration of an ideological mandate as demonstrated though the Final 
Report of the Nationalised Industries Policy Group – commonly known as The 
Ridley Report.  
In October 1984, Margaret Thatcher gave a speech to the Conservative Party, where 
she stated that, “Let me make it absolutely clear the miners' strike was neither of this 
Government’s seeking nor of its making.”853 Thatcher’s declaration poses some 
questions. Her speech to the Party conference faithful reflects an impression of a 
government which had been faced with a threat in historic isolation – a trade union 
movement, and a NUM, which had sought a premeditated confrontation. Yet 
evidence demonstrates a Conservative administration fully aware of the need for a 
“re-evaluation of contingency planning”.854 The 1974 miners’ strike and the 
subsequent symbolism of the Conservative Party electoral defeat, was to vindicate 
Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher’s preferred option in confronting the trade 
                                                          
853 Thatcher, M. (1984).  Speech to Conservative Party Conference. Margaret Thatcher Foundation. Available at: 
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union movement and to reject appeasement in industrial relations.855 A readdressing 
of trade union policy was first considered as early as 1974. The Carrington Report, 
an evaluation of the 1974 election loss advocates that,  
Strong unions and the advanced technology operated by their members, 
especially in fuel and power industries, had irrevocably shifted the balance 
of industrial power in their favour… higher priority should be given to 
contingency planning in periods of political and industrial quiet.856  
This presents a shift of theoretical mindset regarding trade union policy. A move 
away from dialogue and conciliation and towards preparation and planning to 
confront “strong unions”. Lord Carrington’s report was secret as ministers were to 
be “banned from public comment”857 resulting in some “degree of consternation” at 
the leaking of the “top secret” party report to The Times.858 Denis Healey was to 
comment that the report was to represent “the most disturbing thing he had ever 
read” with intentions to plan “revenge for the last Conservative Administration’s 
defeat by the miners.”859 In reality, argues Peter Hennessey, the report reflected a 
Conservative Party wholly underprepared to take on a trade union movement which 
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had the “ability to throttle the physical life of the country… should they be 
confronted”.860  
Carrington’s report though, was a prelude to a more militant stance within the 
Conservative Party. It had the effect of opening the “eyes of some of the more 
hawkish Tories”861 whose “principle map maker”862 was to be Nicholas Ridley, who 
“burned with zeal for the free market… and would set to work on some unthinkable 
thoughts about tackling the nationalised industries”.863 In May 1978 The Times 
reported that a paper was circulated within backbench groups including content on 
“how a Conservative government should counter any “political” threat from its 
enemies”.864 Commonly known as The Ridley Report, it was to provide a 
“framework for the government during the coal strike of 1984”865 – with an emphasis 
placed on the preparation and planning for confrontation “on the chosen ground of 
the Tories”.866 What the document provides is a practical framework from which to 
hang the ideological thought processes of the New Right – a clear and practical 
advent of dogma moving into reality – a guide on how to challenge a British 
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industrial community. The document was circulated in an edited fashion to the 
Shadow Cabinet, as evidenced by a leak to The Times, which reported,  
Shadow ministers said last night that although they had received the report 
the annex was not included. They suggested that it would never be 
accepted by the Shadow Cabinet.867  
The report represented the most radical of Conservative policy. The missing annex 
was to detail how a battle with the trade union movement “should be on ground 
chosen by the Tories”.868 It reflects a form of positive deconstruction, a will to 
dismantle and to disarm industrial political influence by advocating targeted 
confrontation with trade unions. Industrial and energy policy was to be designed to 
destabilise and fragment, indeed, it was a case of the pursuit of a non-policy. An 
emphasis was placed not on the construction of long-term management and 
development but on implementation of “totally inflexible” targets and a gradual 
reduction in the financing of investment programmes. Government would step away 
from involvement in industry, its “monolithic structures” split and subsidies reduced 
to allow a leaner, stripped down industry to be accountable to the rigours of the 
marketplace. This process of the weeding out of “uneconomic activities” would 
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eventually lead to privatisation.869 The report was prepared to say and think the 
“unthinkable”870 to take a “long hard look at nationalised industries”, and 
controversially look beyond the boardroom to the industrial battlefield. It was 
expected that on publication it was to create, in the words of The Economist, a 
“humdinger of a row”.871  
The plan would take time to implement. It was considered too early in 1981 to 
confront the NUM, yet The Ridley Report “provided the framework” of which 
“almost every detail of its recommendations has been followed in the legislation of 
the past five years”.872 Industries were to be either “vulnerable” or “non-vulnerable”, 
coal being vulnerable and the railways, civil service and steel, to be non-vulnerable. 
Government should be prepared to,  
Try and provoke a battle in a non-vulnerable industry, where we can 
win… A victory on ground of our choosing would discourage an attack 
on more vulnerable ground of which the most likely area is coal873  
Viewing this disclosure in context it is startling in its ferocity. The language 
demonstrates an acceptance of the need for provocation, of winning and of 
vulnerability – a message of government advocating a war footing with British 
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industry. There is a consistent theme of confrontation, to “break up” and to confront 
“the enemies of the next Tory Government” to “provoke” and to “defeat”.874 The 
emphasis was on the breaking down “The utilities” to “sell whole units to private 
buyers direct”. In the case of the NCB it was “big and unlikely to be saleable” and 
so therefore “should be broken down into basic units”. It was recommended, and 
underlined, that the, “N.C.B. break down into pits and seek to form worker co-
operative”, as,  
More and more of the nationalised industries are run for the benefit of 
those who work for them. The pressures are far more jobs for the boys and 
more money for each boy.875 
Reward for “uneconomic” activity would stop. The implication is that the comfort 
of coal mining, the “carrots in the public sector” had constructed an unrealistic 
mentality in face of the realities of the marketplace. A breaking up of working 
collieries into co-operatives would allow for the necessary engagement with market 
forces to reconnect with the reality of “earning their required rate of return” and not 
being rewarded for uneconomic “activities”.876 The “jobs for the boys’ analogy, 
reflects a challenge not just to statistics or productivity, but to a mindset and a way 
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of life. The consistency, community and family ties of working within the coal 
mining industry – there had been too much carrot and not enough of the stick, as the 
“sanction of bankruptcy” had not been applied.  
The report evidences an ideological drive for deindustrialisation. Denationalisation 
would become a political tool, a means, not to develop industrial strategy, but to 
assert authority by “moving nationalised industries out of the public sector once they 
had been reconstructed and the battle against the workforce won”.877 Deconstruct 
nationalised industry and a path would would be made to privatise on a national 
scale. This process would start with legislation, a “nasty little bill” to ensure eventual 
physical conflict with an aim to “fragment” and a process would unravel; the,  
First problem to deal with is to end statutory monopolies in the public 
sector. It is no good selling pits or steel mills etc. if it is illegal to operate 
them…. To do this will require legislation  
After which,  
It will be very much easier to attempt a permanent form of 
denationalisation after we have achieved a certain degree of 
fragmentation… There are a number of industries which could be broken 
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up into separate companies, as many of which as possible should be sold 
to private buyers.878  
The “fragmentation” of nationalised industries was not born out of fiscal or 
pragmatic imperative; neither was it to be democratically accountable. As Simon 
Jenkins argues, “The public never saw a white paper putting the public case for 
privatisation”879 – policy was designed to reenergise the individual “at the expense 
of social solidarities “and as Jenkins argues, “This was done intentionally”. Nigel 
Lawson argued in September 1982 that, “No industry should remain under state 
ownership unless there is a positive and overwhelming case for doing it”880 – the 
decimation of monopoly, the breaking physically and psychologically of British 
state-controlled industry, trade union and worker, would allow for, as Geoffrey 
Howe argued, state ownership to be “displaced or supplemented, wherever sensibly 
possible”.881  
The unique intensity of the report would reverberate through the Conservative Party. 
Senior shadow ministers were seen to be “embarrassed” on receipt of the report that 
represented “an influential view in the party”.882 Post-war Conservative Party 
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administrations  have all “been committed to some degree of privatisation”,883 yet 
this was a call for wholesale dismantling of national industry and utilities, of 
proposals “for hiving off sections of the nationalised industries”.884 The greater goal 
was not simply to defeat the militancy of miners, dock workers or the postal union, 
this would present a means to an ultimate end – privatisation. Jenkins argues, the 
ultimate objective was to be “the systematic privatisation driven by an ideological 
compulsion to make what was public private.”885 And with this sole aim in mind, 
The Ridley Report  is a template for proposed industrial confrontation, that reflects 
unnervingly the realities of the build-up to, and enactment of the 1984 strike. As an 
instruction manual on how to counter industrial action, it states categorically the 
need for,  
- The government determining the timing of the confrontation.  
- Coal stocks to be accumulated around power stations.  
- Coal supplies arranged by non-union foreign ports.  
- Non-union lorry drivers to be recruited.  
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- The state to organise and to equip a flexible, para-military, mobile police force 
ready to use riot tactics.886  
These recommendations were “an eerily prescient sketch of tactics”887 that were 
deployed during the strike. Huw Benyon argued that, “The extent to which this report 
has been followed as a blueprint by the Thatcher Government is vital to an 
understanding of the 1984 miners’ strike.”888 The report offers a plan on a practical 
level – a construct of a series of actions to gain success in countering trade unions – 
a pragmatic guide to “fragmentation” and policing. Yet it also reflected a 
psychological reinterpretation of the trade union, of how to counter a political threat, 
of the “communist disrupters” and the “enemies of the next Tory government”.889 
The term “enemy” is highly significant. The development of post-war corporatism 
had offered a chance for industrial representation to forge a path within the 
establishment; the evidence produced through The Ridley Report demonstrates the 
wholesale reversal of this mindset – from a corporate entity to an enemy of the state.  
The report evidences that Thatcher had “plotted to destroy the union”.890 From 1978 
onwards, a strategy was developed to counter the power of the NUM, in what Ridley 
                                                          
886 Economic Reconstruction Group (1977). Report Final of the Nationalised Industries Policy Group. Margaret 
Thatcher Foundation. Available at: https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document.  
887 P. Wilshere, D, Macintyre & M. Jones, Strike: Thatcher, Scargill and the Miners (Andre Deutsch, 1985), p.18  
888 H. Benyon, Digging Deeper – Issues in the Miners’ Strike (Verso, 1985), p.36  
889 P. Wilshere, D, Macintyre & M. Jones, Strike: Thatcher, Scargill and the Miners (Andre Deutsch, 1985), p.18 
890 C. Bloom, Thatcher’s Secret War: Subversion, Coercion, Secrecy and Government, 1974 – 90 (The History 
Press). p.123  
  
283  
  
would later assess, was “really closer to a revolution than a strike… it was very much 
in the nature of a peasant’s revolt”.891 There was an acknowledgement of the 
challenge that this rhetoric would present, that the mandate given to Ridley’s report 
would allow for extreme scrutiny, but it “would be cardinal for the government to 
hold firm”.892 His report would earn him notoriety and old dog-eared copies would 
be held by striking miners as a symbol of Thatcher’s determination to defeat them.893 
Ridley understood the severity of what he was proposing, and expresses his 
concerns, “If there were to be weakness” in its application; “there is no point” he 
argues, “in undertaking it if we are not prepared to go through with it”.894  
Thatcher had “pressed Nicholas Ridley to produce a further strategic document”.895 
I argue that there was knowledge, awareness, preparation and an understanding of 
when there would be a conflict with the NUM – “There is no doubt” Ridley states, 
“the government would be challenged sooner or later”.896 To repeat Margaret 
Thatcher’s adamant response to the origins of the 1984 dispute that, “the miners' 
strike was neither of this Government’s seeking nor of its making”897 needs to be 
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viewed through the context of The Ridley Report; it evidences the preparation for 
conflict in 1984. 
 
5.2 Preparing for Battle – “Mobilising Against Scargill”  
The Ridley Report was to formulate a vision for industrial confrontation. To 
implement this vision, time, preparation and an external coal supply was required. I 
argue that from 1981-1984 a Conservative government neglected the United 
Kingdom’s medium to long-term energy policy in order to plan, finance and 
implement industrial confrontation with the NUM.  
For Margaret Thatcher, industrial unrest in the coal industry was “probably the 
greatest threat to her government”.898 Peter Walker notes that the Prime Minister was 
“properly nervous of the harm the miners’ dispute could do” as the 1974 defeat of 
Edward Heath had been “clearly scorched on her mind”.899 The threat posed by the 
NUM was to “crystallise the essence of the British disease” and, through Ridley, had 
been identified as an “immediate category of risk”.900 Therefore, the coal industry 
was to be targeted for wholesale pit closures – yet, this could not be known within 
the public realm. Parliamentary debate, dialogue and scrutiny of a pit closure scheme 
                                                          
 
898 P. Walker, Staying Power; Peter walker An Autobiography (Bloomsbury Publishing Ltd, 1991), p,166  
899 Ibid.  
900 H. Young, One of Us (Macmillan, 1989), p.368 
 
  
285  
  
would offer the perfect opportunity for the NUM and Arthur Scargill to galvanise 
his members in legitimising industrial action through a national ballot. But by 
January 1983, this research identifies, there were wholesale pit closure plans being 
implemented. Nigel Lawson reveals this in an internal memo to Margaret Thatcher 
in January 1983. With over a year to go before the start of strike action, Lawson 
identifies that Arthur Scargill, “no longer has the standing in the industry” and so, 
The [Coal] Board are therefore convinced that the rate of closures should 
be speeded up.  
To minimise the risk of immediate national strike action and to maximise 
the chances of closing uneconomic capacity the Board will want to take it 
step by step and play it by ear.  
The Board plan in a reduction of manpower of some 15,000 in 1984 
This strategy is but the first step in what will need to be a sustained 
programme lasting a number of years.901 
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The context of this revelation in 1983 is important. This research 
demonstrates in this chapter a denial of an official, long-term pit closure 
programme to the NUM leader Arthur Scargill. In April 1984, Arthur 
Scargill made a speech at the NUM conference. He argued,  
When I was elected President of this Union, by over 70 per cent of the 
votes cast, I was elected on a programme of total opposition to pit closures 
and reductions in manpower902  
Scargill’s argument was that his mandate for leadership was based upon an 
opposition to pit closures. I argue that the legitimacy of a national ballot of 
mineworkers for strike action was to be reliant on a true reflection of the number of 
proposed pit closures; this was never forthcoming until its release under the thirty-
year rule. Understanding that a successful ballot “was the only hope of stopping the 
shambles affecting the union”903 Peter Walker noted in his autobiography 904,  
I decided that in order to defeat him I must see there was no possibility  
of him winning a vote for industrial action… He must never be given  
this case. 905  
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This is an important admission. Cabinet records, detailed in this chapter, reveal the 
existence of a denied “hit list”. Scargill had complained “again and again” of its 
existence which was never divulged906 as its existence would ensure an end to the 
“obviously fictional” agreed joint talks “with government on a future for Coal” and 
ensure a legitimate strike ballot, cementing Scargill’s authority.907 Walker was 
adamant; he was to be given “all the resources I needed to guarantee there would not 
be a successful ballot for industrial action”908 – there never was going to be a strike 
ballot and there was never to be transparency regarding the pit closure scheme. What 
was required now was time and preparation.  
Nigel Lawson “implemented” Ridley’s plan.909 He was to stockpile coal up to fifty-
eight million tonnes, gather reserves of vital chemicals and was even to “set up 
helicopter landing sites inside power stations”.910 Therefore, all energy policy was 
“subordinated” in order to defeat Scargill.911 This was no more apparent than in the 
ambiguous nature and sustained, long-term political concealment of the intent to 
protect energy supplies for the inevitable conflict. UK energy policy was to be 
designed, not for the nation’s effective, medium to long-term needs, but primarily to 
serve as a political tool to defeat the NUM. The development of Conservative Party 
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preparation for the strike demonstrates an “interrelationship between an authoritarian 
state and the idea of individualism”.912 The power of monopolised industry, although 
ideologically rejected, offered a degree of centralised control; energy supplies were 
now weaponised. In 1983, 108 million tonnes of coal was required for electrical 
generation; this demand, though stockpiled domestically, was to be imported from 
amongst others, Australia.913 The unofficial, proactive energy policy, was the 
prioritising of coke and coal supplies, while in public Lawson was proposing a 
hands-off approach to energy policy, arguing,  
there were many energy policy issues with a small “e” to occupy my 
attention – uneconomic pits, energy prices… I was, however, frequently 
criticised at the time and since for not introducing an Energy Policy with 
a capital “E” and capital “P” … Disappointing as this must have been to 
some people I did not – and still do not think – that it makes sense to have 
an “Energy Policy”.914  
Written in 1988, four years after the dispute, this is a paradoxical statement. Though 
the above quote points to a lasissez-faire approach, there was a clear “objective” – a 
defeat of Scargill; described in Parliament by Lawson in July 1984, as “a worthwhile 
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investment by the nation”.915 This “investment” was to cause outrage in Parliament 
on the Labour benches – the term “investment” seen as evidence of culpability  
in fomentation of the strike. Lawson retorted that, “if the defeat of the miners’ strike 
was not a worthwhile investment, why did we spend so much public money to  
win it”.916  
Government energy policy reflected a limited state intervention. Lawson argued that 
it was the market that was to be the “best tool for allocating supplies between present 
and future needs”917 and “dubious long-range projections” were unrealistic. The 
priority was to reject subsidy, control labour costs and fix a realistic energy price; 
Lawson was “highly sceptical” regarding government intervention and “Energy 
Policy enthusiasts”.918 So why the U-turn? Why did the government take an active 
interest post-1979 in maintaining and building coal reserves – an example of much 
derided long-term planning; in the words of Nigel Lawson, the “overriding need” to 
defeat the NUM,919 - “I subordinated almost everything to the overriding need to 
prepare for and win a strike”.920  
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The priority could not be clearer. In public, the government espoused small state 
rhetoric, in private, paradoxically, the power of this state would be fully utilised in 
the mass stockpiling of coal and coke reserves. Stocks of coal at power stations rose 
from 29.9 million tonnes in 1979 to 58 million tonnes in 1983. The government, who 
had retreated from a confrontation with the miners in 1981, could, “build up stocks 
without challenge”,921 and evidence from Cabinet minutes in 1983 illustrate the co-
ordinated approach to a “miners’ strike starting in May/June”.922 Minutes of a 
meeting of the Official Group on Coal in 18th February 1983, almost a year prior to 
the dispute, details the period coal stocks would last in the event of a miners’ strike,  
For the period to next autumn CEGB923 endurance builds up to a maximum 
of 27 weeks for a miners’ strike starting in May/ June and thereafter should 
not fall below 26 weeks… An additional 2-3mt of coal stocks would 
increase endurance of by about 3 weeks for a strike beginning in mid- 
November – i.e. to early June.924  
The confrontation with the NUM was to override all other UK energy needs. The 
challenge to the NUM was pre-planned’ it was premeditated and countered the whole 
ethos of the public administration’s desire for fiscal control and limited state 
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involvement regarding energy policy. There were to be conflicting messages at the 
heart of government; in a document entitled Public Expenditure – Hitting the Targets 
dated 15th July 1983, Ferdinand Mount highlights the importance of setting targets 
for public expenditure, “of the anxiety and determination we call share” expressing 
requirements to “fulfil our aspirations to reduce Government borrowing” and 
secondly, “Hit those targets”.925 Keith Joseph, in July 1983, argued that it was 
“crucial that we should keep back for 1984/1985 the £3billion reserve which 
appeared in the last white paper” which was to mean “finding savings of some £2.5 
billion in 1984-1985”.926 As Lawson recounts, all other priorities were subordinated 
to the defeat of the miners, whilst the public face of government was austerity and 
fiscal prudence.  
Therefore, government policy was one geared to “extreme”927 budgetary control and 
this brought the inevitable departmental challenges. In a letter from Peter Rees, Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury to Nigel Lawson, Rees, outlines the difficulties and 
challenges of squeezed budgets and demanding financial targets,  
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I have with great difficulty identified the whole of the required savings in 
my cash limited programme in such a way to leave science unaffected. But  
I will have to find £20 million from the universities…This will sharply 
reduce the scope for rationalisation and new development.928  
The government’s political message was utterly contradictory. To the Nation it was 
of a need for economic prudence after the excess of the previous Labour 
administration. It was a message of cost-cutting and departmental soul searching at 
how to adjust the ever-tightening budget. In the 1983 Conservative Party General 
Election Manifesto, the message was for the control of state spending, “We shall 
maintain firm control of public spending and borrowing… We shall continue a 
responsible financial strategy929 and Bernard Ingham declared at a Public 
Expenditure presentation in 1983, it was paramount that the government was seen to 
be “determined to keep on top of spending and exercise restraint as a way of life”930 
– the fiscal message could not have been clearer.  
Yet the Secretary of State for Energy, Peter Walker, in June 1983, was considering 
how far it was to be, “feasible and desirable to increase endurance of coal burning 
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industry”.931 Walker outlines the various effects a miners’ strike would have on 
power station production of electricity and “certain customers who normally draw 
coal direct from the pits”, and was to outline in full the prospective costs to the 
taxpayer. Walker outlines the following costs in a context of providing support for 
those in industry, and the supply of energy for less than a two-month period “The 
NCB has in mind a total provision of perhaps 150,000 tonnes, which would provide 
an endurance of perhaps 7 - 8 weeks”.932 Walker summarises the predicted short-
term costs as,  
 Cement £1 - 1.2 million  
 Other large industries £2.2 million  
 Small Industries £0.9 million  
 Coal depots £0.6 million  
 Strategic Stocks £1.2 -1.5 million   
Total £5.9 - 6.4 million  
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The eventual strike would last for just under a year. Walker’s forecast was for a 
seven to eight-week period, to simply “maximise stocks by November 1983”.933 Yet 
the figures were to be a drop in the ocean considering the financial burden of 
defeating the miners over a twelve-month period from March 1984 to March 1985. 
The expectations were for a coal strike initially to last no longer than 15 - 20 weeks 
and was planned and prepared for as a part of overall governmental budgetary 
responsibility, whilst dictating to Cabinet the importance of fiscal responsibility. 
From 1981, as evidenced, a pit closure programme was in place; this was 
government priority regarding energy policy – all other concerns, as detailed by 
Nigel Lawson, were to take a backseat until the defeat of the NUM. Newly released 
documents, from Nigel Lawson written to the Prime Minister, argue that, “of course, 
a number of other decisions in the fields of public expenditure, coal price, and pay 
round, hinge on the approach we adopt”.934 Lawson’s internal memo to Margaret 
Thatcher in 1983 demonstrates a government fully committed to the inevitability of 
strike action. Nobody within Cabinet was more aware of the “overriding need to 
prepare for a coal strike” than Nigel Lawson; “The House,” he declared in 1984 at 
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the height of the strike, “Should be in no doubt whatever that the government are 
prepared to pay the cost of resisting this strike however long it lasts.”935 
And the eventual financial cost was immense. The Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster and Minister for the Arts (The Earl of Gowrie) stated to the House of 
Lords,  
My Lords, the strike is estimated to have reduced growth in the gross do-
mestic product by between 1 and 1¼% in 1984, to 2½%. 
Lord Diamond responded,  
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl for those figures. Do they add 
up to the estimate, which has been widely publicised, of a cost between  
£5 billion and £6 billion in total, whether it arises in this year or the fol-
lowing year? As those are the economic costs only, and in view of the 
enormous personal suffering caused by strikes to strikers, their families 
and their wives in particular (as well as the economic costs which are 
shared by all of us).936 
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There is a conflict of ideologically driven agendas that the above has demonstrated. 
Nigel Lawson as both an Energy Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer, was 
“always a firm believer in the market economy and the enterprise culture… set 
within a firm framework of financial discipline”.937 There are so many contradictions 
to this statement when considering the overriding aim to defeat a trade union at 
almost any cost. As demonstrated, the desire to deconstruct the coal industry was 
confirmed in 1981, and yet billions of pounds of taxpayer funds would be ploughed 
in to the preparation and policing of the strike. The public utterances of fiscal 
responsibility do not reflect the mass investment, long-term planning and rejection 
of budgetary targets to defeat the NUM in a planned conflict. The cost to the taxpayer 
and effort to reconfigure wholesale government strategy does indeed evidence 
Lawson’s claim that he was to subordinate everything to “win a strike”938 and defeat 
the NUM. This I argue does not demonstrate statecraft policy. 
 
5.4 The Legacy of British Steel Corporation 
To help contextualise the eventual confrontation between the Conservative Party and 
NUM, the example of relations with British Steel Corporation demonstrates 
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implementation of The Ridley Report’s template as early as 1980. British Steel 
represented a bench mark for Tory interventionist industrial policy. It was a 
landmark industry, hugely significant in size, scale and symbolism – an industry 
which had a proud tradition, served and was served by working class communities, 
and yet in the early years of the Thatcher regime, it lay at a crossroads. From the 
1970s through to the 1980s it struggled to be profitable and for orders in an 
increasingly competitive marketplace. The similarities with the mining industry and 
community are apparent – historic industrial British communities, proud tradition of 
service, yet commercially vulnerable to an ever changing, globalised market place.  
This is an important point. I argue that imposition of policy directed towards the 
BSC939 was to mirror the later challenge against the NUM. Traditionally the Iron and 
Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC) had been “under the control of moderate, 
politically right wing leadership” 940 who were not prone to strike and were “prepared 
to identify with the objectives of management”.941 The steel industry was not 
militant, and as such Thatcher’s policies and stance towards the British Steel 
Corporation are significant; they firstly demonstrate an ever greater ideological 
approach to Britain’s nationalised industries and secondly, these polices represent a 
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signpost for the eventual larger conflict with the NUM in 1984. BSC was to be a 
testing ground for the advent of privatisation.  
Therefore, government policy towards the coal industry was hidden by smoke and 
mirrors. In an interview in 1981, Margaret Thatcher was discussing the potential for 
a miners’ dispute, and mineworkers’ allegiances to Arthur Scargill. She argued, “I 
have a lot of faith in the miners, let me say… I don’t think they would follow him in 
trying to have a row with government”942 – her press secretary, Bernard Ingham, was 
to reiterate publicly media policy that, “Finally, I sought to get over the fact, that this 
Government – and in my experience all Governments I have served – did not want 
confrontation”.943 Yet a die had been cast; the decision to “speed up the closure of 
uneconomic pits”, was documented as early as January 1981,944 and the reality was, 
that by 1982, the Thatcher administration was not ready or able for a fight. Yet this 
was to change – and the appointment of Ian MacGregor from BSC was highly 
significant.  
MacGregor’s appointment was not one to be viewed as conciliatory. The BBC 
reported that on the appointment of the new chairman of the National Coal Board, 
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John Smith, Shadow Energy Secretary, stated that “is an extraordinarily foolish 
appointment”945 and William Sirs, General Secretary of the Iron and Steel Trades 
Confederation argued that, “He seems to have no social conscience whatsoever.”946 
Nicknamed “Mac the knife”, MacGregor’s remit in 1983 was to streamline, cut costs 
and improve efficiency, with the majority of cost-cutting, as demonstrated at BSC, 
achieved through redundancies. Nigel Lawson would respond, illustrating the stark 
economic realities, that, “Mr. MacGregor’s objectives will be to focus the board's 
efforts on the earliest practicable return to profitability costs.”947 There was to be no 
indication of any long-term industrial planning, or coherent incentives for workforce 
participation. Indeed, in his autobiography, Lawson details MacGregor’s successes 
at BSC being that of a, “ruthless American whose main achievement at British Steel 
had been to slash the workforce”.948  
His appointment at NCB was controversial. He was to have the Tory party, “In a 
state of horror”949 as visions of 1974 came flooding back to backbenchers. 
MacGregor himself described how he sensed the challenge against the NUM and 
Scargill was to be “running on the ragged edge of acceptability or even into the area 
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of unacceptability”.950 What is abundantly clear is that the appointment was to be 
highly politicised and calculating – it was designed primarily to demonstrate the 
forthcoming confrontation and asset stripping with the mining industry. It was to be 
déjà vu – BSC had been driven into the ground. Michael Foot argued at the Labour  
Party Conference in 1983 that,  
Under Ian MacGregor, Mrs Thatcher’s special miracle worker, British 
steel lost £2,393m in three years, more than twice as much as the total loss 
of the five years of the spendthrift Labour government951  
Foot’s argument was that MacGregor’s appointment again demonstrated a non-long-
term strategy for British industry. It was ideological remit to slash and burn, of asset 
stripping and short-term financial targets to sustain the marketplace. Foot pleaded at 
the Labour Party Conference in 1982, that, “we must stop the wrecking of the steel 
industry now”.952 
On his appointment at British Steel in 1980, MacGregor set out his stall 
emphatically. In an address to the Parliamentary Press Gallery, it was noted that, 
“His main message was that BSC was bankrupt and should be liquidated”953 – Britain 
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and its industry had fallen behind as an efficient, cost effective, profitable nation 
because the UK had been more concerned about “social stability and equality and 
not about producing wealth. Hence, despite an ability to deliver on educational 
standards, technical capacity and management skills, we have fallen behind”.954  
This is obviously a revealing statement, neatly summarising the priorities of the new 
regime. Yet he was a popular choice within government inner circles – “Margaret 
had a high regard for Ian”955 recounted Nigel Lawson, and it was to reflect the 
dispassionate nature of MacGregor’s management formula. At BSC, MacGregor set 
out a “formidable job shedding programme.” By December of 1982, MacGregor’s 
proposal for the future of the nationalised industry had reached Keith Joseph. In a 
memo entitled “BSC’s  
Corporate plan; Closures” Keith Joseph details the need to implement MacGregor’s 
recommendations in haste,  
I think there is no need for us to hold up… He intends to reduce the number 
of jobs by about 17,000 by a combination of closures and de-manning… 
These reductions are the minimum necessary956  
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Yet interestingly, the obvious draconian measures were to be questioned – did they 
go far enough? MacGregor was certainly no industrial sentimentalist, yet he was 
pragmatic in the pursuit of profit; he was no ideologue. Forwarding these proposals 
to Margaret Thatcher, Sir Tim Lankaster noted that,  
Sir Keith feels it is necessary to give an immediate go-ahead so that BSC 
do not lose any momentum while the Plan is being considered by 
Government. The only issue for Ministers in Sir Keith’s view, is whether 
the Plan is tough enough – i.e. there can be no question of fewer 
redundancies than 17,000 and fewer closures than those set out in the 
plan.957  
In an ironic twist, Thatcher, in handwriting along the edge of the correspondence 
wrote, “This can't be done before Xmas. It would be a terrible Xmas present for 
many families”.958 This internal correspondence is revealing – MacGregor, as was 
his remit at BSC, to initially target wage costs as an immediate, short term strategy 
to stem the haemorrhage of large losses sustained by the industry. He was interested 
in the purity of the pursuit of profit – not power. His remit had always been to return 
“BSC to enduring profitability” – but BSC had obvious financial difficulties; by 
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1976 much “of the steel making in Europe had been loss making”959 and by 1981 
BSC were to receive government subsidies of £400 million.  
 Though unpalatable and unsentimental, MacGregor made hard decisions, which 
eventually proved successful in returning BSC to profitability. But I provide 
evidence that the government wanted more than simply profitability – the ability to 
go further and faster in their quest to challenge British industry. In internal 
documents to the Prime Minister entitled, “Thinking the Unthinkable”. John 
Hoskyns, commenting on MacGregor’s review, demands “real decisions” on the 
future of BSC,  
Action must be taken now to provide Cabinet with real decision points 
rather than phoney review – in July… All the excuses for delay instead of 
decisions are already there… there is a need to call for a proper  
cost/ benefit analysis of BSC run-down.960  
Hoskyns had previously demonstrated draconian instincts upon the closing of British 
industrial giants. In January of 1981, Hoskyns demanded the immediate run down 
and closure of British Leyland, advocating in an internal memo to the Prime 
Minister, “our best opportunity of starting the closure of BL is now… If there are 
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buyers for parts of BL they will come forward now… Closure would demonstrate 
the price of failure and show the country we really do mean business”.961 It is an 
interesting analogy – “mean business” was to be the shredding of British business 
interests at the earliest opportunity available – closure, fragmentation, fire sale.  
Ian MacGregor recollects the “moment of truth” 962 at BSC came in December 1980, 
when “we had to decide what size of business we thought we were going to be able 
to sustain…This meant further slim-lining – 20,000 more jobs to go on top of the  
50,000 we had already shed in the year.”963 After implementation of MacGregor’s 
“capacity rationalisation programme” BSC964 was back in profit by 1986, achieving 
commercial viability, but at the expense of 60% of the inherited workforce.965 
Though having pumped in billions of pounds into BSC and though privatisation in 
1979 would have been deemed “unthinkable” due to the perception of release of a 
Crown Jewel of British industry, its return to a degree of sustainability now placed 
the sale of BSC in a new light – if a “national champion” of industry could be sold, 
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so could British Rail and British Coal. The mindset of Conservative Party policy had 
been re-engineered and the privatisation of BSC was to carry a “high symbolism”.966  
As BSC returned to profit it was to be sold immediately. MacGregor’s “capacity 
rationalisation”967 programme had resulted in a half yearly profit in 1987/1988 of 
£190 million, immediately resulting in Ken Clarke announcing to Parliament the 
privatisation of British Steel, “as soon as possible, subject to market conditions… 
Making British Steel competitive and returning it to the market place is the best 
guarantee of the long-term future and success of the corporation.”968 The years 
immediately prior to privatisation demonstrated efficiency gains under state control 
– but as Nigel Lawson argues,  
The prime motives for privatisation were not Exchequer gain, but an 
ideological belief in free markets and a wider distribution of private 
ownership of property 969 
This is a revealing quote, demonstrating clearly the contradictory views held within 
Cabinet. Patently it was nothing to do with “long term future” as argued by Clarke – 
it is an ideological default setting. It was never to be about the management of an 
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industry or even the need to pursue profitability. Parker and Wul argue that regarding 
BSC, “the change in capital market did not lead to obvious performance gains.”970 
Government policy at BSC was a premeditated attack on industrial job creation and 
state control – pursuit of profitability was an irrelevance, a mechanism simply to be 
able to shift state assets on to the private marketplace – and even this would not 
secure future British jobs and security.  
MacGregor’s time at British Steel, “would deliver everything that Thatcher and 
Joseph wanted”.971 In 1979 British Steel employed 166,000 staff – in 1983 there were 
71,000 – these jobs were lost due to an underlying, ideological principle of the 
distrust of state-run industries. Thatcher argued,  
Just as nationalisation was at the heart of the collectivist programme by which 
Labour governments sought to remodel British society, so privatisation is at the 
centre of any programme of reclaiming territory for freedom972 The NUM and the 
mining community were to be the next great targets – ironically the chapters 
detailing MacGregor’s detailing his appointment at the NCB, is entitled, Coal; War 
is Declared. 973 
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5.4 “There was no secret hit list of pits” – Ian MacGregor  
On the 12th March 1984 tens of thousands of miners stopped work; more than half 
of Britain’s 187,000 mineworkers were to commence strike action and as “miners in 
Yorkshire and Kent were the first to down tools”974 they were joined by colleagues 
in South Wales and Scotland. The strike began due to the announcement of the 
closure of Cortonwood Colliery in Yorkshire by Coal Board Chairman Ian 
MacGregor. On the 6th March a “critical meeting” had been called by the Coal 
Industry National Consultative Council to “establish common ground between the 
Board and the unions”. It was “doomed to failure”.975 Ian MacGregor had stated 
categorically “I can’t wait for the unions. I work for the government”976 and was to 
press ahead with his proposed “restructuring plans”.  
Arthur Scargill had pushed MacGregor ever harder on the existence of a “hit list” of 
pits “slated for closure”.977 Scargill had “done his sums again” – MacGregor and the 
NCB were planning for a far greater number of pit closures than the accepted twenty 
to twenty-one collieries with the resulting 21,000 job losses. The Board were 
planning an eight million tonne reduction in coal capacity with over seventy pit 
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closures and 70,000 job losses; a plan which was to be denied.978 Scargill had wanted 
strike action and the accompanying legitimacy of a national ballot of members, as 
had been established practice in the “successful conflicts of 1972 and 1974”. The 
legitimacy and result of a ballot would rest on the truth regarding the pit closure 
scheme and the correct numbers involved – what was the reality regarding the 
number of pit closures and the subsequent job losses? Ultimately, the truth behind 
Scargill’s purported “hit list” was not to be forthcoming; a national ballot would not 
be mandated on the official NCB pit closure proposals. The truth was to be withheld; 
therefore, it was time to support “the strikes already under way”.979 
This research provides primary evidence for the existence of this “hit list” eluded to 
by Scargill. The pit closure scheme was in progress as early as 1983, as evidenced 
in correspondence between Leon Brittan and Nigel Lawson. Lawson questions 
Brittan’s commitment to coal imports from Australia to stock pile coal in preparation 
for industrial conflict. Nigel Lawson writes that,  
We must not allow any misjudgement about coal imports to prejudice the 
strategy for pit closures that we agreed at the Prime Minister’s meeting on 
27th January. The benefits from achieving the maximum feasible rate of 
closures far outweigh the costs of curtailing CEGB coal imports. 
                                                          
978 Ibid. 
979 Ibid, p.144 
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Moreover, the scale of closures necessary to return the NCB to 
commercial viability is such that we may well be approaching the brink 
for a number of years to come. I should add that the question on imports 
is not merely whether it creates sympathy for the miners but whether it 
stiffens their resolve to closures.980  
 
In response, Leon Brittan, complained, 
I am disturbed at the suggestion that we continue with import restrictions 
next year. It is debateable whether permission for the CEGB to import 
cheaper coal would really win sympathy for the miners.981 
There is the strongest case against such artificial distortion to the markets. 
You suggest there might be a case for paying up to £25 million to 
reschedule the current Aus. Contract.982  
Yet Brittan, like Lawson, concurs February 1983, over a year prior to beginning of 
strike action in March 1984, that, 
 
Our priority aim must be to achieve a higher rate of pit closures.983 
                                                          
980CAB 184/670 Lawson, N. (1983). Memo to Leon Brittan. The National Archives of the UK (TNA) 
981 Ibid. 
982 CAB 184/670 Brittan, L (1983). Memo to Nigel Lawson. The National Archives of the UK (TNA) 
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The above demonstrates Nigel Lawson’s understanding of the incendiary nature of 
both stockpiling coke reserves and a pit closure scheme; “achieving the maximum 
feasible rate of closures” and does not, I argue, relate solely to the official proposal 
of the closure of 20 to 21 unproductive pits. The maximum level of pit closures 
would only be possible by marginalising the support for any striking miners – to 
obstruct a mass strike in Britain by denying the correct level of closures. Government 
policy was closure, at great financial cost, of an industry without the need for 
confrontation – it was a waiting game for the government. If, as Lawson argues, coal 
imports for the meantime are not suspended from Australia,  
 
Above all, it would give Scargill an issue over which he could almost 
certainly get a majority vote for a national strike, and on which, almost 
uniquely; the miners could count of substantial public support.984  
This issue is vital to this research. It demonstrates energy and an industry policy 
designed to defeat the NUM and Arthur Scargill – not a coherent strategy to sustain 
UK energy needs; therefore, evidencing a dogmatic agenda. The priority clearly in 
this correspondence is the closure of mining pits, and this does vindicate Scargill. 
The principle controversy regarding Scargill’s handling of the strike was the lack of 
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a universal ballot and therefore the credibility of a mass strike; energy policy was 
designed around this criterion. Nigel Lawson understood this only too well, as 
evidenced in a letter to Ian Gow in January 1982,  
The only way to defeat Scargill in the next round is the same way that 
proved successful this time; to create the conditions in which a majority 
of the miners refuse to follow him to a pit head ballot.985  
 
This research has produced evidence that may point to a lack of transparency of 
government industrial policy – there was a “hit list” as this research evidences. In 
1982, Arthur Scargill was sent an anonymous copy of a secret plan earmarking 75 
pits for closure, with the loss of over 100,000 miners’ jobs – “its contents were not 
only denied by government and NCB chiefs, but were disbelieved by militant NUM 
leaders who had been assured that their pits had long-term futures”.986  
This was evidently not the case and Scargill was to be vindicated, as demonstrated 
in this research. Archive material from the National Archives, released in January 
2014, evidences a “secret” meeting, held at Downing Street on the 15th September 
1983. There was to be no official documentation of the meeting; Michael Scholar, 
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Mrs Thatcher’s Private Secretary, stated that there would be nothing in writing of 
the topic matter, which was deemed “clarifying the understandings between 
MacGregor and the ministers”.987 Indeed, in handwriting scrawled at the top of the 
“secret” document was written, “subject (no master)” and “1 copy made and given 
to R Armstrong”.988 
During this meeting, ministers were told of the plans of newly appointed NCB 
Chairman, Ian MacGregor, to close an initial 64 pits, rising to 75 pits within three 
years. Note show an “accelerated rundown of coal capacity was accepted”,989 and 
that the pit closure scheme having, “Gone better this year than planned: there had 
been one pit closed every three weeks”.990 There was to be no official “closure list” 
but a “pit by pit procedure” and that,  
Mr MacGregor had it in mind over the three years 1983/85 that a further 
75 pits would be closed: first, 64 which would reduce the workforce by 
some 55,000 and reduce capacity by some 20 million tonnes: then a further 
11 with manpower reductions of 9000.  
Manpower at the end of that time in the industry would be down to 
138,000 from its current level of 202,000. 
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Each one per cent of miners’ pay cost £20 million a year, so that closures 
produced considerably greater economies than the results of practicable 
pay moderation.991  
The reasoning for closure was “greater economies”.992 The above demonstrates a 
rejection of “moderation” – a rejection of statecraft policy to impose 
deindustrialisation, based on an ideological remit in accord with The Ridley Report. 
If implemented, results of these projected closure plans would lead to two thirds of 
Welsh miners, a third in Scotland and half of those in North East England, South 
Yorkshire and the South Midlands would be made redundant. The entire coal 
industry in Kent would be closed.993 It was asked, 
how to arrange these meetings so that as little as possible of the more 
sensitive aspects is committed to paper, 
The final line of the document reads that,  
It was agreed that no record of this meeting should be circulated… 
Not to be photocopied or circulated outside the private office994  
A “short oral briefing” would be sufficient regarding the plans to be discussed in the 
meetings. Those who were present at the meeting were the Prime Minister, 
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Chancellor of the Exchequer, Secretary of State for Employment, Secretary of State 
for Energy, Sir Robert Armstrong, Sir Peter Gregson and Michael Scholar. The 
minutes of the meeting conflict with the official policy of the incumbent government, 
who consistently denied the existence of a “hit list” of pits.  
To reinforce the undisclosed pit closure scheme, a meeting held in January 1984, 
two months prior to the start of the year-long strike, was to propose an acceleration 
of this closure and redundancy scheme; again, a secret document “copy No. 1” 
details that,  
The Prime Minister held a meeting today to discuss proposals put forward 
by the Secretary of State for Industry for an enhanced redundancy scheme 
for miners under the age of 50.  
Summing up the Prime Minister said that the objective of a more 
accelerated rundown of coal capacity was accepted.995 
This proposed redundancy and pit closure scheme was not debated or disclosed to 
Parliamentary scrutiny, the media, the miners or the mining union. It was not 
discussed at full Cabinet level and it did not have collective Cabinet authority – 
questions from MPs would be rebuffed. In response to questions in the House of 
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Commons in June 1983, Margaret Thatcher denounced the existence of any closure 
plan, and made light of the hardship of unemployment. Mr Lyell, MP, asks,  
Does my right hon. Friend deplore the deliberate scare tactics of Mr. 
Arthur Scargill in walking out of his very first meeting with the new 
National Coal Board chairman after only three and a half minutes and 
shouting about a hit list of pit closures?  
The Prime Minister in response,  
I agree very much with my hon. and learned Friend. I understand that the 
National Coal Board made it clear to the National Union of Mineworkers 
that there is no so-called hit-list of pits earmarked for closure.996  
There was, critics argued, to be a cover up and a denial for thirty years.997 So 
effective was the cover up of the secret memo that, “MacGregor’s 75-pit closure list 
was never mentioned again in Cabinet papers”998 right through the duration of the 
strike to March 1985. Indeed, it had taken until March 2014 and the publication of 
documents under the thirty-year rule, for the true levels of the stockpiling of coal 
and the planned pit closures to be revealed. This research, through these primary 
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sources, illustrates in full the denial of a pit closure scheme beyond the sanctioned 
20 pits, and the covert government challenge to Arthur Scargill.  
The importance of undermining Scargill was paramount. The incendiary nature of 
the pit closure scheme was such that, “Thatcher had no hesitation in authorising an 
advertising campaign to tell the country that Scargill was lying to his members”.999 
The campaign was to include a letter, ironically entitled, “Your Future in Danger” 
addressed to all striking miners at the height of the industrial dispute, which stated 
in capital letters, the denunciation of alleged pit closures and job losses,  
 
THESE THINGS ARE ABSOLUTELY UNTRUE. I STATE THAT 
CATEGORICALLY AND SOLEMNLY. YOU HAVE BEEN 
DELIBERATELY MISLED1000  
 
Ian MacGregor, in his autobiography, reiterated the denunciation of the NUM leader. 
Decreeing Scargill as “obsessed with his anti-government beliefs…There was no 
‘secret hit list’ of pits”.1001 MacGregor condemned Scargill’s rhetoric of, “the Coal 
Board’s alleged bid to butcher the industry” as coming from a “Man bent on such a 
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romantic dream and a glorious place in history.”1002 Yet archival evidence, and this 
research, demonstrably proves the existence of this “hit list” of pits. Arthur Scargill 
was not prepared for his industry to be destroyed without a fight; he repeatedly 
demanded the existence of this pre-planned closure programme – and it was 
repeatedly denied to him. Scargill’s message on being appointed was that he believed 
there was a “hit list” of pits to be closed and that, “under no circumstances shall I 
countenance a pit closure programme… it would be suicidal of the Government or 
board to think otherwise”.1003  
Scargill had been clear. In 1982 he was to be voted President of the NUM with a 
majority figure of 70.3%. It represented a landslide victory in the most powerful 
union in Western Europe, and a campaign which was fought on the sole premise of 
the rejection of pit closures on economic grounds, and the consistent demand for the 
government’s and Coal Board’s policies to be transparent, clear and legitimate. 
Scargill’s preparation for battle coincided with a descent of political will and support 
from the true ally of the NUM – the Labour Party. Lawson’s rhetoric was accepted 
by Neil Kinnock, who lamented the “suicidal vanity” of Scargill, and used the 
analogy of lions being led by donkeys. Neil Kinnock and the leadership of the 
Labour Party did not support the actions of this legitimate trade union, commenting 
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that, “The people who need the support and safeguard of trade unionism and of 
public services, cannot afford to be part of any political ‘Charge of the Light 
Brigade.’ There is no glory in defeat for them”.1004  
The Labour Party and Neil Kinnock had been misled. The truth regarding the pit 
closure scheme was denied to them the official opposition, as it was denied to the 
NUM, the TUC and the British public until January 2014. Kinnock, who was to be 
so virulent an opponent of Scargill and the non-ballot, this documentation reveals, 
was made to believe that there was to be a closure programme of the acknowledged 
20 to 21 pits, and therefore he was recommending that an ACAS drafted settlement 
be accepted. Peter Walker, Secretary of State for Energy, responded in bold fashion 
and denied even the existence of a pit closure programme of the 20 pits,  
I have informed Mr Kinnock that he is clearly under a misunderstanding 
for there is no list of 20 pits… and since he has stated publicly that the 
ACAS formula provided a strong probability of settlement, I hope he will 
now use his influence to see that the National Union of Mineworkers 
accept this formula.1005  
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Negotiations broke down with ACAS by November 1984, and the closure of 20 pits 
proved to be the tip of the iceberg. Neil Kinnock was misled, and indeed the pit 
closure programme was never a minimum of 20 pits, the minimum was to be 75  – 
and yet he was to argue that a national ballot would have ensured, “active support 
from trade unions and trade unionists, which would have changed the whole 
environment of the strike”.1006 The publication of a “hit list” would inevitably have 
meant victory for strike action and the cooperation of Nottinghamshire miners;1007 
therefore, the government would not allow that to happen – the “hit list” would 
remain secret. This research proposes that due to the non-disclosure of the true 
intentions of the government, the issue of the non-ballot and subsequent non-
legitimacy of strike action is a smokescreen of the government’s making. There 
could be no legitimacy for strike action through a national ballot due to the non-
disclosure of a pit “hit list”.  
The government line would be consistent throughout the duration of the year-long 
strike. Symbolically, a response by Peter Walker in November 1984, to an enquiry 
from Stanley Orme, Shadow Energy Secretary, regarding Herrington Colliery in 
County Durham, highlighted the scale of government denial. To Orme’s question 
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regarding Herrington’s long-term future, Walker responded in such strong and 
determined language, stating in no uncertain terms, “I must say Arthur Scargill is 
like a bus driver to the Labour Party. He takes you for a ride every day”.1008 Orme 
responded, arguing that he was “shocked and disheartened by the frivolous tone of 
your response” and that regarding his enquiry to the existence of “such projections” 
Walker’s tone was one “that is neither constructive or helpful”.1009 Walker reiterated 
there was no “hit list” – there was simply an “engineer’s assessment” and, “It is clear 
that no colliery will be closed unless it has gone through the colliery review 
procedure”.1010 Herrington Colliery was closed in 1985. 
To the public, the coal mining industry was in good hands. Walker argued that the 
government,  
would continue a major investment far greater than that in the coal 
industries of the whole of the rest of the European community. An 
investment programme which will provide Britain with the most effective 
and efficient coal industry in Europe1011 
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The reality was somewhat different. The government closed 170 pits over the next 
decade, and in 1994 the last 15 pits were privatised. MacGregor’s proposed job loss 
programme was in progress by January 1984. In a secret letter, David Pascall, a 
policy adviser to Mrs Thatcher, wrote, 
The NCB’s current strategy is to achieve financial viability by 1988. This 
requires manpower reductions of 64,000 (from 202,000 to 138,000) and 
the closure of 25 m.t of capacity between 1982 - 1988 
Furthermore, we are already achieving a significantly faster rate of both 
manpower reductions and pit closures than anticipated.  
The proposed scheme will cost £187 million. 
The estimated cost of a strike, given as a £160 million per month.1012 
 
The figures demonstrate conclusively adaptation of the deconstruction of the coal 
mining industry. Clearly there is a conflict between the official figures offered by 
Ian MacGregor and the reality as evidenced above. It shows MacGregor’s proposed 
pit closure scheme – denied by the government, and an acceptance of mass fiscal 
stimulus in promotion of an industrial dispute. The financial cost to the taxpayer of 
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the pit closure scheme and the year-long strike are completely at odds with the public 
utterances of governmental budgetary control.  
Therefore, the secret documents I have revealed offer a glimpse at the lengths, 
economically and politically, that the Thatcher administration was prepared to go to 
challenge the NUM. This challenge was, I argue, constructed through a policy 
engineered through an ideological mindset and the formation of an internal 
Conservative Party committee, designed to prepare for and conduct a pit closure 
scheme that was not accountable to public and political scrutiny. The context to the 
secret nature of the “hit list” is important, as an announcement of such a scheme 
would legitimise Arthur Scargill’s demands for strike action. A full disclosure of the 
pit closure scheme would enhance the winning of a national ballot, thereby offering 
an opportunity for the disparate elements of the mining industry, notably the 
Nottinghamshire mineworkers, to join in strike action. Secondly, it would have let 
the Labour Party under Neil Kinnock reject neutrality and offer credible political and 
parliamentary support to a national strike. Therefore, the existence of a “hit list” was 
denied the the government.  
This research has proven the existence this unofficial “hit list” of viable coal mines 
closures, thereby adding to academic study of the subject matter.  
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5.6 Conclusions  
The Conservative government was ready for industrial conflict with the NUM by 
1983. This process, from the proposed “hit list” to maximum endurance, had been 
organised, as revealed, through the “shadowy Whitehall committee codenamed 
“MISC 57”.1013 A “secret Cabinet committee” established in July 1981, its remit was 
“Withstanding a Coal Strike”.1014 Chaired by Sir Robert Wade Grey,1015 it was 
formed to plan for the closure of uneconomic pits and prepare for confrontation with 
the NUM. Its existence and details were denied to previous researchers under the 
Freedom of Information Act, but were released under the thirty-year rule in 2014.1016 
The secret nature of the committee was reinforced by a codeword used by those who 
knew of its existence, “Endurance.1017 In accordance with the template set by The 
Ridley Report, John Vereker1018 wrote; 
MISC 57 has begun the next phase of its work i.e. preparing for possible 
industrial action in the New Year over pit closures. 
                                                          
1013 Marsden, S. (2013). Thatcher made secret plans to bring in the military during the miners' strike. The Telegraph. 
Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/margaret-thatcher/ 
1014 PREM19/541 Whitelaw, W (1981) Minute to Margaret Thatcher, Withstanding a Coal Strike: MISC 57 report on 
possibility of withstanding a coal strike, winter 1981-2. The National Archives of the UK (TNA) 
1015 J. Campbell, Margaret Thatcher: Volume Two: The Iron Lady (Vintage Books, 2008), p.355 
1016 F. Beckett & D. Hencke, Marching to the Fault Line: The Miners’ Strike and the Battle for Industrial Britain 
(Constable, 2009), p. 57 
1017 Ibid.  
1018 John Vereker was a member of Margaret Thatcher’s policy unit.  
  
324  
  
You know the general background to the closure issue, and the 
inevitability of some closures regardless of the existence or otherwise of a 
“hit list”.1019 
By march of 1983 Vereker was positive in the assertion that,  
I am happy to report that this morning we for the first time glimpsed on 
the horizon the prospect of indefinite endurance, albeit at a very 
considerable cost1020 
This chapter has evidenced the long-term planning for industrial conflict with the 
NUM, the investment of massive public expenditure at times of austerity and the 
development of a covert pit closure agenda; this evidence, I argue, demonstrates 
clearly a rejection of a statecraft interpretation of government policy. Though the 
Conservative government did continue to demonstrate electoral credibility and 
internal party control, the above revelations reveal an administration that was to 
pursue a premeditated ideological agenda based upon the recommendation of The 
Ridley Report, evidencing the “fragmentation” of UK industry, notably the targeting 
of the UK coal industry and the NUM. This research confirms Arthur Scargill’s 
consistent claims of the existence of a “hit list” and counters the government’s 
denials. I argue that this is an important addition to academic debate regarding the 
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government’s preparation and conduct during the 1984 miners’ strike. I have 
analysed the ideological blueprint that would map out the government’s response to 
the NUM and revealed a covert plan to stockpile coal reserves, plan wholescale pit 
closures and deny Arthur Scargill and the NUM a true reflection of government 
industrial policy towards the coal mining industry – this could be interpreted as a 
government cover up and political duplicity. Therefore, the above primary evidence 
accounts for a dedicated template for the dismantling of British nationalised 
industries, the adherence to an energy policy of vague non-accountability and a 
premeditated and pre-planned confrontation with a trade union movement. Statecraft 
is a demonstration of government controlling a central stage; the “Reconstruction of 
that traditional centre autonomy”1021 – not creating and escalating a regional dispute, 
“where a particular statecraft is wrecked by events or movements external to the 
governing”.1022 This is reflected through tangible evidence of smoke and mirrors 
tactics towards preparation and policing of the miners’ strike dating back to 1984. I 
argue that evidence provided in this research reveals the departure of any form of 
Parliamentary, Cabinet, media or industrial relations scrutiny to this process and a 
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potential deceit towards the NUM, Arthur Scargill and the British public over New 
Right targets for pit closures.  
Chapter 6 – The 1984 Miners’ Strike 
6.0 Introduction 
The 1984 miners’ strike, I argue, and demonstrate through this research, was a 
premeditated, planned and necessary conflict, that was to enable an established New 
Right in the Conservative Party to prosper and to enable neoliberal economic reform 
to be realised. The bitter conflict was the fulfilment of The Ridley Report; a 
realisation of an instruction “The government should, if possible, choose who and 
when to fight”1023 and when “necessary to organise and equip a squad of mobile 
police, ready to use riot tactics to defeat pickets”. The process for industrial conflict 
had been set in motion; “Coal stocks were to be built up at the power stations” and 
additional “Coal supplies should be arranged via non-union foreign ports”. The 
template had been a success, the remaining stage was conflict itself; the process of 
the “need to fragment the industries as far as possible” – a need to confront.1024 
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This research reveals the totality of the preparation and eventual implementation of 
an industrial policy; a policy that was constructed to inflict the desired confrontation 
and fragmentation of a viable, productive and unionised industry. I evidence that the 
construction of this dispute was not designed to impose statecraft; but to impose 
industrial sabotage. I will demonstrate that the “enemy within” was a necessary 
construct; one that was to necessitate chaos to reinterpret the post-war order, to 
defeat the National Union of Mineworkers, to end corporatism and aid the 
implementation of neoliberal economic policy.  
 
6.1 The Defeat of One Nation conservatism  
The whole process of preparation for pit closures and confrontation with the NUM 
would take time and planning. It would take the contravening of the protocols of 
Cabinet responsibility and unity and would need the loyalty of those who were 
prepared to stand and fight to avoid, in the words of Peter Walker,1025“the triumph 
and violence of the mob”.1026 Peter Walker “was the archetypal Edward Heath 
man”.1027 Yet in 1983 he was summoned to see the Prime Minister to be offered the 
post of Energy Secretary, as she “believed the government was about to be 
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challenged in a major battle”.1028 Walker was to describe the coal dispute in terms of 
the “greatest threat” to the Thatcher government, and essentially a “Fight to the 
Finish”1029 and had been “softened up” to take the role; she required the requisite 
political and communicatory skills, and there would be no one in Cabinet capable of 
conducting a “battle with Arthur Scargill as well as I could”.1030  
Walker was a political survivor. A moderate who had been handed the mandate for 
defeating the insurrection of Scargill; he would be the “wet who beat the striking 
miners” – a man who was “patient, imperturbable and with a genius for press”.1031 
He was a One Nation Conservative – one that was promoted to an ideologically 
driven Cabinet to “give a positive presentation to public opinion of the 
government's”1032 – his credentials allowing for a sense of calm amongst the 
declaration of ideological warfare. This entailed the creation of a moderate platform 
of legitimacy from where Cabinet unity could be projected by his “communications 
skill to explain the government case to the public”.1033 The strike was deemed by 
Walker, who was always eager to proclaim his One Nation credentials, as a “correct 
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balance between efficiency and compassion” – a conflict against “a Marxist 
sympathiser” of “whom the ends justified the means”.1034  
Yet Walker’s rhetoric belies the true motivation of the conflict; to confront and 
destroy the power of the NUM. He was the government minister responsible for the 
management of the dispute, a politician held in high regard, yet his role in the 1984 
conflict, demonstrates the decline and fall of a One Nation politician; indeed, I argue 
that the role Walker played symbolises the absorption of One Nation politics into the 
dogmatic fold. Walker may or may not have earnestly sought to implant a sense of 
consensual judgement, yet ultimately, he consistently toed the party line to “defeat 
him”1035 – Arthur Scargill.  
In public Walker would align himself with defeating Scargill. In his autobiography, 
he documented his struggle with the “Marxist”. Yet Walker could not hide his 
dismay towards the pit closure scheme; he had argued, prior to the dispute, that there 
“should be no closure list, but a pit by pit procedure”, as he was concerned that the, 
“Manpower reduction would bite heavily in particular areas”.1036 Walker was 
criticised for this stance by Ian MacGregor, appointed chairman of the NCB in 1984, 
who described him as a man with no “backbone”.1037 Yet though seen as a “wet” he 
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was a minister prepared to circumnavigate the new protocols of Cabinet, of non-
circulation of energy proposals and the construction of “private briefings”.1038  
I argue that Walker’s consensual overtones and statecraft credentials were 
smokescreens for ideological industrial policy. He was a politician, as Thatcher 
acknowledged, with “political knowhow and the communication skills”,1039 a One 
Nation Tory loyalist, a convenient face to government policy – in a speech to the 
Scottish CBI1040 Walker offered “A peaceful participation in success is on offer – 
conflict, violence and disaster would be a crazy alternative”.1041  
Yet the rhetoric he supplied in September 1984 does not correlate to strategic aims 
discussed in January of that year. On 19th January, in his capacity as Secretary as 
State for Energy, Walker was a part of a secret meeting that proposed “reducing the 
number of miners from just under 200,000 to 140,000” and that the “process of run-
down ought to be accelerated” and,  
The Secretary of State for Energy said that from the point of view of the 
Coal Board, these proposals made a great deal of sense. 
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The Chancellor agreed the rate of closures should be accelerated and that 
these proposals were sensible.1042 
Indeed, as evidenced, a policy for the closure of pits had been formulated as early as 
July 1981. The newly formed MISC 57 was to be charged with commissioning a 
strategy of “how to withstand a coal strike”.1043 It was noted that a strike of that year 
“could probably not be withstood for more than 13-14 weeks”. Therefore, the 
priority in1981 was a “peaceful settlement” to cement a “plan of action for 1982”. 
This was to go so far as to propose the use of military intervention that “might be 
made a more realistic option in future”.1044 The archives show that Peter Walker was 
privy to MISC 57.1045 
This primary evidence is highly significant. The documents support evidence, 
initially presented in chapter five of this research, detailing the planned and 
accelerated pit closure scheme from 1981 onwards. Peter Walker had been 
presented, in his own words, with a “dilemma” when appointed Energy Secretary in 
1983, and he was to accept the Energy Secretary role with some “reluctance”.1046 
Ideologically he was distant from the New Right, he did not share the sense of 
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“drama and glamour of conviction politics” – yet he does admit his presence as a 
“wet” in an atmosphere of such dry ideological single mindedness, had a 
“fascination” to it.1047 He said in a BBC interview in 2004, that  
I went to cabinet suggesting a package for the miners which, if approved, 
I thought would mean there could be no way he could ever get a strike 
ballot. It included: no compulsory redundancies; early retirement if they 
wished it at the age of 50 on incredibly generous terms; expanded mobility 
allowances if they moved to another pit; a good pay increase; and an 
£800m capital investment programme for the coal industry1048 
This I argue demonstrates smokescreen politics. The reality is that the demise of 
Walker’s One Nation Conservative credentials mirrors the process implemented by 
the New Right – rejection of traditional Conservative values and an embrace of po-
litical revisionism. Walker argued at the height of the dispute in May 1984, that, 
There can be no truth in the propaganda that says the Government and Mr 
Ian MacGregor of the Coal Board are out to butcher this country's coal 
industry. For the facts are there.  
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And no other industry can look forward to such a massive capital invest-
ment programme for the years ahead. This is a strange way to butcher an 
industry. 
Too many miners have been duped into a pointless and futile strike  
by propaganda with a political motive. That way lies the abyss for the  
industry. 1049 
I argue that Walker’s pliability, his acceptance of pit closures and rejection of his 
core beliefs of “government and industry working together” demonstrate the en-
forcement of ideology over statecraft. Walker had been a loyal Conservative since 
1945; He states that from Butler, to Eden, Macmillan, Douglas Home and Heath – 
their views were “close to mine”.1050 Ultimately, his speech to the Scottish CBI and 
acceptance of covert pit closures demonstrates a point of political realisation; con-
servatism as a political tool had been transformed and with that its personnel. 
Walker’s plea to peace and tranquillity, of consensus and negotiation was to be a 
sham; he was a fully aware of the secret meetings, of the cover up designed to hide 
the planned closure of up to 75 collieries and a manpower reduction of 64,000 jobs; 
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and he was to deceive Parliament in this knowledge. In response to questions from 
MP Roy Mason, Walker argues,  
Let me remind the Right Hon. Gentleman that in March there was no 
proposal for the closure of 20 pits and no lists of pits.1051 
Walker argued that the NCB and government had handled closures with a “Sensible 
and civilised approach”1052 and in a further statement to the Commons in October 
1984, he was to offer, 
An undertaking that any miner who wishes to continue working in the 
industry will be able to do so1053 
Over 200 pits were closed. Walker had, inadvertently or not, deceived Parliament – 
there were no guarantees of work or indeed a viable industry to work in. Walker 
argued that he felt a “huge sense of relief” at the defeat of the “Marxist sympathiser” 
Scargill and the return to “comparative prosperity” of the mining communities. In 
March of 2016 the last deep coal mine in the UK, Kellingley Colliery in North 
Yorkshire, capable of transporting 900 tonnes an hour of coal to the surface was 
capped. There is now no discernible mining industry in the UK. The manipulation 
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of Walker mirrors a determination to eradicate statecraft, to alleviate opposition; the 
nuances of Parliamentary and Cabinet responsibility were jettisoned.1054 
And this would mean the targeting of the Left – the closure of productive coal mines 
and the instigation of a planned conflict with the NUM, and in Arthur Scargill there 
emerged the necessary opponent for confrontation. He was to represent, during the 
government’s build up to the strike in October 1982, an obstacle to reform, and 
indeed an opportunity. Internal “wet” opposition was either jettisoned or brought in-
house in order to confront Scargill. As Bernard Ingham wrote in a memo to the Prime 
Minister, “…seems to me we are letting Scargill get away with too much... the 
Scargill list of lies” – these lies would require as early as 1982 “a clearly understood 
strategy for the dispute as a whole”.1055 In June 1983, after a crushing victory over 
Michael Foot, the ante was raised further – the left was to be targeted; “Election 
night” argued Alfred Sherman, was to be seen,  
As the opportunity to bring about changes which will fundamentally alter 
the socio-political infrastructure, so that 1983 does not become another 
1959. In the short term, we must prepare to meet the threat of violence, 
non-cooperation and sabotage which the Left has been brandishing and 
will certainly try on... Scargill and their like will not take Labour's election 
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defeat lying down but will be spurred towards more violent and illegal 
confrontation.1056 
Sherman’s advice demonstrates government policy designed to prepare and 
antagonise for a coal dispute with the NUM. This, I argue, was clearly mandated 
through MISC 57, and was a prerequisite for economic reform post-1985. There was 
not just the preparation and accumulation of coal stocks to sustain energy efficiency, 
but the necessary deliverance of pit closures and a desired national coal strike; 
conflict with the NUM – conflict with Arthur Scargill – was an ideological necessity. 
John Vereker confirms this; in secret memos to Alan Walters and Ferdinand Mount, 
he argues, 
The Department of Energy and the Treasury now acknowledge what John 
Hoskyns (head of the policy unit) argued from the day he arrived here; that 
sooner or later the Government would have to face, and win, a major na-
tional coal strike 
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It does seem considerably less likely that we could bring the Coal Board 
anywhere near breakeven without winning a strike, and that of course car-
ries the major risk that embarking upon and then losing a strike is the most 
expensive option of all1057 
Breaking the miners held the key to the overall strategy of Thatcherism. Though a 
“skilled communicator” and a “clever choice” of Energy Secretary, Peter Walker’s 
innate “wetness” would ultimately see his strategy of communication bypassed for 
Ridley’s “large mobile squads” of police deployed throughout the country; there 
would be no time for wetness.1058 Walker’s pursuit of “efficiency and compassion” 
– One Nation conservatism’s historic raison d’être, was to be jettisoned. The miners 
were now a legitimate target as evidenced in correspondence with Geoffrey Howe 
and Nigel Lawson. Lawson argued that the “problems of the coal industry could not 
be resolved without the decisive defeat of the militant arm of the NUM” as, 
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Our original aim was to build a successful, profitable coal industry inde-
pendent of government subsidies; to de-monopolise it and ultimately open 
it to private enterprise1059 
Economic viability was never an aim – it was wholesale deindustrialisation in accord 
with Ridley’s plan of 1978. Walker, though a sophisticated, shrewd, and ultimately 
a political survivor, owed little to his ideological mindset; he was a political animal 
and cut his cloth for the new regime – a regime that had targeted the NUM, had 
targeted pit closures as early as 1982, and had planned and prepared for industrial 
battle. And in March 1984, the planning would cease, and the inevitable conflict 
would begin. There would be no time for One Nation rhetoric or indeed statecraft 
party management; Walker would go on to argue that the future of the coal industry 
was to become a “net exporter of coal” and to “improve potentiality in the market 
place”.1060 The die had been cast prior to his becoming Energy Secretary – the 
rhetoric of a “wet” within the confines of Thatcher’s inner circle would not help halt 
the inevitable confrontation.  
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6.2 Why the NUM?  
Industrial policy, as demonstrated through this research, was calculated to defeat the 
NUM as a credible representational force. The miners’ strike was not simply about 
“uneconomic pits” – the defeat of the NUM was to “become an obsession” with 
government.1061 The process of denationalisation, “shifting of power from the 
government to free enterprise” was to be “the principal key to the whole rightward 
shift of the political spectrum” – a means, as Stuart Hall argued, of “effectively 
disorganising the Left and the working-class response”.1062 Hall argues that to win 
the struggle, Thatcherism was “deploying the discourses of ‘nation’ and ‘people’ 
against ‘class’ and ‘unions’ with far greater vigour and popular appeal”.1063 
The symbolism of the union and mining community would shift – from corporate 
colleague to internal enemy. Internal briefings to the Prime Minister would comment 
on mass ranked unions intent on “violence and intimidation which has scarred and 
wrecked the coal industry” the shadow growing “darker as influential men and 
women in our society question, even repudiate the ideas of Parliamentary democracy 
and the rule of law”.1064 Mining communities and working class communities, were 
to be depicted as a danger, as a force to challenge the foundations of law and order 
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and democratic association; Thatcher would argue in an interview for Der Spiegel 
in 1985 that “It is both an irony and a tragedy that although members of one trade 
union can inflict great harm on others, they cannot protect themselves or their fami-
lies from the damage that others cause”.1065 The perception of the NUM was re-
imagined – to one of hostility and conflict by a “New Radical Right and the class 
forces they now aspire to present”.1066 
Adeney and Lloyd argue that “Politicians were constantly reminded of the power 
and the problems of coal”.1067 Labour Party roots were “entwined deeply with the 
miners and their struggles” and for the Conservative Party, coal and the miners “were 
a recurrent fixation”. On coming to power in 1979 Thatcher did not want or need a 
confrontation with the NUM – the legacy of 1972 was still vividly remembered. The 
smashing of government pay policy and the restoration of militancy – in February 
of that year the police notified Edward Heath, that miners were in control of Saltley 
coke works1068 in the West Midlands.1069 The forcing of an election in 1974 was to 
lead to a defeat to Labour and the introduction of tripartism through “A Plan for 
                                                          
1065 Thatcher, M (1985).  Interview for Der Spiegel, Trade Union reform Margaret Thatcher Foundation, Available 
at: https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document 
1066 S. Hall, The Great Moving Right Show, Marxism Today, January 1979 Available at: 
http://banmarchive.org.uk/collections/mt/pdf/79_01_hall.pdf 
1067 M. Adeney & J. Lloyd, The Miners’ Strike 1984 Loss without Limit (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), p11 
1068 H. Benyon, Digging Deeper; Issues in the Miners’ Strike (Verso, 1985), p.31 
 “The closure of Saltley coke depot – when massed pickets of fifteen thousand miners, engineering workers and their 
supporters outmanoeuvred less than a thousand police – sent shock waves through the Establishment”.  
1069 M. Adeney & J. Lloyd, The Miners’ Strike 1984 Loss without Limit (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), p11 
  
341  
  
Coal”1070 and would see the NUM as Europe’s predominant trade union force. Joe 
Gormley at the NUM and Derek Ezra at the NCB would both drive a hard bargain 
for both miners and mining industry; yet as Ezra argues, this was constructed through 
the “maximum areas of agreement” – It “fitted” the “national mood”.1071 The NUM 
“delighted” in the ambitious targets of 200 million tonnes of coal production and 
new coal fields were opened, such as Selby in Yorkshire as “investment poured into 
the industry”.1072  
Yet this mood was to darken – a sense of conflict was to emerge. Gormley would be 
replaced by Scargill, Ezra would ultimately be replaced by MacGregor, and Heath’s 
defeat in the wake of militancy and Saltley Gate, would, argues Peter Dorey, “sound 
the death knell for the party’s neocorporatist approach to industrial relations and 
trade unions”.1073 Electoral defeat would burn indelibly in the psyche of the 
Conservatives; there was no illusion that, “Breaking the miners holds a central place 
in the overall strategy of Thatcherism”1074 – when this became a reality in 1984, 
                                                          
1070 "The object of the national Plan for coal is to discover the most efficient size and shape of the industry —to find 
out how much of each kind of coal should be produced and where it should be produced to meet consumers' 
demands and make the best contribution to the nation's welfare." The Spectator, 17th November 1950. Available at: 
http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/17th-november-1950/4/the-coal-plan 
1071 M. Adeney & J. Lloyd, The Miners’ Strike 1984 Loss without Limit (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), p15 
1072 F. Beckett & D. Hencke, Marching to the Fault Line; The Miners’ Strike and the Battle for Industrial Britain 
(Constable, London), p.26 
1073 P. Dorey, The Conservative Party and the Trade Unions (Routledge, 1998), p89 
1074 H. Benyon, Digging Deeper; Issues in the Miners’ Strike (Verso, 1985), p.34 
  
342  
  
Norman Tebbitt was to argue that the defeating the NUM had “Broken not just a 
strike, but a spell”.1075  
This spell is one which has an historical resonance history. The miners’ union was 
one of the first to affiliate itself to the Labour party and therefore has always “been 
central to Labour politics”1076 – it has always reflected a political as well as industrial 
agenda. Miners understand the nature of struggle, and the national implications this 
entails; in 1926, John Wheatley1077 argued that the “Miners are fighting alone, but 
they are fighting the battle of the whole nation. If they lose, we lose”,1078 and George 
Orwell was to eulogise on the importance of the coal miner to society, in that he 
provided “the absolutely necessary counterpart of our world above. Practically 
everything we do, from eating an ice to crossing the Atlantic, and from baking a loaf 
to writing a novel, involves the use of coal, directly or indirectly... it keeps us 
alive”.1079 A.J. Cook argued that existence of mining communities had been one that 
“has been a long struggle” one between “profits and human life”, a battle of “which 
the miners are fighting and it is the battle on behalf of the whole working class”1080 
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and Labour MP, Eric Heffer, emphasised the dual nature of the miners’ union, one 
where an “industrial struggle cannot be divorced from the political struggle”.1081  
Mining communities were to present a barometer of the nation’s status quo.1082 And 
in many ways, this was the case in 1984; the New Right’s fear of the NUM does not 
manifest simply from industrial representation but something even greater – the 
legitimacy of an historical set of class values. There was power in the mining 
community, reflected through and in Parliament; and no more eloquently presented 
than by Keir Hardie, who argued that, “There is nothing more desirable than the 
return of working men to Parliament.”1083 The pits of Ayrshire produced Hardie, who 
in turn helped to pioneer the Labour Movement. Working in the coal mines from the 
age of eight, Hardie was to energise a movement that was to challenge the nature of 
poverty in Britain and the suffering of the working classes. He was to be no 
revolutionary, preferring to declare war on “a system, not a class” – challenging the 
status quo and the working man to embrace social democracy and self-improvement 
through education and collective unionism.1084 In essence the Labour movement 
grew from the coal fields – “No one” quoted William Thomas Stead in 1905, “should 
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ever look at Keir Hardie without remembering the pit from which he was digged”.1085 
In the general election of January of 1906, fifty-seven Labour representatives from 
three different wings of the party were elected to Parliament, “Fourteen were miners’ 
members what has now come to be known as the trade Union Group”.1086 By 1908 
the MFGB1087 affiliated itself directly to the Labour Party, linking the miners to a 
broader political strategy1088 and enabling the miners’ representative to gain a 
foothold in the political process. The mining industry and Labour Party policy 
towards it was now subsumed within Parliamentary socialism; Roy Gregory details 
that by 1910, miners “constituted a tenth of the electorate... This concentration added 
to their solidarity and long experience in politics made them a formidable force”1089 
– and this force was prepared to “raise a direct challenge to the established social 
and political order”.1090 This is key to the Conservative historical stance to the miners 
and the mining community.  
Therefore, there is a historical and political precedence to the 1984 dispute which is 
utterly unique. The isolation from mainstream society determined the mining 
communities’ identity and was to be expressed through a political struggle which 
cannot be over emphasised. M. Bulmer argues that the struggle of the mining 
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community is encapsulated through the trade union. Its existence and reliance on the 
union is paramount to its existence; “every institution in the village” was constructed 
through “Lodge office, the committee table, the pulpit and the craft of the pit”.1091 
Personal ambition attached itself closely to the collective of the community, 
developed in a small, independent, work-based community whose history, 
community and future was dictated by an industrial and political consciousness.  
The collective was their identity. History was to be its strength and the union its 
means of survival – indeed as the seminal work Coal Is Our Life details, the lives of 
miners inhibit, “communities of a different character from those industrial towns 
characterised by diversity of occupation, social class and varied social and cultural 
amenities”.1092 A mining town such as Ashton was defined by its work – its meaning 
and identity as much a part of the pit as the black seams of coal on which it was built. 
As John Rex argues, “community life for the miner is quite unlike that for men in 
other occupations”.1093 Rex describes the mining community as one which lives in 
isolation, which looks to both the rural and the urban world as outsiders. Insularity 
of community is created because of the, “Shared common labour, because of the 
shared physical danger, or because of the social struggle by means of which they 
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defend themselves against other human beings which threaten them”.1094 Rex 
identifies the mining communities of Lancashire as autonomous. Comparing the 
industrial mining community to that of the feudal institutions of the agricultural 
community, whatever the bosses may feel or think, mining communities have their 
own way of creating cultural autonomy. Miners have their own unions and they have 
their own festivals creating a, “class homogeneity, independence and corporateness 
that finally sets the seal on the intensity of community life”.1095  
This intensity of community life is reflected by Warwick and Littlejohn. They 
examine the dual experience of the mining community and the creation of an 
“identities and consciousness, which can be markedly different from other parts of 
the same society”.1096 The pit village inhabits an almost parallel society where the 
rigours and ugliness of hardship, death, fatigue and danger are mirrored by those of 
friendship and closeness and solidarity. Warwick and Littlejohn argue that the shared 
experiences create a sense of “shared glory and pride” in the community and the 
collective. The collective, they argue, is imperative to the survival and expansion of 
the community – life is made easier when facing the cutting edge of the dominant 
political economy, when resistance to the dangers and rigours of life are understood, 
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accepted and shared by the community. Therefore, the natural harshness of the 
environment, the rigours of life in an industrialised community, creates identities 
and consciousness which are politicised and are seen through a political lens.  
Therefore, political solidarity and awareness have direct consequences on each 
person’s daily lives in the small community. And yet, this identity was to be the 
communal and industrial death knell. As Rory Turner argues, the social insularity 
and isolation associated with mining towns were to be their undoing. Mining villages 
were unable to develop or to regenerate as the pit was the be all and end all of the 
community. The pit represented salvation for the community and its limitation, as 
the villages existed solely because the coal industry developed. Grimethorpe, Turner 
argues, was almost totally reliant on the fate of coal – there was no other alternative. 
Small businesses were underdeveloped and neglected due to the overall, pervasive 
nature of the coal mine, creating, “communities that were steeped in mining, and 
which had very little need to develop the versatility necessary for other kinds of 
economic activity”.1097 Over-reliance argues Turner, reduced social and political 
interaction with neighbouring communities and urban conurbations, compounding 
the sense of isolation and instability. Therefore, these industrial communities were a 
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unique brew. One of political sophistication yet innate localism – of an identity that 
was forged through industrial togetherness yet distant from established society.  
The miners were likely to provide a damaging measure to the rest of the public 
sector.1098 It is within this context of localism, political consciousness, pride of 
community, the sheer dominance of coal as a magnet of social cohesion, political 
awareness and the undeniably fierce loyalty that this industry engenders, that the 
Conservative Party’s response to the 1984 industrial conflict must be considered; 
and yet at the height of the dispute there was little understanding of these dynamics. 
In a letter addressed to Anne Scargill and Betty Heathfield, of the group Women 
against Pit Closures, 1099at the height of the dispute in November 1984, Peter Walker 
comments,  
You have expressed concern at the plight of your children because of the 
deduction from social security of amounts deemed to be equivalent of 
strike pay. I hope you will both ask your husbands why it is that they have 
not paid strike pay to help the children concerned. Why have your 
husbands decided it is better to spend union funds on mob picketing is not 
                                                          
1098 Hoskyns, J (1980). PREM19/539 COAL Minute; Margaret Thatcher Miners pay. The National Archives of the 
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only against TUC guidelines but also against traditional practice of the 
National Union of Mineworkers. 
The actions of your husbands are certainly damaging mining 
communities... The year that your husbands have created has been a year 
of union funds being wasted, miners being plunged into debt, miners’ 
children suffering, and mining communities being deeply divided.1100 
The enormity of misunderstanding of the mining communities is revealing. Adeney 
and Lloyd describe how people managed during the strike. For example, striking 
Derbyshire miner, Stuart Asher – “His family was receiving £33.47 from social 
security plus some family allowance. They calculated they could spend 70p a head 
per day on food” and his “wife meanwhile was eating mostly bread” and “Many 
miners got by only with the assistance of their wives’ often part time jobs”.1101 
Women’s support groups epitomised the support for the strike; “the main drive was 
to provide welfare assistance for the communities, as well as giving women an active 
focus”.1102 There was a difference between the New Right and the mining 
communities that could and would never be reconciled.  
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6.3 Arthur Scargill – A Necessary Symbol of Defiance  
In May 1960, at the age of 22, Arthur Scargill stood as the Communist candidate for 
the North Ward of Worsborough Urban District Council. He pledged to, “fight for 
the needs of the people both young and old, to make Worsborough a model mining 
village with all the social amenities for all the people.”1103 In February 1966 he would 
make his mark with his first speech to the NUM; in a “short three-minute speech” 
he would challenge the Labour Party on pit closures, demand extra payments for 
miners and attacked the Minister of Fuel and Power, Richard Marsh, for talking 
“flannel”.1104 He was “remarkably young” and with “burning ambition” he would 
rise, via Saltley Gate, to be the most powerful union leader in the country. Scargill 
was a Communist and a maverick; he was a loner, yet a self-publicist. A man who 
did not settle easily into the centre-left of traditional post-war trade unionism; and 
most of all he was charismatic. From that young age of 22, a political narrative would 
unwind until ultimately, he would lead the most powerful union in Western Europe 
into glorious defeat or the grandest of selfish follies. 
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Scargill was to be a “man apart”.1105 He believed vehemently in the class war, of 
“involving in mass struggle workers for an alternative economic policy”1106 to 
construct a “Socialist system of society” where a transference of economic policy, 
and the delivery of Communism, would come not from a political party, but the trade 
union movement.1107 This was his mantra – his ideological pursuit – of his rejection 
of conciliation, of diligent adherence to tactical acumen and the delivery of working 
people’s prosperity. And indeed, in many ways he mirrored Thatcher; he exhibited 
a puritanical work ethic, a phenomenal work rate and the ability to work long hours; 
“His work schedule would destroy most people”.1108 Scargill expected similar 
standards of work from colleagues; self-discipline, “deeply held convictions” – these 
would inspire loyalty from close colleagues, yet he was dictatorial and egocentric,1109 
he invited enemies from both the left and right.  
Like his nemesis Margaret Thatcher, Scargill was an outsider, who was to thrust 
himself onto an established organisation, and arguably, was either saviour or “the 
root of ills”. For Thatcher it was the establishment, the Conservative Party and the 
“country squires”, and for Scargill it was the “balance-sheet mentality of both Coal 
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Board and Government” the “police, the judiciary, the social security system – 
whichever way seems possible, the full weight of the state”.1110 As Thatcher’s “wets” 
succumbed to inertia, dismissal and derision, for Roy Lynk, Nottinghamshire NUM 
official, who was to become the general secretary of the Union of Democratic 
Mineworkers, Scargill had converted the “finest union in the world” to a 
dictatorship.1111 The combative and ideological comparisons run deep. In many 
ways, the ideological Scargill was to fan the New Right flames; indeed, I argue he 
was needed by Thatcher and in many ways, he needed her; as Jimmy Reid argues, 
“Scargalism and Thatcherism are political allies... They are philosophically blood 
brothers.”1112  
Both were politicians of conviction, of committed economic and social ideology; 
and both would engineer the conflict that the New Right desired. Scargill and 
Thatcher were on their own personal crusades, and Scargill, “thought he was the new 
Messiah” argued Emlyn Williams,1113 and in many ways the religious pretext 
absorbed by Thatcherism, the conviction of the zealot, is mirrored in Scargalism. 
Although “they were both apparently poles apart politically, philosophically and 
                                                          
1110 A. Scargill. Speech to NUM Conference, December 1984. Available at: http://www.ukpol.co.uk/arthur-scargill-
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ideologically, they are both dogmatists.”1114 Scargill was the most “charismatic trade 
union leader to appear in Britain for a generation” he was “young, he is tough, and 
he is tireless. He is wily, he is articulate. He is a mob orator of genius. And he is 
completely unscrupulous. He is, in fact, in the mould of demagogues... Scargill must 
certainly be fought and defeated.”1115  
This is what Scargill offered – a means of conflict, the oxygen for battle, the means 
to impose an ideology. He was to be Thatcher’s secret weapon, and though they 
never met, Patrick Hannan, imagining their meeting of minds, in When Arthur Met 
Maggie, argued that their ideological imposition, their dogged resistance to statecraft 
meant that they were central to the “process of bringing traditional British politics to 
an end” it being a “monumental clash of ideology and temperament”.1116 Scargill 
was to be the spark required to rejuvenate the tired notion of Tory conservatism – he 
was a political and ideological requirement; in her tribute to Nicholas Ridley, 
Thatcher wrote that, 
He therefore produced a blueprint for defeating a political strike such as 
that organised by Arthur Scargill a decade later. Indeed, Nick was one of 
the most fruitful and clear-sighted of those Tories who used opposition to 
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rethink Tory philosophy and to plan the programme for what became a 
great reforming Tory government.1117 
Scargill’s inability to see beyond his own ideology, led him towards this dogma of 
the New Right. Yet of course, functionally and politically, Scargill defined the 
antithesis of the neoliberal crusade. He was not prepared to accept the sole 
ideological platform of compulsory redundancy through pit closures and the loss of 
jobs – of an imposition of an alternate ideology. Therefore, we have Scargill, a 
maverick, impassioned leader of men, determined to outwit the economic dogma of 
the New Right.  
Scargill was eloquent, articulate and understood the role of the media in representing 
the Yorkshire miner – he was one of them. He had, “the punch of a knockout 
politician and the perkiness of a stand-up comedian”1118 and it was an unswerving, 
dedicated loyalty to “his people”, to the young and disenfranchised of the mining 
communities who rose to his rhetoric of “stand on your feet – and behave like 
men”.1119 Emotive, aggressive, determined, Scargill’s words resonated with the 
human emotions of those who worked, lived, played and died in the mining 
community.  
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His was an alternative vision to economic liberation and the liberty of freedom so 
espoused by Thatcherism. His was the calling for “a Socialist system of society in 
which the Communist party will play a major role.”1120 Scargill was never a member 
of the Communist Party, but he “regularly attended Communist Party Schools and 
education courses”1121 – his drive was not just simply to advance the cause of his 
union, the NUM, but to actively pursue the implementation of socialism by 
replicating the success of the trade union movement with wage negotiation and 
working conditions on a national scale. In doing so, the key area of challenge and 
reform, argued Scargill, would be “an alternative economic policy”1122 – 
highlighting the integral connection between economic and social reforms. This 
countered the premise of the NUM – one which the membership considered “an 
industrial union, not a political wing of some far-left political ideology”.1123 Scargill 
would, like Thatcher, through the construct of ideological transformation, divide and 
conquer the NUM and lead it into conflict.  
On coming to power at the NUM many, like Joe Gormley, thought that Scargill 
would mellow and grow into the role, leaving the rhetoric and bombast to one side, 
“I had to learn my lessons as I went along, Arthur will also need to learn his”.1124Yet 
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this mellowing in power was certainly not an option for Scargill. On a personal level 
he “was incapable of delegating responsibility”; he was “hypnotic” in his ability to 
gain support of the young and militant members of the NUM and this “ultra-left 
adventurer” who led the militants to defeat Heath was running the most powerful 
union in the world.1125 Like Thatcher, Scargill was messianic in his drive and would 
not be derailed in his beliefs. With Scargill the unions represented a socialist threat 
in that he did not “keep his Marxism separate from his union practise”.1126  
The NUM now represented a whole new danger. Joe Gormley, though presiding over 
strikes in ‘72 and ‘74 “never admitted it publicly, but he was against both” as he 
“preferred the art of negotiation and compromise to a full-scale punch-up”. Nobody, 
Gormley argues, “in this union must be seen to be more militant than me. I do not 
want the Left to win anything.” Gormley said later of Scargill ‘I didn't realise it at 
the time, but I let a monster out of the bottle”.1127 And indeed, he was proved correct; 
Scargill would offer to the New Right the appropriate “monster”, the requisite 
pantomime villain – the communist agitator who defied the state – and in doing so, 
the mining community would be tarnished. 
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 In a letter to Margaret Thatcher, David Hart, “a shadowy financier who secretly 
helped the working miners to start crippling legal action against the National Union 
of Mineworkers”1128 observed from Impressions from a Coalfield that, 
Sheffield was very different. Standing in a crowd of miners – not the seven 
thousand of the press reports, more likely three thousand – I could encoun-
ter thoughts of Nuremberg. Though they were better humoured there were 
elements there.  
The stink of fascism. Admiration bordering on adoration for their leader. 
Scargill's address was appalling. Stilted, read from a prepared statement, 
utterly without inspiration. He is no orator. Still the young militants 
cheered and roared at almost every sentence. For they have found a Mes-
siah who promises to lead them out of the dark valleys of decaying pits, 
declining industries, feelings of personal hopelessness, into a promised 
land which is still to be defined positively but which, negatively, will cer-
tainly not include such ‘luxuries’ as freedom and democracy.1129 
The New Right had found their nemesis. The “stink of fascism” within, would like 
the fascism of Galtieri, offer the required momentum to cause destructive industrial 
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change. Scargill would lead, in his messianic fashion, not dissimilar in fervour to 
Thatcher, the advance of a union as a political animal – a man of dogma.1130 The 
inevitable miners’ strike of 1984, would therefore call upon “her famous firmness, 
falling perfectly into the moral mould where good and evil could be identified 
without ambiguity”.1131 The whole scenario of rabid Marxism challenging the state 
fitted within her narrative – the political gain of victory would be priceless. In a 
memo to Margaret Thatcher in 1982, Nigel Lawson details starkly the challenge that 
Scargill presented to the Tory party, “the political gain from inflicting a second 
defeat on Scargill would be of the first importance to the Government at a crucial 
stage of its life”.1132 
Arthur Scargill was to become an ideological tool. Hugo Young’s chapter on the 
miners’ strike is entitled Vanquishing Lucifer1133 – Scargill fitted the evangelical 
crusade, and the enormity of the challenge he posed, fitted perfectly the scale 
required for Britain’s transformation. No one argues Adeney and Lloyd, could 
approach, “the malignity and power of the NUM President”1134 and no one 
represented defiance and an ability, and more importantly a tangible power, to 
challenge and ultimately threaten the state. In 1981, the first attempt to close twenty-
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three pits by Thatcher’s administration was met with defiance and a backtracking of 
a fearful government whose memories of 1974 were resonating. Scargill boasted,  
The very fact that miners, within thirty-six hours of 40,000 men coming 
out to strike, were able to change a government’s course as far as pit 
closures were concerned is a clear demonstration that it can be done1135 
And what could be done? Arthur Scargill’s followers simply worshipped him1136 – 
he represented the challenge to the state, he represented defiance and lack of 
compromise, and he never became a part of the establishment. For those in power, 
for those who needed to establish a new Britain through the politics of conviction 
and the rejection of consensus and compromise, here was a man, and most 
importantly a leader of the most powerful union in Britain if not the “finest union in 
the world”1137 whose revolutionary zeal matched that of the neoliberals who were to 
challenge the inner sanctums of the Tory Party. It represented an irresistible force 
working against an immovable object and as demonstrated in documentation of the 
neoliberal converts – a man and a union who must be defeated for the new order to 
prevail. 
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There is great debate still on the merits of Scargill’s defiance. His tactical and 
theoretical naivety: “lions led by donkeys” noted The Guardian’s editorial.1138 The 
decision not to hold a national ballot to fully legitimise a strike, was described by 
Norman Tebbit as a, “war on democracy” and Neil Kinnock lamented that the 
strike’s, “deciding factor was the suicidal vanity of Arthur Scargill”.1139 There is no 
doubt that Scargill was divisive and controversial – but, as demonstrated in this 
research, he was eventually to be vindicated1140 in his assertion that a secret “hit list” 
of pit closures existed. Just as Thatcher sought to gain “moral strength to rebuild the 
fortunes of this free nation” to “resist the blandishments of the faint hearts” and “let 
us stand together and do our duty”,1141 it was Scargill who would call to defeat the 
“climate of helplessness, hopelessness and outright despair”, it was the NUM’s 
“responsibility as trade unionists to fight that despair and oppose the policies which 
created it”.1142 Both would deny the prudence of statecraft, for the nuanced debates 
orchestrated by either Heath or Gormley, both would strive for the assertion of 
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dogma, of a construction of a New Britain, of the reversal of decline, but only one 
could succeed and post-1974, there could be only one victor.  
 
6.4 The “Mob” of Orgreave  
Thatcherism, like Scargalism, relished the “binary clarity of conflict” – the clarity of 
us against them, good against bad, the sense of righteousness “to cloud strategic 
judgment” – the need for clear and moral choices.1143 Throughout Thatcher’s admin-
istration the electorate would be presented with these choices of right and wrong, of 
immoral and moral, of liberty and equality, of nationalisation and privatisation, in-
dividualism and collectivism, wealth creation and bankruptcy, and most violently 
and vividly, trade unionism against the rule of law – of the mob against the state.1144 
Through these “binary choices” Thatcher could construct “apocalyptic” visions of 
Britain’s industrial landscape which would provide “context and justification” for 
the enormity of the “Biblical notions of good versus evil”.1145 There would and could 
be “no alternative” or attempt to “substitute the rule of the mob for the rule of law, 
and it must not succeed... If they gave in to mob rule that would be the end of liberty 
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and democracy.”1146 The answers were to be “self-evident” – a choice between mob 
rule or the democratic rule of law? There was “no alternative” and the miners were 
to be portrayed, by Peter Walker, as Marxists calculating “whether or not the mob, 
using mob violence, can rule”.1147 This “antithesis” description of working miners 
allowed Thatcher to accentuate the “threat” of the mob – not miners, not men de-
fending livelihoods and communities, but members of militant trade unions.  
This fitted the narrative that was to be presented to the public. It was to be presented, 
as Peter Dorey explains, as much as “a law and order issue as an industrial relations 
one” with picket line violence acted out in the media spotlight. Those engaged on 
the picket lines could now be legitimately depicted as “thugs”, “bully boys” and 
“rent-a-mob extremists”.1148 This imagery fits within the dynamic set by The Ridley 
Report; as detailed in this research, the report recommended that, “we must be pre-
pared to deal with the problem of violent picketing”, and the only, 
way to do this is to have a large, mobile squad of police who are equipped 
and prepared to uphold the law against the likes of the Saltley Coke Works 
mob.1149 
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And it was the labelling and imagery of perceived mob rule that would legitimise 
ideologically driven trade union policy. Again, as illustrated through primary source 
material in this research, the Stepping Stones Report’s analysis and advice to 
government, this fits the template that was eventually witnessed in real life at 
Orgreave. The iconography of the mob, the association with intimidation and fear, 
reflects Hoskyns’s assertions in 1977, that  
In one sense the TUC are the new Lords. Warlords? This is damaging to 
democracy. 
This is clearly a threat to free choice and thus to our democracy. In about 
fifteen years all that we might be left with could be union leaders in  
control.1150 
Orgreave was the opportunity to stop this from happening – to counter the 
“warlords” of the TUC. The response of the state at Orgreave to the threat of the 
trade union movement had been constructed, I argue, through the ideological dictate 
of Ridley’s and Hoskyns’s seminal reports some seven years prior. The accepted 
protocols of industrial dispute, albeit with the caveats of pickets and entrenched 
dogma, were to re-emerge as a “war” or the “Battle of Orgreave”. A perception of 
miners was to be reconfigured as Norman Tebbit argued,  
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They [the miners] think it was their right to use violence to stop people 
from going to work. It wasn’t.  
It’s clear. What’s the problem? The problem for them is they lost their 
battle – a violent battle – to overthrow the rule of law.1151 
Therefore, the conflict delivered to the New Right the appropriate clarity of 
conviction – the mob against the rule of law. It delivers the “problem” of the mob, 
of a threat, as Thatcher argued, to many people in this country who “are honourable, 
decent and law abiding and want the law to be upheld and will not be intimidated” – 
a battle that was to go the “very heart of our society”; it would be necessary for, “The 
rule of law must prevail over the rule of the mob”.1152 
Yet this narrative – this fault-line – counters the historical precedent of role of the 
mob in England. E.P. Thompson warned of the “loose employment of the term 
‘mob’”1153 in the 18th Century, theorising that the English mob actually conducted 
itself within a “well understood framework of restraints and limits”.1154 Its intentions 
were not for anarchy and riot but for “collective action”. The “moral economy”1155 
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of the coal mine was represented through this collective action and a “defence 
against profit seeking employers”. The morality of the collective did not lie in the 
faceless rule of the mob, but in the customs and traditions built from the “sixteenth 
to the eighteenth centuries”.1156 Thompson’s critique regarding the construct and 
motivation of a labelled “mob” reflects the 1984 conflict at Orgreave; “Too many of 
our growth historians are guilty of a crass economic reductionism, obliterating the 
complexities of motive, behaviour, and function”.1157 
Therefore, the New Right strategy to depict a feckless mob, had disfigured and 
“transgressed the moral economy of the coalfields”.1158 Any form of legitimacy of 
protest, of unified picketing was transformed into, what George Rude argues, is the 
“other stereotype more fashionable among conservative” of the “mob” in question 
as “the instrument of outside agents – ‘demagogues’ or ‘foreigners’ – and as being 
prompted by motives of loot, lucre, free drinks, bloodlust”.1159 Therefore the mob 
presented a political tool – a spectre of anarchy, contorted and redesigned, not as a 
corporate, responsible trade union, but as a challenge to democracy and the rule of 
                                                          
rises in food prices provoked keel men on the Tyne to riot in 1709, tin miners to plunder granaries at Falmouth in 
1727". One spasm led on to another: the outcome was "plunder". For decades, systematic social history has lagged 
in the rear of economic history”.  
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law. Thatcher remonstrated with Neil Kinnock in fiery debates in 1984 over the 
conduct of miners and pickets, 
The gentleman referred to mob rule as political posturing. I can say to him 
only that whatever Government are answering from the Dispatch Box, if 
they gave in to mob rule, which would be the end of liberty and 
democracy.1160 
Thatcher’s remark that a mob of miners challenged democracy is obviously highly 
contentious. What was the reasoning in the cultivation of such imagery – was it really 
a true depiction of an “end of liberty and democracy”? I argue that the use of the 
term “mob” disengages politics, the media and the public from the from the reality 
of the 1984 conflict; as a collective noun, it depicts a homogenous group, a faceless 
term, an innate object that presented a threat to democracy. This symbolism could 
be manipulated; Thatcher arguing that “One really simply cannot be intimidated by 
mob violence”.1161 There was a political and moral line which could not be crossed. 
                                                          
1160 HC Deb 08 June 1984 Vol 61. Available at: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written-
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As Ian Gilmour suggested, Arthur Scargill “would not have been able to retain the 
support he has if there was not hostility to a hard-line government?”. The mob was 
a prequisite; it offered the appropriate degree of hostility to help redefine the 
morality of the right. Now, with pitched battles with mounted police there would be 
no U-turns or defeat; the narrative would be upheld and as Peter Walker argued, the 
“rule of law has been maintained and the mob has failed everywhere”.1162 
And for the rule of law to be maintained, The Battle of Orgreave had to be policed. 
In June 1984 10,000 striking miners clashed with 5,000 members of the police force 
– it was massed industrial and political confrontation. Orgreave had intensified the 
miners’ dispute in that, as Adeney and Lloyd argue, a “Rubicon was crossed at 
Orgreave and there was no going back for the rest of the strike”.1163 Scargill had 
selected Orgreave, a coke supplier to the BSC steel plant in Scunthorpe, as a 
“potential Saltley”, but it was to become the “Waterloo” – a realisation that striking 
miners were “not going to win by mass picketing”. There are many conflicting 
images, accounts and reflections of Orgreave; policemen complained over the course 
of successive conflicts between 23rd May and 18th June 1984, that “bricks were 
coming over first as far as we were concerned” and that Orgreave was a “pickets’ 
                                                          
1162 P. Walker, Speech to Oxford University, 1984, University of Oxford. Conservative Party Archives, Bodleian 
Library, University of Oxford. Available at: https://www.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/cpa 
1163 M Adeney & J. Lloyd, The Miners’ Strike 1984-5 Loss without Limit (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), p.118 
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death-trap, a mistake. We took a lot of casualties. It was terrible”.1164 Police horses 
were deployed and “truncheons were used far too liberally”, and BBC camera crews 
“were themselves hit by stones”.1165 Mass pickets had been maintained “despite 
police road blocks and sealing off the whole area”1166 and on 30th May barricades 
were “erected to the point the police had charged up to. The barricades consisted of 
telegraph poles, bricks, rocks, stones, and fencing. Barbed wire was added. More 
cheers”.1167 The Guardian reported on 18th June 1984, that                            
Frustration on both sides spilled over into sickening scenes of miners 
being batoned and of police being attacked with bricks, slivers of glass as 
well as the containers of fuel1168 
It was “a picket and it was violent”.1169 The police “gave no quarter; just got laid into 
them”1170 and they were to be deployed as a “political weapon”.1171 There is no doubt 
that there was violence from both striking miners and the police; it was confrontation 
not seen on the British mainland since the 19th Century. The BBC reported that a 
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former police officer who had taken part in Orgreave had been told to use “as much 
force as possible” against striking miners,  
I couldn't believe what I was seeing. I was just seeing police officers attack 
people. These were people on the ground and even if they weren't doing 
anything – just walking away – police officers had their batons and they 
were just hitting people.1172 
The violence for Scargill was “something reminiscent of a Latin American state”.1173 
There were 72 police officers injured at Orgreave and they were policing “under 
extreme provocation”.1174 Margaret Thatcher commented on the violence that, “This 
is not a dispute between miners and government. This is a dispute between miners 
and miners. It is the police who are in charge of upholding the law. They have been 
wonderful.”1175  
The events at Orgreave polarised a nation and Parliament. There were to be acts of 
violence perpetrated on both sides; Andy Burnham asked the House that as 
“Orgreave is one of the most divisive events in British social history. Given that 
                                                          
1172  BBC News, Battle of Orgreave “Police had been relishing clashes. Dan Johnson, 10th October 2016. Dan 
Johnson, 10th October 2016. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-37609965 
1173 BBC News, Miners and Police Clash at Orgreave, 29th May 1984. Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/29/newsid_2494000/2494793.stm 
1174 K. Perry (2014). The Battle of Orgreave: how events unfolded. The Telegraph. Available at: 
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there is evidence of unlawful conduct by the police in relation to it, is it not simply 
staggering that the Home Secretary has brushed aside an inquiry as not necessary?” 
and David Davies was to respond, “Does the Minister agree that far and away the 
worst atrocity in those terrible events was the murder of the taxi driver, David 
Wilkie? Is my right hon. Friend as amazed as I am that his death has not been 
mentioned once by Opposition Members”.1176 The scars and divisions still run deep 
after more than thirty years, through the ex-mining community and the police force.  
The policing of Orgreave was incendiary; “miners and their wives had by December 
grown to hate and fear the police”.1177 Answering questions at the Orgreave riot trial, 
Assistant Chief Constable Clements, the Senior Officer in Command on the day of 
18th June 1984, argued that, if there was to be an industrial battlefield, he wanted it 
“on my own ground and on my own terms”1178 – his word was final. This was 
confirmed by his second-in-command, under questioning regarding use of 
truncheons and riot gear against miners, “he had no hesitation” stating “'If there is a 
conflict between the standing orders and the manual, the chief constable is 
autonomous in his area.”1179 Though the line of questioning aimed at Chief Constable 
Clements was designed to challenge the operational integrity of the policing 
                                                          
1176 Ibid 
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operation of the day, it does clarify the autonomy, good or bad, of the police 
authorities. The responsibility of policing mass picketing was a policing, and not a 
political issue.  
Yet this research demonstrates this not to be the case. Policing fitted the 
ideologically driven strategy, the rejection of statecraft and public safety, as argued 
in this paper. Evidence has recently emerged of government manipulation and 
deployment of police services as an “instrument of the state”.1180 Dr Allan Billings, 
South Yorkshire’s newly re-elected police and crime commissioner admitted that the 
pitched battles three decades ago were the “nearest we have come to a politicised 
police force”, 
Orgreave must be treated as a national as well as a South Yorkshire 
policing issue... modern-day officers were being “dragged down” by 
legacy issues which “they cannot escape”.1181  
The “legacy” is the manipulation of the police involved in the strike – “The 
government set the stage for the final Battle of Orgreave”.1182 The police force was 
to become a part of the New Right’s weaponry – a tool of the state that was to be 
coerced to become a force, not simply to maintain law and order, but to rectify the 
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memory of Saltley Gate, to avenge the defeat of Heath and ultimately to ensure the 
radical transformation of industrial Britain. At Orgreave a force of 4,200 officers 
from ten counties, 50 mounted police, 58 police dogs and several riot units, I argue 
were not neutral – they had been politicised to ensure an ideological economic 
agenda could be realised.1183 It “might have been helpful” argued Sir Lawrence 
Byford, the Chief Inspector of Constabularies in 1984, “if government ministers had 
shown “greater evidence of neutrality” when it came to supporting the police.1184 
And Sir Brian Cubbon, Permanent Secretary of the Home Office, in 1984 wrote that 
“internal questions” needed to be asked about how, 
the Home Office relay(s) to the police service the political influence on 
operational policy which was wanted in the early days of the (miners) 
dispute.1185 
There was to be direct political interference with a local policing matter. On 13th July 
1984, the Prime Minister argued that, “Peter Walker’s strategy a few weeks ago was 
to hold talks” but the “central issues cannot be for negotiation” – there would need 
to be a reversion to a “war of attrition”.1186 Thatcher’s memo is revealing. Peter 
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Walker was to be side-lined – his “strategy” of negotiation and dialogue had not 
worked. In his autobiography, Walker admits his neutrality regarding the policing of 
the strike,  
Police action was critical to breaking the strike. The police set up an 
operations room in Scotland Yard. Each of the forces had to provide so 
many men. They were moved wherever it was considered necessary and 
no politician was really involved. I only once visited the operations 
room1187  
Though congratulatory of the role of the police, Walker concurs that “questions were 
raised about the principle of having a national police operation”.1188 New primary 
evidence, released in 2017 justifies Walker’s observation; there are a new set of 
questions that have arisen that examine direct government influence on policing at 
Orgreave and the miners’ dispute. In March 1979 Margaret Thatcher responded to 
MP Merlyn Rees, who advised that it was “not the task of the Home Secretary to 
give instructions to the police about the day to day conduct of their job”.1189 Thatcher 
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replied, that “the only occasion when it would be proper to issue a circular to Chief 
Constables is when there has been a change in the law”.1190 
Contrast this statement to events on 3rd July 1984. “The Battle of Orgreave” is over 
but the repercussions are still being felt; Leon Brittan, the then Home Secretary and 
MP for Richmond, North Yorkshire, forwarded a three-page document to Margaret 
Thatcher, detailing how Peter Wright, the then Chief Constable of South Yorkshire 
Police, had been “forbidden by Labour-controlled South Yorkshire Police Authority 
from incurring any costs policing the picket lines outside Orgreave without ‘their 
express authority’”.1191 Proposing that the “Government bypasses the police 
authority”, and South Yorkshire County Council, by “making emergency funding 
available”1192, Mr Brittan argues,  
The Attorney general and I have already put in hand, however, certain 
contingency arrangements.  
Because he has no funds available to him and the importance of ensuring 
his position, it is proposed that treasury Solicitor and Counsel be available 
to him.  
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I am sure we need to move quickly in this way, to forestall public 
speculation that police operations against the dispute will be hampered, or 
even that the Armed Forces would have to be brought in instead.1193 
On receipt of the letter from Brittan, Andrew Turnbull – Mrs Thatcher’s Private 
Secretary, scribbles at the top of the Home Office letter,  
Prime Minister. Agree with Home Secretary’s line?  
Mrs Thatcher wrote in her handwriting, 
Is this enough? Can we provide the funds direct?”1194 
These funds enable the continuation of the fight and the NUM would be defeated. 
The state would interfere directly in the policing of Orgreave – and Orgreave was to 
be Scargill’s Waterloo. Thatcherism could not be seen to be defeated as had Heath 
– there were no “U-turns” no dialogue and ultimately, unlike post-Saltley Gate in 
‘74, no question of “Who governs?” was required. The victor was clear, and the 
“mob” had been clearly defeated.  
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6.5 Conclusions  
The above analysis demonstrates Margaret Thatcher’s direct interference with “day-
to-day conduct” of policing. It reflects, I believe, a determination to circumvent the 
accepted principles of refraining “from even seeming to usurp the powers of the 
judiciary of avenging individuals or the State”1195 – by the politicisation and indeed 
militarisation of the police force to defeat the NUM. The symbolism of the “mob” 
at Orgreave, of the mass that were to challenge the rule of law, was to redefine the 
miners’ strike as a binary choice of good and bad – of law against lawlessness. This 
provided the moral cause so required by Thatcherism, the necessary foe to be able 
to deconstruct; I argue, it was the pinnacle of Ridley’s plan, the final piece in the 
jigsaw of defeating the trade union movement. Scargill was correct, there was a “hit 
list” and there was to be defeat for the NUM – but, just as the police faced, and dealt 
out violence, they too were to be pawns in the greater ideological game. The 
construct of the miners’ strike had been designed, patiently planned and 
implemented; an acceptance of violence, of the manipulation of the police force and 
of the symbolism of defiance against a mob; this was the mob at Saltley Gate in 1972 
and the miners in 1974 who were to bring down the government of Edward Heath. 
The defeat of the miners at Orgreave was a cathartic moment, when the demons of 
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the Conservative Party past were vanquished and a door to another world was 
opened. This was to be world post-trade union militancy, post-corporatism and post-
industrialisation. This I argue, does not equate to the efficiency of government 
administration and of Conservative Party management; the defeat of Scargill 
ultimately demonstrated a win-at-all-odds mentality, to implement and to enshrine 
an ideological, economic crusade. Certainly, Arthur Scargill mirrored the dogma of 
his nemesis, but his political naivety ultimately led him to become another victim of 
the New Right’s perpetual ascent to governance through an ideological and not 
statecraft agenda.  
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion – The ideological victory 
7.0 Introduction 
The primary evidence gathered and presented in this thesis gives legitimacy to the 
proposed theory that after 1974, in response to the defeat of Edward Heath, a group 
formed around the new leadership in the Conservative Party was to adopt and 
develop a predetermined policy, constructed through an ideological agenda, intended 
to target, confront and to defeat the NUM, as witnessed at Orgreave in 1984.  
To achieve this aim, sections of the Conservative Party that adhered to statecraft 
theory were to be marginalised and ultimately relieved of Cabinet responsibility, 
enabling the reconfiguration of economic and industrial strategy, by rejecting the 
considered parameters of statecraft to implement an ideologically driven agenda 
using confrontation. In short, conservatism was to be redesigned to enforce 
economic and industrial policy through confrontation.  
In this chapter I intend to demonstrate both a summary of my research and the 
relevant messages and themes which flow between these chapters. This will 
demonstrate a procedural development and implementation of ideological change – 
a systematic and planned imposition of ideology. The chapter construction highlights 
this dedicated formulation of policy of confrontation – policy that did not adhere to 
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an organic or evolutionary nature, but as the chapter summary will reveal, a 
deliberate deconstruction of industrial and energy policy.  
7.1 The End of Moral Decline 
To end decline Thatcherism would have to pose and eventually answer some 
difficult, and at times unedifying questions. The questions of trade union impasse, 
of inflationary control, of a British industrial malaise, had been raised before, notably 
by Powell and Thorneycroft; yet the answer to these questions, the construct of a 
new national identity had never been successfully negotiated. Macmillan, Wilson 
and Heath had all broached large plans of technological and social improvement, yet 
they had failed in the process of deconstructing an old order. Thatcher’s government, 
I evidence in this chapter, would through an adherence to a spirit beyond that of the 
political, through an individual, social and economic morality, would become the 
administration that would pick up the mantle of the post-war world, would face the 
challenge of the collective forces of trade unionism and enforce change – to end 
decline.  
In this research I have chosen a specific historic period of political and social change. 
I demonstrate the reconfiguration of one political organisation and a reconstruction 
of the corporate dynamic; these were big challenges, with multiple dynamics of 
actors, policy and procedure; yet the greater challenge, this research demonstrates, 
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was the construction of a new dawn of British politics, a new moral purpose that had 
been eroded by the post-war “delusive dreams”.1196 To achieve this, there would be 
a requirement for clarity, vision and purpose; of an impetus, of movement and a 
challenge to implement social, political and moral change within The Conservative 
Party, the trade union movement and ultimately a Britain which was ready to throw 
off the shackles of regression.  
The challenge was to change “the British character in peacetime”.1197 I reveal, that 
though the tools to realign British failure were economic – an implementation of 
monetary reform, the prioritising of the control of inflation over unemployment and 
a rejection of demand management – the agenda was far greater than simply 
economic. With echoes of Correlli Barnett’s ascertain of Britain’s “affinity for 
muddle”1198 and its “sacred cows” of consensus, Thatcherism rejected the doctrine 
of constructive, practical conservatism in the form of Macmillan and his “Middle 
way”. This was a conservatism that could not readdress the fault-lines of 1970’s 
stagflation and trade union impasse – it was a form of conservatism from a different 
age and indeed world; one that was prepared to accept corporatism, the tripartite 
state and embrace, or at least accept, this corporate status quo.  
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A new form of conservatism would reject One Nation politics. The undefined nature 
of Conservative thought, though always averse to dogma, would allow for an 
embrace within Tory ranks of a new doctrine. Though an anathema to many 
established post-war politicians, there was a call within the party for a “New 
Conservatism” – a correction of politics. This would entail a new morality, a greater 
sense of determined demand for change and sense of renewal; a new dynamism 
within the Conservative Party. Edward Heath’s defeat in 1974 would present an 
opportunity, one that could introduce Nigel Lawson’s philosophy of The New 
Conservatism – from crisis to opportunity.  
This would reinstate government which would not “lack backbone” as previous 
administrations had and would not fail as “a result of political pressures”. This 
presents a key point – Lawson’s new form of Conservative thought, based upon the 
assumption that “governments cannot create economic growth”1199 prioritised the 
resistance of these pressures and to redesign the political narrative. The 
implementation of monetarism, the “liberalisation of the financial markets” and 
prioritising of inflationary control, could only become reality, as Lawson 
acknowledged, if sacrifices were prepared to be made, arguing that “Reducing 
inflation, like most things in life, has its price… on output, profits and 
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employment”.1200  
And this is the essence of Lawson’s The New Conservatism.1201 It is, I argue, a 
pastiche of Conservative thought – a mime to the classic political philosophy of an 
understanding of the nation, of its body politic and balanced requirements. This 
research looks at ideology associated with a New Right; an ideology that is 
determined by a dogma, to enforce economic and societal change, in face of social 
discontent and violence, as illustrated by the scenes at Orgreave. One Nation 
conservatism contrasts with this; I have presented an argument that determines the 
conservatism of One Nation politics of pragmatism, consensus and harmonious 
industrial relations with the trade union movement. Lawson’s narrowed view of 
conservatism, demonstrates, I argue, a mindset of blinkered enslavement to this 
ideology; as Ian Gilmour argued of the New Right, they “have been blinded by their 
own rhetoric”.1202 Ideology would replace statecraft as a tool that would enshrine 
itself from the “political pressures” that Lawson describes; a political insulation 
against the extremes that monetarism would construct.  
Jim Bulpitt argues, that the “high politics” of office – of the Parliamentary process, 
would shield an administration from the pressures of low politics – of local authority, 
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of the nitty-gritty of political administration. This I counter. It was not statecraft that 
acted to aim for the safety of high politics but the shroud of dogma. Thatcher’s high 
politics, infused within ideology, would not isolate her or her party from criticism – 
it would not shroud her from her moral convictions. The byproducts of monetary 
reform; unemployment, trade union militancy, social discontent – there was no 
protection from these, none of statecraft’s retreat to a higher political arena. 
Thatcherite high politics would entail the rejection of U-turns and the ploughing of 
an ideological furrow. The pressures placed on the Thatcher administration, by 
Parliament and Cabinet, corporations and trade unions, socialists and “wets”, the 
critique of the 364 economists who were to denigrate economic monetarism; these 
pressures were not placated through statecraft but by an ideologically driven belief 
system. 
Ideology, as evidenced in this research, does not reach for the pragmatic option to 
govern. Unlike statecraft, it is a mechanism that does not recognise the merits of 
dialogue, negotiation and political consensus. I have demonstrated that this clouds 
political judgment – statecraft is the nature of politics and political decision making. 
Nigel Lawson’s proclaiming of some new form of Conservative thought or being 
does not stand up to political or indeed statecraft scrutiny – it is deluded to any form 
of traditions of Conservative thought or practice. It was to inhibit the space of a 
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recluse, of no inhibition to the moral and political implications of unemployment 
and the consequences that this brings. Ideology drove Nigel Lawson to accept the 
victory of low inflation at the expense of millions of British men and women being 
unemployed – it would ultimately lead to scenes of pitched battle at Orgreave. 
Lawson was to deny this, in a lecture entitled, The British Experiment,  
It is, incidentally, sometimes argued that the reduction of inflation has 
been brought about not by the Government's monetary policy but by three 
million unemployed. The implication is that high unemployment has 
reduced wage demands which in turn have reduced inflation. This view 
derives from the widespread error of seeing inflation in terms of a simple 
cost-plus framework.1203 
I argue that Lawson’s denial reflects a mindset that has redefined the nature of the 
political status quo – that allows for experimentation in dogma. His definition of 
New Conservatism inhibits a space where, as he argues, “political pressures” do not 
hold sway – where the old certainties and established political principles are 
realigned. His “new” politics of tacit acceptance of three million unemployed – 
                                                          
1203  N. Lawson Speech, The British Experiment, The Mais Lecture, 18th June 1984, City University Business 
School, Centre for Banking and International Finance. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Available at: 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org 
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whilst during an industrial dispute, of such intensity that has not been seen on 
mainland Britain since the 1920s, demonstrates an insularity and shroud of dogma 
and ideology. As Jim Bulpitt argues, statecraft “insulated” politicians to enable them 
to govern effectively, I conclude that this is reversed; Lawson’s economic New 
Conservatism, used the tools of ideology to implement economic dogma. Ideology 
was to insulate this New Right from the realities of industrial Britain, from the 
realities of three million unemployed and the inevitable socio-economic 
consequences of the 1984 miners’ strike.  
Yet this was to influence the moral dynamic of Thatcherism. The insulation of an 
ideology – of economic dogmatism – was bound within a greater authenticity; one 
of the notions of righteousness. Economic liberalism facilitates the movement away 
from the Keynesian orthodoxy, but the real force was one of liberation and a 
reconstruction of the national soul. This would bypass the realities of unemployment 
and social discontent, as within the no U-turn agenda lay a greater force of nature – 
the religious connotation of freedom and liberty. Thatcherism’s economic and social 
realignment of British politics would have a legitimacy through a moral endeavor. 
Espousing Hayekian values of the immorality of state intervention and the purity of 
market forces, Thatcherism released a force of nature that would combine the New 
Conservatism of Lawson’s economic formula for recovery, with a spiritual crusade 
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against a tyranny of the collective. This infusion, of an ideological reinterpretation 
of an historic political party, would construct a political force that would dare to 
reconstruct – to creatively destroy a political, economic and social post-war agenda.  
Statecraft would be consumed. The self-proclamation of The New Conservatism, its 
economic agenda pointing to a new, post-corporate world, would be driven on by a 
messianic verve for individual freedom. A quasi-economic and moral spirituality, 
enthused by an agenda to halt British decline, would now set an agenda, formulate a 
plan and look to target the established pillars of corporatism – the relationship 
between the trade union movement and government. The impasse and malignity that 
this has constructed during the post-war world, would justify the elimination of an 
“enemy within” – an internal enemy of “wets” who halted progress and rejected 
dogmatism, and an “enemy without”, the established enemy of economic liberalism 
– the trade union movement.  
I have contextualised the debate showing where this new form of politics emerged, 
what its inspiration was and ultimately, as subsequent chapters reveal, how the 
government and trade union movement were to confront in 1984.  
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7.2 Enoch Powell – A pursuit of liberty and rejection of the mass  
Powellism is a search for the sanctity of the sovereign nation. It is an emotive cry 
for the liberty and freedoms associated with Englishness, individualism and the 
delicate political forces from where these most treasured of gifts stem. Powell’s 
decree of the “lunacy” of government intervention in a labour movement was, he 
argues counter to the “function” of government; corporatism was an attack on the 
legitimacy of Parliament and the delicate, complex and ancient spirit of political 
discourse. Powellism, in many forms, searches for the innate delicacy of British 
identity and the soul of our nation; man-made constructs, the altering of historical 
precedent, the notion of a collective, a union or bloc, challenge democratic 
institutions – a masse that was prepared to alter the delicate fabric of the autonomy 
of sovereignty. Enoch Powell represented a symbol of bittersweet resistance to this 
this unnatural phenomenon; a lone wolf whose cry was not always palatable but 
struck at the heart of British decline; the insatiable demands of the mass – the attack 
on liberty.  
Unlike Powell, Thatcher’s objective, as evidenced, was to “change the soul” of the 
nation – to bend a collective will in her image. A nation that had been dulled by mass 
representation, an adherence to the collective and the loss of an individual dynamic. 
Powell would not contend with the manipulation of national sovereign identity; his 
ideals were not to change national identity but to sustain it. His inspirational qualities 
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for Thatcherism lay in the conceptual ideal of liberty; the trade union movement, the 
Labour Party, these were functioning arms of a state that denied individualism and 
freedom – this was Powell’s legacy for Thatcherism.  
For Powell there was “no political reality beyond the nation state”, it represented the 
“ultimate political reality”.1204 There could be no challenge to this identity – the 
“extraordinarily well-developed homogeneity” would guide the British people to the 
ruling “dictates of ‘good tone’”.1205 There could be no man-made challenges to this 
natural sovereignty, no trade union impasse, no collective identity or corporate 
cooperation – these constructs of a self-inflated state; these man-made edifices of 
power in the trade union movement were a challenge to a natural homogeneous state. 
Therefore, the sovereign state, Powell argued, held a “unique structure of power” – 
one that was as indefinable as it was delicate; it was constructed through an organic 
historicism, of an identity that could not be contrived, but through deference, 
dedication, loyalty, patriotism and military service, could enhance the individual 
holistically and morally. 
Sovereignty presented an organic entity of “values and traditions”. I argue that, 
though there are fundamental disagreements, Powellism as an ideology helped to 
configure Thatcherism and ultimately the reinterpretation of trade union policy. 
                                                          
1204 B. Jackson & R. Saunders, Making Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), p.95 
1205 E. Powell, Speech, Commonwealth (sham) 14th January 1966, Camborne. Available at: 
http://www.enochpowell.net/speeches.html 
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Powellism inspired Thatcherism. Though contrasting in the interpretation and of the 
importance of the nation state – and ultimately the imposition of state control in 1984 
at Orgreave and beyond – Powellism’s defiance against a political establishment, the 
pursuit of a personal freedom through the prism of national patriotism, appealed to 
the New Right. Powell did not agree with the implementation of an ideological 
economic solution to renew Britain – it was not a pursuit of economic freedom, but 
one of personal liberty. The man-made state, the socialist ideals of control of the 
means of production, was to mean that “the people and the nation can be trusted to 
decide nothing unless the Government supplies the answer”1206 – a challenge to the 
individuals who comprise this state and the liberty of which they are so destined to 
aspire to.  
It was Powell’s avocation of liberty that was attractive to Thatcherism. Powell was 
not anti-trade union – it was the transgression of the state that required checks and 
balances; the “entire trade union movement” Powell argued, has “been brought to 
accept that the trade unions are responsible”1207 for the sickness of inflation. Powell 
saw through the denouncing of industrial representation, “I am not blaming 
them”.1208  
                                                          
1206 S. Letwin, The Anatomy of Thatcherism (Harper Collins, 1993), p.75 
1207 E. Powell, Speech at Chippenham, We live in an age of conspiracies, 11th May 1968. Available at: 
http://www.enochpowell.net/speeches.html 
1208 Ibid. 
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Therefore, Powell’s directive was anti-socialism, but not inherently anti-trade union. 
Trade unions were a state tool – a piece in the jigsaw of corporatism; a part of a 
coherent post-war plan to challenge the legitimacy of sovereignty. Deny the tools of 
corporatism – its power base of the trade union movement – and reaffirm 
parliamentary sovereignty. Trade unions were no more responsible for the rate of 
inflation or unemployment, than that of “ordinary people at being made the butt and 
scapegoat for evils from which they themselves”.1209 As for economic decline, 
Powell was adamant “the Government causes it”.1210  
Therefore, Powell does not denigrate the trade union movement – it is not the citizens 
who challenge the primacy of the sovereign state – it is not the individual – but 
government, and, corporate government. Corporatism reimagined artificially the 
role of the sovereign state, industry and industrial representation; artificial, non-
organic – it was a political construct, a tool of socialism. Trade unionism was to 
present the human edifice of socialism – the mechanism of its implementation; those 
individuals that the trade union movement represented were not the guilty ones. The 
whole spectre of wage control, of negotiation, of boards, and the industrial “sermon 
                                                          
1209 E. Powell, Speech at Chippenham, We live in an age of conspiracies, 11th May 1968. Available at: 
http://www.enochpowell.net/speeches.html 
1210 Ibid 
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of threats” – these are constructs that bypass sovereign legitimacy; let them, Powell 
argues, “be shot into the dustbin”.1211 
Therefore, this research demonstrates that the influence of Powellism was to run 
through the New Right. As a newly constructed political force, it could reinterpret 
Powellism, redefine who was to be the “enemy within” and call for the subsequent 
confrontation with the trade union movement. I argue that Powellism, paradoxically 
in the context of this New Right, was reinterpreted as a movement proposing 
economic and social liberty, through a greater ideological agenda of change. The 
pursuit of liberty through adherence to sovereignty and an allegiance to historical 
monarchy and patriotism, was to re-emerge, through a New Right, as a new 
“peasants revolt”. It was a use of Powellism to justify a new moral code; an anti-
corporate agenda that equated the established trade union movement with an attack 
on liberty and national moral decline.  
Powellism, I argue, was to be manipulated. Powellism legitimised the perception of 
trade union repression and its role as an agent of anti-liberty intolerance. Indeed, 
Powell had argued that the trade unions’ “binding contracts on behalf of their 
members” was akin to a “fascist corporate state”. In the context of the collective 
enforcement of pay bargaining and working conditions, government proposals and 
                                                          
1211 Ibid 
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negotiable terms of “enforceable collective bargaining”1212 were akin to a “private 
law or code”. This flew in the face of individual freedom, initiatives and liberty; 
trade unionism, as argued by Powell, could through collective action descend to the 
bottomless pit of fascism. This was to be a bold and challenging statement – yet it 
was to serve the New Right in its application of a new economic agenda.1213 
Therefore, the reinterpretation of Powellism and its bold, academic and moral 
assertions, used correctly, helped deconstruct an existing agenda. It would unlock a 
legacy – that of Keith Joseph, of Stepping Stones and ultimately the implementation 
of Ridley’s template for industrial sabotage. Powellism in isolation would not 
acknowledge the blame and sabotage of the trade union movement, the blaming of 
the trade union member – this he could not countenance. His rhetorical account of 
the issues of corporatism, collective bargaining, trade unions and socialism, 
constructed the required narrative for the New Right to expand.  
Powell in 1975 would drift away politically. Yet his legacy, I have demonstrated, is 
paramount to the construction of a new form of conservatism and it’s attempt to 
deconstruct the established political and industrial playing field. His maverick 
tendencies and sacking by Heath, would not allow him to become a part of a radical 
                                                          
 
1213 E. Powell, Speech at Chippenham, We live in an age of conspiracies, 11th May 1968. Available at: 
http://www.enochpowell.net/speeches.html 
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new front in British politics, yet Powellism, I demonstrate, is the template for the 
formulation of a policy that was to be bold; that was to circumvent the established 
corporate protocols. Through the certainty of idealism Powell and Powellism could 
be bold; this is his legacy to a New Right seeking inspiration. The emboldened 
sentiments and rhetoric of Keith Joseph, his mantra of “monetarism is not enough” 
and Stepping Stones’ idiosyncratic challenge to the functioning industrial and 
political work forces, were inspired to think the unthinkable and to do the 
unthinkable in a post-war world. Powellism I argue, allows for, not simply policy or 
administrative efficiency – statecraft – but legitimises the implementation of policy 
of a grander ideological scheme. He dared to challenge the consensus thinking of the 
day – he dared to confront the collective and accepted notions of social, political, 
economic and industrial thought – for this, he was to be marginalised, but the 
importance of Powell is that he dared. In his defence of what he believed to be right, 
to be sacrosanct and to be organically and historically true – the relationship between 
the individual citizen and the homogenous state, he argued that,  
If we are not to be powerful and glorious ourselves it is compensation to 
think we belong to something powerful and glorious.1214 
                                                          
1214 C. Schofield, Enoch Powell and the making of Postcolonial Britain (Cambridge University press, 2013), p.138 
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This “glorious” sovereign state; untouchable and sacrosanct, offering an unbreakable 
bond between the individual and a higher, greater authority. Through its history and 
complexities, the state offers inspiration to the individual, aspiring to grandeur, to 
reject the notion of mediocrity or decline and to pursue a higher social purpose. This 
innate relationship, fashioned through generations, could not succumb to a doctrine 
of socialism collectively; it is greater than one political doctrine demanding equality. 
Powellism looks beyond a government of corporate limitations – it was not the 
“function of government to plan the size and distribution between industries of the 
labour force.”1215 This was a prosaic interpretation of the functions of a government 
with state power; yet also, Powellism would not equate to Thatcherism’s aim – a 
hegemonic state construct. The function of government and the state was not to 
reconfigure community, or industry, to challenge or interfere with organic 
community and hierarchy; there were implications to direct state involvement with 
reinterpretation of industrial relations as “You can neither intervene, nor withdraw 
from intervention, by half measures”.1216  
Thatcherism was not to adhere to the notion of “half measures” – ultimately it would 
reconstruct a state and challenge Powellism’s pursuit of natural liberty. Yet in 
                                                          
1215 E. Powell, Speech to Kensington Young Conservatives, 30th November 1970, Kensington Town Hall. Available 
at: http://www.enochpowell.net/speeches.html 
1216 E. Powell, Speech to Kensington Young Conservatives, 30th November 1970, Kensington Town Hall. Available 
at: http://www.enochpowell.net/speeches.html 
 
 
  
395  
  
Powell, the New Right saw a champion of dialogue and critique; he was to dare to 
challenge the role of socialism, the follies of equality and the man-made constructs 
that would interfere with natural, historic liberty. Powellism was to forge a path for 
a new challenge, for conflict and questioning, from which a New Right was to 
emerge – for it to dream its ideological dream.  
 
7.3 The silencing of Cabinet revolt; the end of One Nation “wets”  
There is a duality of the challenge that has been explored in this research. At its heart 
is a revision of two dynamics; firstly, the “enemy within” of the NUM and militant 
trade unionism, but also a far less obvious enemy much nearer the historic citadel of 
Conservative Party power – the Establishment. Thatcherism derives not from the 
playing fields of Eton, but famously from the petit bourgeoisie of the grocer’s 
daughter from Grantham – denoting self-sufficiency, hard work, thrift, self-
determination and opportunism. Margaret Thatcher was an “outsider” – not 
possessing the traditional background, or indeed gender, to ascribe to the established 
virtues of the Conservative Party. Yet this was to be a part of her arsenal – the ability 
to observe what was required for change, to not be constrained by the baggage of 
established political and theoretical views on what conservatism was and stood for; 
and ultimately to be able to challenge the regressive and stilted views of 
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Conservative thought. To challenge the nature of her Cabinet, to combat the lethargy 
of a class of politician, of men, who acted as a barrier to economic reform, she would 
take on and defeat this establishment within her party – to defeat the “wets”.  
This research has identified this challenge to and change of actor within the 
Conservative Party. The priority of an ideology was paramount, the implementation 
of a dogmatism vital in the empowerment of change, but these factors are embedded 
through the charisma, personality, background and nuance of an individual; the 
background, the mindset and thought processes. Thatcherism was to reject the 
individual MP who represented the muddle, fudge and confusion of the established 
consensus; a rejection of the cosy and fulfilled MP, who was happy with a status 
quo. Thatcherism in turn would turn to those with a moral backbone to impose that 
which was necessary, to implement economic reform which did not comply with the 
accepted wisdom of Keynesian aggregate demand and pursuit of full employment. 
Thatcherism would reject the compromise of the “wets” and consensual politics, the 
fudge of One Nation MPs – instead she would turn to those who believed; to the 
economic and theoretical inspiration of one who saw the danger of the “socialists of 
the Left and the Right”1217 – F.A. Hayek. He would propose a “conservative 
socialism”1218 within the ranks of the Conservative Party; the association with an 
                                                          
1217 I. Gilmour & M. Garnett, Whatever Happened to the Tories – The Conservatives since 1945 (Fourth Estate, 1988), 
p.20 
1218 Ibid 
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established economic and social apathy at the heart of the establishment – of a link 
between One Nation politics and the trade union movement. 
Hayek dared to state what could not be countenanced within the Shadow Cabinet in 
June 1978 – the embrace of radicalism and the sweeping away of established 
Conservative traditions; “I have no way of knowing Mrs. Thatcher’s mind” Hayek 
argued, but, “it is more important to be placed in a position which she can save 
Britain from accelerating economic decline than to win the next election”.1219 There 
was to be a rejection of traditional conservatism, a reinterpretation of what is 
important to the political party – winning general elections and satisfying the careers 
of established MPs – and imposing what was economically and morally correct for 
the nation.  
Therefore, Hayek would argue that country would “not be saved by the Tories being 
elected”.1220 The administration would have to adopt economic ideology and reject 
effective governance; rejecting policy designed to reach out to the voting public 
through a unified political discourse. There was a greater agenda, and Hayek’s words 
and reference to “the timid” immerse him within the debates and fault-lines that were 
tearing the Conservative Party apart. Hayek’s emergence from the confines of an 
                                                          
1219 Ibid.  
1220 Hayek, F. (1977).  Letter to The Times, Trade union immunity under the law. Margaret Thatcher Foundation 
Available at: https://www.margaretthatcher.org 
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inter-party cause célèbre is unusual but fitting within the parameters of the radical 
debate occurring within the Conservative Party itself; just as Hayek would also 
intervene within the union question, asking of the British people in July 1977,  
When will the British public at last learn to understand that there is no 
salvation for Britain until the special privileges granted to the trade unions 
by the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 are revoked?1221  
Hayek’s influence was obvious as I have demonstrated through this research, in the 
taking of “… drastic action. Mrs Thatcher must escape from the advice she is being 
given by Mr Prior and Sir Ian Gilmour”1222 and so the politics of established 
conservative principles were rejected – the individual actors of One Nation politics 
were rejected. Hayek’s words could not have been more prophetic. His demands for 
the demotion of the centralists Gilmour and Prior were to be carried out with ruthless 
efficiency; they were, in Hayek’s eyes, the stubborn “muddle in the middle”1223 the 
apologists for progress; the established protocol of social, post-war Keynesian 
consensus economic thinking would prioritise demand and promote the evil of 
unemployment that was so predominant in the pre-war years. Controlling inflation 
                                                          
1221 Hayek, F (1977).  Letter to The Times, Trade union immunity under the law. Margaret Thatcher Foundation 
Available at: https://www.margaretthatcher.org 
1222 Hayek, F (1980) Letter to The Times, Monetary policy, The Hayek cure; bigger and better bankruptcies. Margaret 
Thatcher Foundation Available at: https://www.margaretthatcher.org 
1223 Hayek, F (1982). Letter to The Times, After being much too long restrained by the believers in the Muddle of the 
Middle. Margaret Thatcher Foundation Available at: https://www.margaretthatcher.org 
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was the new mantra; the acceptable notion of a degree of cleansing of an economy 
through good bankruptcies and an entrepreneurial spirited business class. This was 
an economic call to arms – thanks to Hayek, Friedman, Keith Joseph, Alan Walters 
and Patrick Minford, the 364 economists who called for a return to Keynes in 1981 
would be ignored, and the established economic and social protocols of the day 
would be smashed. Economics would now present a means to reinterpret 
conservatism; for decades a cosy consensus of corporatist trade unionists, 
economists and Conservative MPs which espoused the needs of the state and the 
provision of security through a collective environment.  
Economic policy would refashion conservatism. Thatcherism would now offer a 
different form of conservatism; the ideology of opportunity through market and 
industrial reform would prevail, but there would be a cost. In January 1982 the 
number of jobless stood at 3,070,621 – the greatest number of unemployed since the 
1930s; one in eight people were unemployed. And within the Conservative Party 
internal division reflected a challenge at the heart and soul of conservatism.  
The fault-line that was espoused by Pym of “theorists and pragmatists” was a conflict 
that was bloodless and to a large extent gutless. The “wets” as they were termed were 
a representation of an older, gentler form of conservatism; one that was prepared to 
accept a status quo of corporatism to achieve the holy grails of One Nation stability 
and continuity. What is apparent is the ruthlessness of the New Right’s coup in 
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reorganising conservatism’s theoretical stance in what The Times described in 
September 1981, to be “her last big effort to build a Cabinet in tune with her 
economic thinking” the “Prime Minister yesterday dropped three Cabinet ministers, 
including the hostile Sir Ian Gilmour”.1224 Jim Prior presented the amiable “Country 
squire” of conservatism; his relationship was to become the origins of “wets” as it 
was to be scribbled all over his briefings presented to the PM. Prior, like the “wets” 
overall was “more a bluffer than a plotter”.1225 It was a question of how life was to 
be seen – through which lens? Conservatism in the eyes of the “wets” – of Gilmour, 
Prior, Pym, even though the staying power and longevity of Peter Walker, was a 
means to reject the excesses of ideology and dogma, primarily associated with 
socialism. The New Right’s embrace of dogma, at times seemed confusing to an old 
Tory guard, yet confusion was to turn to consternation as the grip of monetarist 
doctrine was to change the face of conservatism in its entirety; Patrick Cormack, MP 
for Staffordshire South West wrote,  
Those of us who question the wisdom of the Government’s policy were 
not answered at Blackpool and remain profoundly depressed by the 
                                                          
1224 Commentary (1981) The Times Three Cabinet ministers sacked, Margaret Thatcher Foundation Available at: 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org  
1225 J. Aitken, Margaret Thatcher; Power and Personality (Bloomsbury, 2013), p.307 
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obdurate attitude of the hardliners, who seem quite content to contemplate 
any sacrifice to maintain doctrinal purity, a strange posture for a Tory.1226 
This was indeed a “strange posture for a Tory”. This research has revealed, in accord 
with the manufactured attack on the trade union movement of Britain, a designed 
reconfiguration of the nature of conservatism – leading ultimately to the purging of 
the “wets” in Cabinet. These men were ministers of consequence and experience, 
they were fashioned by the post-war consensus and an intrinsic understanding of the 
nature of what conservatism presented. Yet they were unable, whether it be through 
weakness, inability or lack of desire, to mount a coherent defence of their 
Conservative ideals – conservatism, I have demonstrated was contorted and 
disfigured.  
Andrew Gamble argues, that “the success of Thatcherism as statecraft has baffled 
and dismayed many One Nation Conservatives... Thatcherism never did subordinate 
statecraft to ideology as its critics complained”.1227 This research counters this 
notion. Statecraft policy allows for the “relaxed and pragmatic defence of tradition 
which is the true essence of Toryism”1228 offering the prudent and historically 
credible alternative to recent and changing forms of ideology. Conservatism has 
                                                          
1226 Commentary, The Times, Rumblings of revolt among Tory dissidents, 20th October 1981. Margaret Thatcher 
Foundation. Available at: https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/153142 
1227 A. Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State; The Politics of Thatcherism (Macmillan Education, 1988), 
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1228 B. Evans & A. Taylor, From Salisbury to Major; Continuity and Change in Conservative Politics (Manchester 
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touched upon variant interpretations over the decades, yet inherently, I argue, the 
“wets” presented a form of Conservative thought that resonated with and 
complimented the political and importantly industrial landscape of the post-war 
world. There are arguments to suggest that conservatism has altered dramatically, 
has morphed since its 19th Century connotations, yet the conservatism of the “wets” 
was acknowledged as a form of credible representation of a non-ideological 
construct – of which had been, by some margins, the dominant form of Parliamentary 
and democratically electable form of conservatism. This form of pragmatic, One 
Nation, statecraft politics, complimented industrial Britain and did not seek to 
reinvent the relationship between trade union and government. In many ways it was 
unique in its ability to sustain the traditions of a mixed economy, recognition of, but 
not enslavement to both state and market place and cordial relations with corporate 
Britain.  
In Churchill, Macmillan and latterly Heath this was unique in its nature. This form 
of conservatism was deemed superfluous by a New Right whose aim was to instigate 
economic and social reform, to readdress the industrial nature of the UK and by 
doing so adopted dogma, rejected statecraft and reinvented the Tory Party.  
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7.4 The Revelation of Industrial Sabotage  
Thatcher’s “moral crusade” would be fuelled and inspired by the theoretical purity 
of Powellism; the next stage would be an implementation of economic and industrial 
policy. This is demonstrated through the industrial radicalism proposed within the 
seminal Ridley Report of 1977 and the exposure of the secret “Hit List” of pit 
closures of 1984. Through these industrial proposals, I have demonstrated empirical 
evidence of the ideological template regarding industrial deconstruction; evidence 
not solely of the theoretical influence of Powell, but a finite process, based on 
evidence, from theoretical to practical and from academic to physical conflict.  
I have evidenced, academically, the existence of an industrial process of 
deconstruction, one that was denied to the public, Arthur Scargill and the NUM in 
1984. I have demonstrated new evidence, categorically eliminating statecraft 
accountability, of a government industrial strategy that was designed to deny the 
existence of a pit closure scheme, at a point when the legitimacy of the 1984 strike 
was being challenged, due to the lack of an official national ballot being cast.  
I demonstrate a process, a template, evidenced through primary source material, that 
was to require a necessary degree of planning and practical application. The 
revelations of this paper, sourced through MISC 57, demonstrate the existence of a 
pit closure scheme, that fits the criteria laid down through The Ridley Report in 1977. 
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Ridley’s report was to redefine the parameters of industrial relations – it would not 
simply redesign the practical response to an industrial dispute but change the terms 
of the debate. The report instigated on paper an ideological mindset that had been 
bubbling under the surface since 1974; now was a time to formulate a concrete, 
industrial plan – one designed to confront the trade union movement. 
The leaked secret draft to The Economist in May 1978, would be designed with one 
key area of concern; how to deal with the political threat from “the enemies of the 
next Tory government”.1229 This description of “enemies” is of seminal importance. 
I argue this language, this construction of an enemy, eschewing that of both Powell 
and Thatcher, redesigns a form of social and industrial contract of the post-war 
period. It realigns the nature of government, industry and labour relations, and 
legitimises a new moral code aimed at industrial activity – one that ultimately would 
lead to the scenes of violence at Orgreave and the deceit of the evidenced “Hit List”.  
There is no question that successive generations of politicians had grappled with the 
trade union question. Barbara Castle’s proposed white paper In Place of Strife 
attempted to challenge the culture of unofficial strikes and industrial unrest yet was 
to lead to a “humiliating” defeat, as did Edward Heath’s 1971 Industrial Relations 
Act. By the turn of the 1970s both Labour and Conservative Party had seen attempts 
                                                          
1229 Economic Reconstruction Group (1977). Report Final of the Nationalised Industries Policy Group. Margaret 
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to curb the excesses of trade union agitation and introduce legal constraints end in 
failure; the response of the 1974 Labour Government was to look to conciliation and 
dialogue – the development of the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
(ACAS). Though ultimately the “Winter of Discontent” was to discontinue Wilson’s 
Social Contract once and for all, there had been set an historical precedent of a 
relations formed with trade unions through dialogue – of attempts to broker 
agreement and wage negotiation.  
The adoption of Ridley’s plan ripped apart this agenda; there was now a need to 
“provoke a battle in a non-vulnerable industry.”1230 Negotiation with trade union 
leadership would become an historic footnote; there would be no more negotiation 
– no more reticence from government or conciliation; no more concessions or 
dialogue – only the need for a “chosen battle ground”. In ideological terms the worm 
had turned sharply in favour of an acceptance of conflict and confrontation. Indeed, 
Ridley’s report actively reflects a determination to pursue a solution to the trade 
union impasse of the 1970s through violence – this led directly to Orgreave in 1984. 
The progression to a “battle” led inextricably to the miners – the historical narrative 
lies cannily within the confines of Ridley’s blueprint for this combat – the targeting 
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of a specific industrial representative, the imposition of policy in vulnerable and 
bloated industries, the planning and preparation for a conclusive confrontation with 
a dominant industrial player and military policing techniques to ensure victory on 
the ground. 
The selected period between 1974 and 1984 reveals the processing of Ridley’s 
ideological brief. The primary research demonstrating a manipulation of coke stock 
and levels of “allowable imports”, the fallacy of a non-energy policy and the 
rejection of policy and scrutiny, to prepare for conflict, is revealed in full. The 
dialogue between Lawson and Brittan highlights an imposition of deceit to Cabinet, 
Parliament and the public that reveals an alarming precedent that post-Orgreave is 
still being negotiated today. There has been an historic tacit acknowledgement of the 
stockpiling of reserves, and this research demonstrates the full the existence and 
acceptance of this within the higher echelons of the New Right hierarchy in 
government. Again, it reflects an administration not content to observe the basic 
principles of sound government and energy policy designed to produce coherent and 
effective policy – to deliver energy policy of note to the UK population. This is a 
staggering observation – the rejection of statecraft policy – the administration of a 
nation’s energy and industrial needs to implement ideology. And this was to precede 
an ever-greater incendiary deceit – the existence of a pit closure “Hit List”.  
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This research demonstrates categorically an existence of the “Hit List” of UK coal 
plants. The production and importation of additional coal and coke supplies, the 
preceding deindustrialisation of BSC and the transfer of Ian MacGregor to the NCB 
all pre-empted the eventual targeting of the UK coal industry, the NUM and the 
closure of the coal industry as a viable, working industry. Secret cabinet papers I 
have revealed demonstrate the existence of this list, known by just seven people, 
whose effect was clear – that the National Coal Board’s pit closure programme, had, 
as evidenced, “Gone better this year than planned”.1231 The public statements of 
MacGregor and Thatcher was that there were only 20 target pit closures – in reality, 
as revealed was a proposed 75 over three years, with a loss of up to 64,000 jobs. This 
was to fit criteria – a precedent set by the deconstruction of BSC – where the 
proclamations of MacGregor and Thatcher’s inner cabal, without debate in the 
House of Commons and without Cabinet’s full consent, would instigate wholesale 
industrial sabotage of a prime UK raw material.  
The “Hit List” of which Scargill protested and yet was much maligned – it existed, 
and this primary research details this existence. From a Conservative Party of 
industrial conciliation to a Conservative Party that would engineer a grand scheme 
of denationalisation, firstly through the concessional trade unions at BSC and then 
                                                          
1231 PREM 19/1329 Report by the Official Group on Coal (MISC57) Secret CMO; Record of A Meeting Held at 
No.10 Downing Street 15th September. The National Archives of the UK (TNA) 
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their scalp – the NUM and a pit closure scheme. So sensitive an issue that Cabinet 
collective responsibility was jettisoned in favour of miscellaneous and 
unaccountable sub-committees of strategists, the plan was to deconstruct the coal 
fields of the UK; to redefine whole regions geographically, socially, politically and 
morally – to, as Ridley required, deconstruct. The pit closure scheme, so vehemently 
denied, and never officially recognised, I have evidenced through this research, is  
of vital significance to the history of the NUM and the now defunct coal fields of  
the UK.  
And what does The Ridley Report reflect of the Conservative Party? It reveals the 
decimation of a form of communal conservatism – the rejection of a middle ground, 
the seizure of a political party and reorganisation through dogma. It demonstrates a 
changing of identity – a metamorphosis of culture and personnel which was to 
transform the party. Through primary evidence I have demonstrated this ideological 
journey, encompassing a rejection of policy and the planning for the energy needs 
of a nation, to that of the creation of a timeline towards industrial confrontation – 
ultimately a “Hit List” of which this research categorically demonstrates the 
existence of. Regarding this research this is highly significant; the proven “Hit List” 
reveals not just the lengths to which a New Right were prepared to go to instigate 
industrial conflict but how far the Conservative Party had travelled – how far it had 
removed itself from the realities of statecraft and embraced the now all-
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encompassing dogma of its moral and economic agenda. The revelation of secret 
meetings and covert planning to implement the violence required by Ridley’s plan 
challenged the reality of what conservatism is and what the Conservative Party now 
stood for. This certainly was the case for the few remaining who were loyal to the 
remnants of One Nation conservatism – the “wets”.  
 
7.5 The 1984 Miners’ Strike 
The 1984 miners’ strike represents a conclusion to an implementation of a new form 
of relationship between the state and industrial relations. I have evidenced this 
process; the construct of an ideological vision – a moral crusade – a reinvigoration 
of the ideals of conservatism and the Conservative Party, a template for industrial 
reform, its implementation and ultimately the finality of confrontation – the 1984 
miners’ strike and most evidently “The Battle of Orgreave”. The conflict fits 
perfectly the narrative that this research has revealed; it presents the final piece of a 
jigsaw that would reveal a new social, economic and industrial dynamic within the 
UK. It is, I demonstrate, the fulfilment of New Right ideological strategy to replace 
statecraft.  
This is proven though primary source material revealing the existence of MISC 57. 
Willie Whitelaw’s secret internal letter to Margaret Thatcher dated July 1981, is 
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entitled Withstanding a Coal Strike – it dictates that the pause in preparation for a 
dispute would enhance “endurance potential” to be able to “study longer term 
aspects of the coal problem” including the “use for troops for moving stock”.1232 The 
evidence in MISC 57, starts as demonstrated, as early as 1981; it reveals the 
concerted effort to maintain an edifice of calm – of a pursuit of a “peaceful 
settlement” – until stocks were secured and preparation for conflict was complete. 
The “shadowy Whitehall committee”1233 that would sit in “extreme secrecy”1234 from 
February 1981, formulated meticulous long-term plans; this included the use of 
servicemen “in reserve until a strike started but a willingness to use for movement 
of ancillaries”1235 and the accumulation of a necessary “22 m.t. without provocation” 
of coke reserves. This demonstrates a clear rejection of Collective Cabinet 
responsibility, the end to corporate dialogue, the rejection of conciliatory dialogue – 
a symbolic end to One Nation conservatism and consensus politics.  
Confrontation was inevitable – and desired. The primary evidence I have 
demonstrated confirms the inevitability of the confrontation; the accumulation of 
coke stock, the pursuit of a “peaceful” settlement in 1981 against the backdrop of 
                                                          
1232 PREM19/541 MISC 57 W. Whitelaw (1981).  Internal Secret Memo; Willie Whitelaw to Margaret Thatcher - 
Withstanding a Coal Strike. The National Archives of the UK (TNA) 
1233 Marsden, S (2013). Thatcher made secret plans to bring in the military during the miners' strike. The Telegraph. 
Available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/margaret-thatcher/10213447/Thatcher-made-secret-plans-to-
bring-in-the-military-during-the-miners-strike.html 
1234 J. Campbell, The Iron Lady (Vintage Books, 2008), p.355 
1235 PREM19/541 MISC 57 (1981) report on MISC 57 meeting regarding planning for possible miners' strike. The National 
Archives of the UK (TNA) 
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mounting preparation for the assault on the NUM and the “slanted treatment of the 
use of servicemen”1236 during a UK industrial dispute. Indeed, the evidence of 
planning for confrontation counters the ideological line of a “non-energy policy” as 
advocated by Lawson – planning by a neoliberal, of an economist who would view 
planning as an anathema. Yet the paradox is clear; government energy planning did 
not fit with the orthodoxy of economic purity – it had connotations of socialism and 
collective identity; as Hugo Young argued, Thatcher “was not by heart a 
strategist”.1237 Yet this research demonstrates the long-term planning that was to fuel 
the conflict; this counters the light touch laissez-faire approach espoused by Lawson, 
Britten, Joseph and Howe; yet for the preparation for countering an industrial 
dispute, 
This increases the importance of building up stocks, and thereby 
endurance potential, for the future.1238 
This was pencilled in as early as July 1981 – some four years prior to Orgreave. This 
does not fit with the economic model of non-state interference and planning; it 
counters any formal Conservative Party economic policy of this period that was 
driven by a reticence for government intervention and of course Thatcherism’s 
                                                          
1236 Ibid 
1237 H. Young, One of Us (Macmillan, London), p.365 
1238 PREM19/541 MISC 57 W. Whitelaw (1981).  Internal Secret Memo; Willie Whitelaw to Margaret Thatcher - 
Withstanding a Coal Strike. The National Archives of the UK (TNA) 
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realignment of socialism’s culture of planning. Thatcherism would not advocate a 
planned economy, nationalised industries or long-term industrial strategy; that was 
a byword for the failure of 1974, the regression and U-turn of Heath and the 
obsession with planning and corporate culture. The entrepreneurial energy and 
immediacy of the individual, the small business and service culture, would reject the 
need for state planning; albeit allowing for the preparation for industrial conflict.  
This contradiction is important. I have evidenced through primary source material 
the rejection by Lawson of energy planning; the dialogue and debate with Leon 
Brittan as to the ideological conflict of interest of state intervention when importing 
coal stock and the deconstruction of BSC as a viable long-term industry. This was 
an administration that did not trust energy or industrial planning, and was 
intrinsically opposed to the ideals of a planned economy; yet the miners’ strike was 
planned in detail; MISC 57 documentation – the “group on coal” 1239reveals the 
extent of this planning for “endurance potential”1240 in the face of industrial conflict 
with the NUM – from 21 million tonnes of coke reserve in 1981 to 57 million tonnes 
in 1984 – there was mass planning on an industrial state scale, the likes that had 
rarely been witnessed before in peacetime Britain.  
                                                          
1239 Ibid.  
1240 Ibid.  
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Therefore, the reasoning behind planning for conflict does not sit easily with the 
economic and energy strategy of laissez-faire – it contradicts the notions of 
government policy to serve the nation’s energy and industrial requirements. The 
secrecy of MISC 57, the lack of accountability and public scrutiny I have evidenced; 
demonstrates the grander narrative beyond that of good governance, Parliamentary 
accountability and public scrutiny; the NUM and Arthur Scargill were not terror 
organisations, yet they were to be challenged in secrecy and defeat was planned 
within a shroud of covert meetings. It is beyond statecraft – it is the final construct 
of The Ridley Report and it was to be played out against a backdrop of an attack on 
a recognised industrial representative body – the NUM.  
The memories of the longest serving and successful political party are far reaching. 
The Conservative Party – certainly in the form of the New Right – remembered 
Saltley Gate and they remembered the fall of Edward Heath. Arthur Scargill had 
signed up with the National Union of Mineworkers as a lad of 19 in 1957 and had 
risen through the ranks to play a prominent role in the “Battle of Saltley Gate” when 
fifteen thousand Birmingham engineers walked out to support flying pickets of the 
NUM. This one event was to prove the catalyst for another battle, some ten years 
later at Orgreave. Here Scargill was to be arrested and condemned, seen as a fantasist 
in his claims of a “hit list” of pit closures and vilified, and ultimately to lose the 
conflict in 1984 and to slide into inconsequence and ignominy.  
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Scargill and the NUM were the required devils required for the New Right’s 
narrative. They were to lead the “mob” at Orgreave and to attempt to replicate Saltley 
Gate’s challenge to the establishment; this was not to happen, and yet for a New 
Right destined to succeed through the oxygen of confrontation, Scargill and the 
NUM, the combative militant loner and the largest trade union organisation in 
Western Europe, were the perfect symbol of an “enemy within”. As evidenced, The 
Ridley Report states;  
We should fragment the industries as far as possible. 
It will be very much easier to attempt a permanent form of 
denationalisation after we have achieved a certain degree of 
fragmentation. 
Next there are some industries that should be broken down1241 
I have demonstrated the implementation of Ridley’s ideologically driven plan for 
industrial deconstruction. Orgreave was to become a metaphor for industrial unrest 
and division; it presents a defining image of deconstruction – of an industry, a trade 
union, a way of life and community. It was to be a last stand for the British industrial 
                                                          
1241 Economic Reconstruction Group (1977). Report Final of the Nationalised Industries Policy Group. Margaret 
Thatcher Foundation. Available at: https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document 
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classes to retain a form of communal industrial heritage – the maintaining of 
community. And in certainly less graphic and violent terms, it was, I have evidenced, 
the end of a form of conservatism – of One Nation politics, as in its graphic 
disposition it revealed fragmentation and division, of police on horseback driving 
against striking miners, of police being attacked with bricks, bottles and rocks – of 
a necessary anarchy that was to ascribe itself to the NUM, the mining industry and 
to Arthur Scargill. This would never fit with the conservatism of Macmillan, Heath 
or indeed the “wets”.  
The year-long conflict defied any sense of national logic or pursuit of harmony – of 
national equilibrium. It was to reject conservatism, the Conservative Party and any 
notion of statecraft politics. It was planned and ruthlessly executed; it was in its 
perversity successful – yet it was a victory that came with so many caveats – the 
beginning of the end of the mining industry, the excessive billions of taxpayers’ 
money and ultimately the end of One Nation conservatism. Peter Walker, Thatcher’s 
sole “wet” and political survivor, was to maintain a stoic ignorance of the destruction 
of the coal fields; yet as the last of the “wets” – his consensual ambiguity seen as a 
neutral instrument by Thatcher – he was to be the last of a generation. The miners’ 
strike and certainly Orgreave graphically implemented the fragmentation of Ridley’s 
plan – the recognition of a necessary target and the culmination of this process. It is 
this process that I have presented and examined through primary sources; the 
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rejection of statecraft industrial and energy policy which reflected a Conservative 
Party at ease with the notion of an industrial class – to be replaced by the ideology 
of a New Right; of an imposition through conflict and fragmentation of a dogma, 
driven through an economic crusade against an industrial and political class.  
 
7.6 Conclusions 
The 1984 miners’ strike and the rejection of Conservative statecraft are, this research 
demonstrates, symbiotic in their nature. The structure of this thesis builds on 
evidence of a premeditated agenda aimed at destabilising established political and 
corporate structures – of which the NUM and the Conservative Party were a part. 
The research reveals a duality in the implementation of New Right ideology; to 
enforce an agenda of anti-inflationary and fiscal monetary policy, whilst propagating 
economic and individual freedoms; and so established pillars of British politics had 
to be removed. Both the Conservative Party and the trade union movement 
constituted parts of this failing post-war agenda. Consecutive post-war Conservative 
administrations had failed to solve the “trade union problem” and through statecraft 
policy of negotiation and conciliation, had actively failed in curing the “British 
disease”. Therefore, I demonstrate, the Conservative Party was complicit in the 
failure to confront head on the trade union question and end decline. To ensure the 
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successful implementation of New Right policy, the existing established status quo 
would have to be reconstructed. The structure of the Conservative Party, its 
adherence to consensus and pragmatic deference to statecraft theory could not be 
tolerated.  
The recognised corporate political establishment would be challenged and 
marginalised. This research demonstrates – through primary evidence – the planning 
for this change in political and industrial culture. The manipulation of UK national 
energy policy, the internal coup against One Nation “wets”, the covert, long-term 
preparation for industrial conflict with the NUM, the deconstruction of BSC, the 
deceiving of the UK public regarding a “Hit list” during the 1984 conflict and 
ultimately the manipulation of police and government established protocol at 
Orgreave – all demonstrate a consistent theme of an administration that was prepared 
to forego the accepted protocol of industrial, energy strategy and political orthodoxy. 
This represents a rejection of statecraft – of statecraft policy which priorities national 
and party unity to be replaced by an ideological and dogmatic agenda for national 
reconfiguration. 
This is evidenced by “The Battle of Orgreave”. The confrontation at Orgreave 
symbolised a cathartic moment for the New Right – its moment of destiny; an ugly 
and brutal dénouement of an industrial dogma that was conceived in 1977. Orgreave 
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physically demonstrates an implementation of The Ridley Report; the chosen 
battlefield, planning and preparation for conflict and a systematic implementation of 
force. It evidences the template of which the New Right had formulated – against 
both the trade union movement and internal dissention. Its symbolism, one that was 
to bring Harold Macmillan to tears, demonstrated a visceral violence against miners, 
and an end to the intellectual and philosophical battle that had been waging within 
the Conservative Cabinet. It is, as demonstrated, an endpoint on a road map of 
change, of whose germination was in 1974 and which was to ultimately end on the 
fields of Yorkshire.  
And both these events, the purging of both internal and external challenges, were 
predetermined by the New Right. Both the Conservative Party and the NUM were 
part and parcel of corporate, consensus post-war Britain. In their diversity, the 
classes they represented, the socio-economic backgrounds of the actors who led 
them, they were disparate. But more importantly they were also integral targets – in 
many ways connected by a common desire for a form of politics that the New Right 
despised – a continuation of a status quo and communal and cultural solidity. Both 
these political and corporate demographics understood these attributes; therefore, 
both would be targeted. One Nation conservatism has been marginalised as has the 
mining industry. The miners’ strike and the confrontation with the NUM, was an 
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obvious assault on the trade union movement, yet in order, I demonstrate, to achieve 
this goal, the nature of both the political party and One Nation conservatism as a 
force in British politics was to be reconstructed.  
Therefore, this research has contributed in key areas towards the literature of UK 
Conservative Party and trade union relations. Firstly, it has demonstrated that during 
an historical timeline between 1974 and 1984 the design and development of a 
conservatism was to reject statecraft and embrace an ideologically driven agenda. 
This is demonstrated using primary source material evidencing this construct and 
revealing a dedicated template to succeed in conflicts with the trade union 
movement. I have also evidenced the manufacture of this conflict without the 
knowledge of the full Cabinet, and to the detriment and undermining of One Nation 
Conservative “wets” in government.  
Secondly, the use of this primary evidence from miscellaneous cabinet source 
material clarifies the existence of a concerted effort to plan and undertake a conflict 
with the NUM from as early as 1981. The use of primary sources taken from secret 
cabinet records – MISC 57 – demonstrate conclusively the existence of a “hit list” 
of pit closures. Denied by the government yet categorically championed by Arthur 
Scargill, this paper can and does verify the existence of this “hit list” drawn up by 
the government and Ian MacGregor through secret talks with select cabinet officials 
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through MISC 57. Finally, I have detailed direct government influence on the 
policing of the miners’ strike; police activity at Orgreave, irrespective of local and 
national police protocol, did receive direct communication from individual members 
of Cabinet to defeat the NUM and to end the 1984 miners’ strike.  
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